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Abstract
One could hardly overstate the importance of economic growth and in-
novation as the engine of continuous improvement in the quality of life and well-
being. This dissertation seeks to improve our understanding of factors impacting
on economic growth and the process of innovating.
Chapter 1 underscores that exploring the relationship between competi-
tion and innovation requires consistency in the way innovation is measured and
proxied. It shows that a failure to do so can lead to conflicting conclusions on
how competition affects innovation.
Chapter 2 explores the literature on the relationship between business
cycles and innovation to argue that existing evidence is conflicting and implies
that research and development (R&D) activities respond positively to downturns
at the level of individual firms (i.e. are countercyclical) but negatively at that of
sectors and economies (i.e. are procyclical). The chapter explains this regularity
through the procyclicality of fluctuations in the number of R&D performers,
which offsets the countercyclicality of individual R&D profiles and makes it look
procyclical at the aggregate level.
Chapter 3 documents and analyses the positive link between the strength
of intersectoral connections within an economy, and its growth. To explain this
regularity, it develops a tractable theoretical framework whereby tighter con-
nections bring about stronger propagation downstream of productivity growth
episodes in individual firms and sectors. Analysing the framework yields stark
testable predictions on the most growth-enhancing structure of the intersectoral
linkage.
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Preface
Since the seminal works due to Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956), tech-
nological improvements have been shown to be the key engine of economic growth.
Even though this phenomenon is ultimately an outcome of individual decisions to
innovate and individual research and development effort, it had not been until the
contributions by Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) that the economic profession
has acquired a theoretical perspective on tracing technological growth down to
its micro-origins of economic agents’ innovations. Collectively, these works laid
the foundations of what came to be named endogenous growth theory.1
The establishment of micro-foundations for growth theory linked it with
firm- and sector-level studies of R&D and productivity within the industrial or-
ganisation literature, pursued since at least the 1950s – 1960s.2 Coupled with the
increasing availability of sector- and firm-level data, this paradigm development
has stimulated research into the role of various sectoral factors impacting on the
process of innovation within firms,3 and how this relates to aggregate outcomes
1See (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Chapter 1) for a summary of the field’s early evolution;
see Gancia and Zilibotti (2005), Aghion and Howitt (2005), Acemoglu (2009) Chapters 13, 14,
Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt (2014) for reviews of more recent developments in the area.
2See Griliches (1998).
3Alongside studying sectoral factors of innovation, another broad strand of the IO literature
has focused on the individual firm level. Examples of relevant factors of innovation investigated
in this literature include the size of a firm (literature on Gibrat’s law, see detailed reviews in
Symeonidis (1996) and Sutton (1997)), different dimensions of a firm’s ownership structure,
i.e. concentrated vs. disperse, state-owned vs. private, with foreign participation vs. without
x
such as economic growth.
Sectoral factors include, the intensity of intrasectoral competition, which
has been analysed since early theoretical contributions by Schumpeter (1943) and
Arrow (1962). The inconclusiveness of empirical evidence on the direction of the
link between competition and innovation has pushed the research in the direc-
tion of exploring (both empirically and theoretically) nonlinear characterisations
of the relationship between the two variables. Two early examples are Scherer
(1965) and Scherer (1967), with a more recent contribution being Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005). See Symeonidis (1996) and Gilbert (2006)
for a extended discussion of the literature.
Business cycles have been studied as another factor of innovation, following
the exploration of the topic by Schumpeter (1943). As Chapter 2 argues, this
branch of research has been characterised by a lack of agreement on whether
crises can spur innovative effort, which has led to the creation of approaches
explaining the possibility of business cycles’ both positive and negative impact
on innovation within a single framework. For a review of recent contributions to
this branch of research see Section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2 of the present work.
Among other sectoral factors of innovation under recent study one could
mention relative abundance/scarcity of different production factors as studied
within directed technical (technological) change literature initiated by the works
of Acemoglu (1998, 2002).4 The distribution of government spending across sec-
tors must be also considered another factor of innovation, as argued by Cozzi and
Impullitti (2010). Finally, it is worth pointing out at the configuration of produc-
tion links between sectors (also known as production networks), which Carvalho
such etc. (see discussions in Bishop and Wiseman (1999) and Choi, Hee, and Williams (2011)).
Another feature explored is the location of a firm, as studied in the context of agglomeration
and spatial knowledge spillovers (see Carlino and Kerr (2015)).
4A review of the literature and an introduction to its workhorse framework can be found
in (Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 15). See also Acemoglu (2007) for a discussion of the framework’s
general analytical properties.
xi
and Voigtländer (2015) show to be a significant contributor to technology adop-
tion by firms.
The first two chapters of this work belong directly to the first of the two
broad strands of literature outlined above: Chapter 1 explores further the re-
lationship between competition and innovation by studying the hypothesis of
a hump-shaped (inverted-U) relationship between the two phenomena due to
Aghion et al. (2005). The chapter suggests that observable properties of innov-
ation as function of competition depend crucially on how the former is prox-
ied/measured. It shows that the hypothesis is sensitive to whether innovation is
measured by effort (i.e., R&D spending) or outcomes/accomplishment, thereby
acting as a guidance tool for future attempts to validate the theory.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the link between business cycles and innova-
tion. It reconciles mixed evidence on the cyclicality of R&D spending by arguing
that the cyclical nature of innovative activities changes depending on the level
of aggregation: while R&D spending is countercyclical on the level of individual
firms, it becomes procyclical for sectors and economies. The chapter’s key ar-
gument is the idea of intensive versus extensive margin – the countercyclicality
of an individual firm’s R&D spending (intensive margin) becomes its opposite
through procyclical fluctuations in the number of R&D performers, which make
total R&D spending in a sector/economy (extensive margin) procyclical as well.
Chapter 3, while maintaining an intimate connection with studying how
certain aspects of sectoral and macroeconomic environment affect the dynamics
of innovative activities and economic growth, departs from the overarching theme
of the first two: in its focus is the interplay between the structure of an economy’s
intersectoral linkage and its growth rate. The chapter uses tools from network
theory5 to show that a greater strength of connections between sectors (i.e., their
greater reliance on other industries’ products used as intermediates) leads to
higher growth rates through the effect of network multiplier; in addition, it pins
5See Carvalho (2014) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) for an introduc-
tion to the fundamental tools and concepts of theory of macroeconomic networks.
xii
down the optimal growth-enhancing structure of a sectoral interlinkage.
The last chapter of this dissertation contains a brief summary of the dis-
sertation’s main results and conclusions, as well as suggestions for potential dir-
ections for future research.
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Chapter 1
The Relationship between R&D
and Competition: Reconciling
Theory and Evidence
The hypothesis of an inverted-U (hump-shaped) relationship between innov-
ation and competition due to Aghion et al. (2005), has been tested for different
data sets (Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), Askenazy, Cahn, and Irac (2013)) without
garnering conclusive support.
In this chapter we argue that this lack of agreement occurs owing to the
incompatibility of approaches employed in the papers (measuring innovation in
terms of R&D outcomes in Aghion et al. (2005), and by R&D effort in the other
two). We illustrate our point by developing a tractable general-equilibrium model,
in which a multitude of industries are populated by Cournot-competing firms en-
gaging in productivity-increasing R&D. While R&D outcomes in our model are
a hump-shaped function of competition, R&D effort can be observed to be either
increasing, decreasing, or hump-shaped, thus reproducing compatibly and recon-
ciling the results derived in both Aghion et al. (2005) and in Tingvall and Poldahl
(2006) and Askenazy et al. (2013). Furthermore, this result can act as a guidance
for further attempts to identify the hump-shaped pattern in data.
1
1.1 Introduction
The traditional view on how innovation is affected by competition has
been that the two have an inverse relationship. This conclusion naturally follows
from the Schumpeterian-style idea that heavier competitive pressure hampers
innovators from reaping all the fruits of their effort, thus discouraging R&D.
This line of reasoning can be traced back to the work of Schumpeter (1943), who
argued that ensuing monopoly power (and resulting profits) is a necessary reward
for bearing the costs of innovation. In addition, this idea follows from standard
industrial organisation models of product differentiation (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) and Salop (1979)) and has been encapsulated in the first-generation models
of endogenous growth (e.g., Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
This theoretical prediction, however, has grown to be challenged by the
body of evidence available: for example, empirical findings of Nickell (1996) and
Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1999) show competition and innovation to
have a positive relationship. In order to reconcile the theoretical prediction of
a negative relationship with these results, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith,
and Howitt (2005) used data on a panel of firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange to estimate a non-linear model of the relationship between the number
of registered patents and the degree of competition in an industry, which has
shown the two variables to be related in the inverted-U (hump-shaped) fashion.1
Several attempts to detect the presence of the hump-shaped pattern in
other datasets have been at most only partly successful. Tingvall and Poldahl
(2006), using a panel of Swedish firms, have shown the pattern to be fragile with
respect to the choice of the competition measure2 and the estimation procedure.3
1The authors also introduce a theoretical framework for their empirical results – see discus-
sion below in this section.
2Specifically, the hump-shaped pattern has been confirmed for the Herfindahl index, but
not for the Lerner (price to cost margin, PCM) index.
3The relationship between the Herfindahl index and R&D becomes insignificant if a fixed-
2
Askenazy, Cahn, and Irac (2013), using a panel of French firms, have confirmed
the presence of the hump-shaped pattern only for a subsample of large firms in
their dataset.4
A notable feature of both aforementioned studies is the use of R&D ex-
penditure as the measure of innovation, or, put differently, R&D effort – as op-
posed to R&D outcomes (R&D accomplishment),5 which is the case with Aghion
et al. (2005), who proxy R&D with the number of patents.6 Given the difference
in the approaches to gauging R&D, one can argue that the methods used by
Aghion et al. (2005) on one hand, and Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy
et al. (2013) on the other, can possibly be compatible with each other (and, hence,
the respective authors’ conclusions can be considered together) only if R&D ef-
fort and R&D outcomes, as functions of competition, are related monotonically
to each other.
This chapter argues that such a premise is not safe, by introducing a novel
theoretical framework whereby under some plausible assumptions, R&D outcomes
behave as a hump-shaped function of competition, while R&D effort can be ob-
served to depend on competition either monotonically (as either an increasing
or a decreasing function) or in a hump-shaped fashion. Introducing such a dis-
crepancy in patterns serves two purposes. First of all, it naturally reconciles the
contradictory conclusions by Aghion et al. (2005), Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)
and Askenazy et al. (2013) by pointing out that those are drawn using variables
behaving inconsistently with each other. Second – and more importantly – this
effects estimator is used.
4In order to explain the discrepancy in their results and those by Aghion et al. (2005),
Askenazy et al. (2013) advance a model in which the hump-shaped pattern manifests itself
more pronouncedly for large companies – see discussion below in this Section.
5The latter term is used by Griliches (1998).
6It is worth mentioning here that Aghion et al. (2005) admit they could not obtain a
statistically significant confirmation of their results when using R&D investment as a measure
of innovation either, which they explain by an insufficient number of observation periods for
that variable in their sample – see (Aghion et al., 2005, pp. 707–708).
3
chapter has the merit of bringing additional methodological awareness (with re-
gards to approaches to proxying innovation) to studying the relationship between
competition and innovation in general, and the efforts to confirm the hypothesis
of the hump-shaped relationship between the two, in particular.
To illustrate the chapter’s key intuition, suppose that R&D effort γ is a
function g(m;χ) of competition (as measured by some parameter m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯])
and a set of other parameters χ. The standard logic, which implicitly underlies
the shift from R&D outcomes to R&D effort in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)
and Askenazy et al. (2013), suggests that if q stands for R&D outcomes, it is
technologically related to γ through an increasing function R(γ; θ) (where θ are
other affecting parameters). Thus, the signs of m’s effects on q ( ∂q
∂m
= ∂R
∂γ
·
∂g
∂m
) and on γ ( ∂γ
∂m
= ∂g
∂m
) have to coincide, which allows one to treat γ and q
equivalently. By contrast, R&D outcomes in our model are related to R&D effort
via function R′(γ;m; θ), which increases in γ and in addition, directly depends on
competition. In this case, the signs of competition’s effects on the two aspects of
innovation are determined by expressions: ∂q
∂m
= ∂R
′
∂γ
· ∂g
∂m
+ ∂R
′
∂m
>
< 0 and
∂γ
∂m
= ∂g
∂m
>
<
0, and no longer have to coincide. In particular, when ∂γ
∂m
maintains the same
sign for any m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], whereas that of ∂q
∂m
changes from positive to negative
at some point “mq ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], a situation of discrepancy in the observed behaviour
of γ and q occurs.7
The logic above drives the general-equilibrium framework presented in the
chapter. In the framework, R&D effort is exerted by Cournot-competing firms
populating a multitude of homogeneous industries, and R&D outcome is the
resulting increase in a firm’s productivity. First of all, R&D effort is a hump-
shaped function of competition, which reflects the interaction of two forces: on one
hand, the upward locus of the hump is driven by the escape-costs effect: increasing
competition (which we model as the number of firms in an industry) translates
into more intense rivalry for production factors, which pushes up factor prices
and, thereby, producers’ marginal costs. In this situation, as a counteracting
7The author wishes to thank Prof. David Ulph for this interpretation.
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response, firms are prompted to invest more in R&D. This force is opposed by
the division effect, whereby more competition (as expressed through a larger
number of firms) implies a smaller size of each one of them, thus driving down
the individual amount of R&D effort.8
R&D outcomes in our framework experience the impact of competition
both through R&D effort, and directly through the absence of the scale effect (as
opposed to R&D effort) and congestion. The former encapsulates Gibrat’s law,
whereby the growth rate of a firm is independent of its size,9 while the conges-
tion (‘fishing-out’) effect reflects the duplication of firms’ R&D effort, as it is
exerted simultaneously by all firms in every industry, and “. . . when many firms
are undertaking R&D, . . . they are likely to try similar ideas; thus there will be
some amount of external diminishing returns”, – put differently, in the situation
of simultaneous engagement in R&D firms are ‘fishing out of the same pond’
(Acemoglu, 2009, p. 473).10,11
In light of the above, switching from considering R&D effort to R&D
outcomes removes one impending effect (division) and introduces another (con-
gestion), thus creating a leftward shift (if the congestion effect is relatively weaker
than the division effect) or a rightward one (otherwise) in the R&D outcomes as a
function of competition. Analysing the framework pins down exactly conditions
when these shifts are such that R&D outcomes have the hump region within
the range competition indicator’s range of possible values, while the opposite is
8The last argument relies on the stylised fact that the intensity of R&D effort (as usually
measured by the ratio of R&D spending to total sales) is independent of a firm’s size, i.e. R&D
on average makes up a fixed proportion of an innovator’s size (see Klette and Kortum (2004)).
9See Box 1 for a discussion.
10The logic of this assumption follows the one employed in the premises of the framework
developed in (Acemoglu, 2009, Sec. 14.3) and further generalised in Acemoglu and Cao (2015).
11Note that the presence of the congestion effect does not rule out the possibility of knowledge
spillovers: while those imply the presence of intertemporal dimension (i.e., benefiting from
someone else’s previous research), our setting describes firms’ conducting R&D simultaneously,
which results in duplication of their effort.
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true for R&D effort, so that a situation of discrepancy in innovation measures’
patterns occurs.12
1.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. First and foremost,
similarly to Aghion et al. (2005), d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-
Varet (2010), Askenazy et al. (2013), Onori (2015), we study the phenomenon of
a hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation in the context
of a general equilibrium model.
Aghion et al. (2005) put forward a model of step-by-step innovation, in
which a multitude of an economy’s industries (each populated by two firms) can
exist in two states: neck-and-neck (both firms employ technologies of the same
level) or levelled (one of firms has a technological lead over the other). In the
former state, tougher competition prompts firms to step up their R&D efforts in
order to escape competition; in the latter R&D decreases in competition: due
to the Arrow replacement effect (introduced by Arrow (1962)), the technological
leader does not innovate, whereas the laggard is discouraged from undertaking
R&D by the prospect of facing (in the case of his success) fiercer competition
with the former leader. The hump-shaped pattern emerges in the model on
the economy-wide level: if the degree of competition is low, firms’ incentives to
escape competition are weak, so most industries are in the neck-and-neck state:
therefore, tougher competition intensifies R&D in the majority of industries and
impedes it in the minority represented by the levelled industries, thus having a
positive overall impact on R&D on the economy scale (the reverse logic applies
when the initial level of competition is already high).13
12See Figures 1.3a and 1.3b for an illustration.
13It is worth noting here that the authors’ framework suggests a firm’s R&D intensity to
increase with its size, which is generally not supported by empirical evidence available (see e.g.
Cohen and Klepper (1996), Klette and Griliches (2000)). This property is also inherited by the
model of Askenazy et al. (2013), which builds upon the framework by Aghion et al. (2005) (see
6
In the framework due to d’Aspremont et al. (2010), a multitude of firms in
every industry simultaneously exert R&D effort, which with a fixed probability
yields a decrease in the marginal costs of a successful innovator. If innovations
are not drastic (i.e. the gap between R&D winners’ and losers’ marginal costs is
not too wide, so that the latter stay in the industry), fiercer competition on one
hand raises the sales of successful innovators (at the expense of losers), but, on
the other hand, drags down all firms’ price mark-ups. The superposition of the
two effects brings about a hump-shaped pattern in firms’ expected profits, which
translates into the relationship between firms’ R&D effort and competition.
Onori (2015) develops a modification of the standard Schumpeterian cre-
ative destruction model due to Aghion and Howitt (1992), in which R&D labor-
atories create and sell the blueprints of new technologies to Cournot-competing
producers of intermediate goods, who experience spillover effects of sales volumes
(both their own and those of the other firms in the industry) on their marginal
cost of production. As the author shows, if the effect of learning from other firms
is stronger than that of intra-firm (‘in-house’) learning, the economy’s aggregate
innovation rate can be an inverted-U function of competition, as measured by the
number of firms. If the initial number of competitors is low, its increase allows
each one of them to learn from a larger number of sources, thus raising their
profits (by driving down their costs) and in turn providing the R&D laboratories
with greater incentives to innovate.14
The work by Askenazy et al. (2013) attempts to reconcile their empirical
conclusions with those by Aghion et al. (2005) by building a model upon the
latter authors’ framework, in which the cost of innovation is assumed to decrease
with a firm’s size. Thus, the hump-shaped pattern becomes more pronounced for
below).
14As is commonly assumed in the literature, blueprints created by R&D laboratories are
sold to the intermediate goods producers at the competitive price, which in this case equals the
increase in the latter’s profits. Therefore, such an increase directly translates into that of the
equal magnitude (and, hence, stronger incentives to innovate) for the R&D laboratories.
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larger firms, as observed in the authors’ empirical results.
We believe that this chapter contributes to the reviewed body of literature
by stressing the difference in the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes
with regards to competition intensity, through demonstrating that the latter can
be a hump-shaped function of competition even though the former is not – a
distinction that is not made in any of the aforementioned papers, which prevents
them from accommodating the inconsistency of the results by Aghion et al. (2005)
on one hand, and Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) and Askenazy et al. (2013) on the
other.
Furthermore, our theoretical contribution brings additional methodolo-
gical awareness with regards to approaches to proxying innovation, to the em-
pirical literature inspired by the work of Aghion et al. (2005) discussed above,
and, as we hope, will help to guide future efforts to confirm the hypothesis of the
hump-shaped relationship between competition and innovation.
Additionally, in our model we suggest a novel mechanism producing the
hump-shaped pattern, which comprises the superposition of the escape-costs ef-
fect and the division effect ( in the case of R&D effort) and that of escape-costs
effect and congestion (for R&D outcomes).
Apart from the body of literature presented above, this chapter is related
to a few other strands of research. First of all, it belongs to the literature investig-
ating the link between market structure and innovation in the general-equilibrium
macroeconomic context (examples of contributions in the area are Peretto (1996)
and Impullitti and Licandro (2018)). In addition, by highlighting the differences
between the behaviour of R&D effort and that of R&D outcomes on the theoret-
ical level, our model is related to the works by Link (1980) and Pohlmeier (1992),
where those differences are underscored in the context of empirical IO studies.
Lastly, our model can be thought of as a general-equilibrium generalisation
of the stylised model by Cohen and Klepper (1996), which allows it, similarly to
the authors’ model, to match a number of stylised regularities of R&D, includ-
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ing:15
1. R&D expenditure increases in a firm’s output size (Cohen and Klepper,
1996, Stylised fact 2, p. 928);
2. The elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to the volume of a firm’s
output is unity (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 3, p. 929);
3. R&D productivity (defined as the ratio of R&D accomplishment to R&D
effort) decreases with a firm’s size (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 4,
p. 930): in our model, the resulting increase in productivity is independent
of the firm’s output, whereas R&D effort is linear in the latter, so that in
the long-run their ratio diminishes to zero.
1.1.2 Structure of the Chapter
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 1.2 the model is
presented and solved: Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 introduce the model’s equations;
in Section 1.2.3 we describe the equilibrium conditions in intermediate-good mar-
kets, solve for firms’ optimal decisions on production and R&D investment, and
establish the conditions under which the hump-shaped patterns in R&D effort
and R&D accomplishment emerge; Section 1.2.4 enquires into the behaviour of
the aggregate household to pin down the economy’s behaviour in the long-run.
Section 1.3 is devoted to investigating the conditions under which the situations
of discrepancy in the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes occur, and
checking the empirical compatibility of the model’s predictions. In particular,
given that our results depend crucially on the value of the elasticity of substitu-
tion between inputs, we start with assessing the range of its values compatible
with our model’s setting (Section 1.3.1), after which we proceed to deriving the
discrepancy conditions in Section 1.3.2 and discussing their empirical plausibility
in Section 1.3.3. The last section concludes.
15More recently these regularities were revisited and confirmed by Klette and Kortum (2004).
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1.2 The Model
The model presented in this section describes an economy where the final
good is produced competitively using inputs supplied by industries populated
by homogeneous Cournot-competitive firms. Each firm engages in production
and R&D (which leads to a decrease in a firm’s marginal costs). Both R&D
effort (R&D spending in the model) and R&D outcomes (a drop in marginal costs)
are shown to be hump-shaped functions of competition in an industry, whose
peaks do not generally coincide. This can bring about a situation of discrepancy
in the observed behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes, exact conditions
for which are formally investigated in Section 1.3.
1.2.1 Aggregate Production
Suppose that final output is produced competitively using the CES tech-
nology
Y (t) =
 N∫
0
y(i; t)
ξ−1
ξ di

ξ
ξ−1
(1.1)
where N is the number of homogeneous industries, y(i; t) = y(t) is the i-th
industry’s output at t, and ξ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs.
We assume the final good to be the numeraire, so that its price equals 1 at every t.
Each industry is populated by a constant mass m(i) = m of homogeneous
10
Cournot-competing firms,16 so that an industry’s output equals
y(i; t) =
m(i)∫
0
y˜(i; j; t) dj = my˜(t) (1.2)
Throughout the chapter, we use tildes to denote firm-specific variables.
In what follows, we use m as a measure of competition (similarly to Onori
(2015)): although the number of firms in an industry is not among standard meas-
ures of competition, the model’s m maps monotonically into those – in particular,
the Herfindahl17 and Lerner18 indices.19 Since we are interested in investigating
the relationship between competition and different aspects of R&D, we consider
the latter in strictly oligopolistic environment, so that m > m
¯
≡ 2 through-
out the chapter, similarly to existing theoretical literature (Aghion et al. (2005),
d’Aspremont et al. (2010), Askenazy et al. (2013), Onori (2015)).
16The main reason we use the Cournot-competition mechanism in our model is because
it establishes a negative relationship between the number of firms per industry m and their
mark-ups (see (1.15) and the following discussion), which in turn gives rise to the escape-costs
effect introduced below. Alternatively, one could use the direct approach suggested in Galí
(1994) and Galí (1995), and later used in Comin and Gertler (2006), wherein the elasticity of
substitution ξ(m) is posited to be an increasing function of the number of firms (in particular,
Comin and Gertler (2006) use the following functional form: ξ(m) = 1+Dm
χ
Dmχ , so that the mark-
up is a constant elasticity function of m: µ(m) = Dmχ).
17The Herfindahl index is calculated as IH =
∑m
i=1 δ
2
i , where δi is the market share of the
i-th firm. Since in our framework all firms are homogeneous, the Herfindahl index equals 1m .
18A firm’s Lerner index equals IL = p−ψp (the notations are taken from the model). As
follows from equation (1.15), the model’s Lerner index for each firm equals 1ξm .
19For a detailed discussion, see (Martin, 2002, pp. 335–338) and references cited therein.
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1.2.2 Individual Firms
Each firm seeks to maximise its profits by choosing the volume of output
and the amount of R&D effort γ˜(i; j; t)
p˜i(i; j; t) =
(
p(i; t)− ψ˜(i; j; t)
)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t) (1.3)
where ψ˜(i; j; t) is the average/marginal cost of producing the i-th intermediate
good by the j-th firm.20
A firm produces its output using a Cobb-Douglas technology of unitary
homogeneity by employing capital (k˜(i; j; t)) and labour (l˜(i; j; t)), both provided
by the economy’s households in competitive markets
y˜(i; j; t) = q˜(i; j; t)Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
=
= q˜(i; j; t)Q(t) k˜(i; j; t) ν l˜(i; j; t) 1−ν
(1.4)
whereQ(t) is the economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) level, and q˜(i; j; t)
is its increase for the j-th firm, generated by its individual R&D effort by means
of the following technology
q˜(i; j0; t) = η
 γ˜(i; j0; t)
Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
α×
×
 m(i)∫
0
γ˜(i; j; t)
Q(t)F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)dj
−β ,
α > β > 0
(1.5)
where α and −β are, respectively, the perceived elasticity of q˜ with respect to a
firm’s own R&D effort, and the elasticity of q˜ with respect to aggregate R&D effort
in the industry. In what follows, we interpret q˜(i; j; t) as the R&D outcome being
brought about by R&D effort γ˜(i; j; t). We assume that firms do not take into
account their impact on aggregate R&D effort within an industry
∫ m(i)
0
γ˜∗(i; t) di.
20We slightly abuse notation by equating average costs to marginal costs, but this claim is
valid in this instance, since firms in our model use a linearly homogeneous technology.
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Box 1.1: Factor Scale Independence
Despite the fact that the average quantities of production factors employed by firms,
have been growing steadily in the last thirty years (see Figures 1.1a and 1.1b), that
dynamics has not translated into a persistent growth of TFP growth rates (see
fig. 1.2), which have remained stationary throughout the observation period (1977 –
2013) (see Figure 1.2).
1980 1990 2000 2010
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Real capital
per firm,
mln. 2005US$
(a) Average real capital per firm.
1980 1990 2000 2010
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35
40
45
Years
Employees
per firm
(b) Average workers per firm.
Figure 1.1: Average quantities of production factors employed, US data.
Data source: Feenstra et al. (2015).
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−2%
0%
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4%
Avg.∆TFP≈
≈ 0.863%
Years
∆TFP
Figure 1.2: Percentage changes in TFP levels, US data.
Data sources: Feenstra et al. (2015), Jarmin and Miranda (2002)
We would also like to mention a few additional supporting considerations in
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favour of our assumption of TFP growth’s factor scale independence. First of all,
from the IO perspective, we can refer to Gibrat’s law stating that a firm’s growth
rate is independent of its size.21As shown below, a firm’s growth rate is that of the
economy, which (in the long-run) is linear in the natural logarithm of q˜ – therefore,
its behaviour is compatible with Gibrat’s law if the latter is independent of a firm’s
size.22
From the growth perspective, the scale-independence assumption separates
the economy’s growth rate from the amounts of production factors it possesses, thus
removing scale effects, whose presence in models of economic growth (especially
those of endogenous growth) has been criticised.23
In order to bound q˜ from below we assume that zero R&D effort does not
change the current level of productivity, so that the latter’s incremental multi-
plier q˜(i; j; t) equals one: γ˜(i; j; t) = 0 ⇒ q˜(i; j; t) = 1, i.e. a firm’s productivity
does not change. In what follows, we assume that η is suitably high, so that the
situation when innovation is absent, never occurs.
Dividing every instance of γ˜ by F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
in (1.5) results in q˜’s
being independent of the amount of production factors employed by a firm, which
we motivate by empirical regularities observed in US data (see Box 1.1).
We follow existing literature (see, e.g., (Acemoglu, 2009, Section 14.3),
Acemoglu and Cao (2015)) in assuming that ideas are fished out: in terms of our
model, β is strictly positive, so that it reflects the inhibiting effect of aggregate
21See a detailed discussion in Sutton (1997). Although the consensus appears not to support
the law for small/young firms, it seems to apply to large/old companies (see, e.g., Sutton (1997),
Klette and Griliches (2000), Lotti, Santarelli, and Vivarelli (2009)). Given that our model does
not allow for entry/exit of new producers, every existing firm eventually becomes ‘old’, which
ultimately makes it amenable to Gibrat’s law.
22Although F
(
k˜(i; j; t) ; l˜(i; j; t)
)
is not equal to a firm’s amount of production y˜(i; j; t), the
assumption of factor scale independence results in the optimal value of q˜(i; j; t) being independ-
ent of y˜(i; j; t) as well (see (1.22)).
23This line of criticism is also known as Jones’ critique after Jones (1995) – among other
works on the problem, see Young (1998), Howitt (1999), Jones (1999).
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research effort on individual R&D productivity within a firm. Thus, β can be
interpreted as the congestion parameter, which captures the depletion of the stock
of available ideas as those are being searched for simultaneously by a multitude of
firms (as put in (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 472), ‘fishing from the same pond’).24 Note
that, in spite of the congestion component being present in (1.5), q˜(t) is still an
increasing function of individual research effort γ˜(i; j; t) for every fixed level of
competition m (see (1.9)), which is achieved by setting α > β.
Similarly to Aghion and Howitt (1992), Howitt (1999), d’Aspremont et al.
(2010), the economy-wide TFP level Q(t) grows as a by-product of the individual
research activity. In particular, we model the growth rate of Q(t) as the logarithm
of the average of individual q˜(i; j; t)-s across the economy
gQ(t) ≡ Q˙(t)
Q(t)
= ln
 1
N
N∫
0
m(i)∫
0
q˜(i; j; t)
m(i)
djdi
 (1.6)
We opt for the logarithmic function in (1.6) primarily because the equation’s cor-
responding discrete-time (i.e., observable) version takes the natural form Qt+1 =(
1
N
∫ N
0
∫ m(i)
0
q˜(i;j;t)
m(i)
djdi
)
Q(t),25 which makes our results comparable to pieces of
empirical evidence used later in the chapter (see Section 1.3.3). Equation (1.6)
completes the introduction of the model’s production side.
1.2.3 Industry Equilibrium
We shall start solving the model by transforming formulae (1.2), (1.4)–
(1.6) given the symmetry of all firms and industries (y(i; t) = y(t) ∀i)
Y (t) = N
ξ
ξ−1y(t) (1.7)
y˜(i; j; t) = y˜(t) = q˜(t)Q(t)F
(
K(t)
Nm
;
L(t)
Nm
)
= q˜(t)Q(t)
K(t) νL(t) 1−ν
Nm
(1.8)
24A similar assumption is made in, e.g., Impullitti (2016).
25See footnote 38.
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q˜(i; j; t) = q˜(t) = ηm−β
 γ˜(t)
Q(t)F
(
K(t)
Nm
; L(t)
Nm
)
α−β (1.9)
gQ(t) = ln q˜(t) (1.10)
Note that function (1.9) represents a particular form of R′(γ;m; θ) from the styl-
ised model discussed in the Introduction: q˜(t) = ηγ˜(t) α−βmα−2β
(
N
Q(t)F (K(t);L(t))
)α−β
.
Before specifying the behaviour of intermediate firms, we will derive the
demand function for an intermediate input from profit maximisation in the the
final-good sector
p(i; t) = p(t) =
∂Y (t)
∂y(i; t)
= Y (t)
1
ξ y(t) −
1
ξ (1.11)
Since Y (t) is a linear homogeneous function of y(i; t), the Euler theorem can be
brought to bear to obtain the expression: Y (t) =
∫ N
0
∂Y (t)
∂y(i;t)
y(i; t) di = Np(t) y(t).
Combining the last equation with the assumption of firms’ homogeneity pins
down the price of an intermediate good (in terms of the final good’s price)
Y (t) = N
ξ
ξ−1y(t) = Np(t) y(t)⇔
⇔ p(t) = p = N 1ξ−1
(1.12)
Given the constancy of each intermediate input’s price, we can solve a
firm’s problem. We shall start with rewriting the cost function. Since the pro-
duction function is Cobb-Douglas, a firm’s cost function takes the form26
ψ˜(i; j; t) =
1
q˜(i; j; t)Q(t)
(
R(t)
ν
)ν (
w(t)
1− ν
)1−ν
≡ ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
(1.13)
where w(t) and R(t) are the factor prices of labour and capital, respectively.
Given (1.13), the profit function can be rewritten as follows
p˜i(i; j; t) = p(i; t) y˜(i; j; t)− ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t) (1.14)
26See (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene, 1995, p. 142).
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Since all firms are homogeneous, maximising (1.14) with respect to y˜ yields
the standard result for the price charged in each industry
∂p˜i(t)
∂y˜(t)
≡ Y (t) 1ξ y(t) − 1ξ − 1
ξ
Y (t)
1
ξ y(t) −
1
ξ
y˜(t)
y(t)
− ψ(t)
q˜(t)
= 0
p∗(t)− 1
ξm
p∗(t) =
ψ(t)
q˜(t)
p∗(t) =
ξm
ξm− 1 ·
ψ(t)
q˜(t)
⇔ ψ(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜(t) (1.15)
where the second expression in (1.15) follows from (1.12). Given the first expres-
sion in (1.15), p∗(t) can be rewritten as p∗(t) = (1 + µ) ψ(t)
q˜(t)
, where µ = 1
ξm−1 is
the price mark-up (price-cost margin), whose inverse relationship with the mass
of firms in an industry m is an implication of Cournot-competition between firms.
Given the functional form of µ and our premise that m > 2, we restrict ξ to be
strictly greater than 1
2
.
Since the factor markets are perfectly competitive, the problem of maxim-
ising p˜i with respect to y˜ is equivalent to maximising it with respect to amounts
of capital and labour employed (without taking into consideration the impact
of k˜(t) and l˜(t) on q˜(t)), which allows one to express the economy’s equilibrium
factor prices
max
y˜
{
p(i; t) y˜(i; j; t)− ψ(t)
q˜(i; j; t)
y˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t)
}
⇔ (1.16)
⇔max
k˜;l˜
{
p(i; t) q˜(i; j; t)Q(t) k˜(i; j; t) ν l˜(i; j; t) 1−ν−
− R(t) k˜(i; j; t)− w(t) l˜(i; j; t)− γ˜(i; j; t)
} (1.17)
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∂p˜i
∂k˜
= 0⇔ R(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
p(t) q˜(t)Q(t)F ′
k˜
(
k˜(t) ; l˜(t)
)
=
= ν
ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜(t)Q(t)
(
L(t)
K(t)
)1−ν
=
ξm− 1
ξm
MPK(t)
(1.18)
∂p˜i
∂l˜
= 0⇔ w(t) = ξm− 1
ξm
p(t) q˜(t)Q(t)F ′
l˜
(
k˜(t) ; l˜(t)
)
=
= (1− ν) ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜(t)Q(t)
(
K(t)
L(t)
)ν
=
ξm− 1
ξm
MPL(t)
(1.19)
The term ξm−1
ξm
= 1
1+µ
reflects the distortive impact of monopoly power on factor
prices in the economy: the greater it is (or, put equivalently, the higher oligopol-
ists’ mark-ups are) the more pronounced the deviation of R(t) and w(t) becomes
from the marginal products of capital and labour (MPK(t) and MPL(t), respect-
ively), determining factor prices in a competitive economy.
Turning to characterising firms’ decisions on R&D investment, differenti-
ating (1.14) with respect to γ˜ leads to the expression
q˜′γ˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t)) 2
y˜(i; j0; t) =
1
ψ(t)
⇔ q˜
′
γ˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
y˜(i; j0; t) =
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
ψ(t)
α
y˜(i; j0; t)
γ˜(i; j0; t)
=
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
ψ(t)
⇔ γ˜(i; j0; t) = αy˜(i; j0; t) ψ(t)
q˜(γ˜(i; j0; t))
(1.20)
γ˜∗(t) = αN
1
ξ−1 y˜(t)
ξm− 1
ξm
(1.21)
where expression (1.21) follows from (1.12). A noteworthy feature of equa-
tion (1.21) is that the elasticity of γ˜∗(t) with respect to y˜(t) is unity, which
matches a widely recognised stylised fact on R&D.27 This result can be inter-
preted along the lines of reasoning advanced by Cohen and Klepper (1996): as a
firm’s output increases, so does, for two reasons, the total effect of R&D. Firstly,
27See, e.g. Klette and Griliches (2000).
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with a larger scale of production, the costs of R&D can be spread across a larger
level of output; secondly, the drop in production costs resulting from R&D, ap-
plies to a larger number of items produced, thus increasing a firm’s gains, thereby
encouraging further R&D effort.
Plugging (1.21) into (1.9) yields the final expression for q˜∗
q˜(t) = ηm−β
 γ˜(t)
F
(
K(t)
Nm
; L(t)
Nm
)
α−β = ηm−β
αN 1ξ−1 ξm−1ξm q˜(t)F
(
K(t)
Nm
; L(t)
Nm
)
F
(
K(t)
Nm
; L(t)
Nm
)
α−β
q˜∗(t) = q˜∗ = E
(
ξm− 1
ξm
α
α−β
) α−β
1−(α−β)
, E ≡
(
αα−βη N
α−β
ξ−1
) 1
1−(α−β) (1.22)
Together, equations (1.21) and (1.22) pin down the equilibrium level of
profits accruing to a firm
p˜i∗(t) =
(
(1 + µ)
ψ(t)
q˜∗
− ψ(t)
q˜∗
)
y˜(t)− αψ(t)
q˜∗
y˜(t)
p˜i∗(t) = (µ− α) ψ(t)
q˜∗
y˜(t) = (µ− α)ψ(t)Q(t)F
(
K(t)
Nm
;
L(t)
Nm
)
p˜i∗(t) =
µ− α
Nm
(
R(t)K(t)
ν
)ν (
w(t)L(t)
1− ν
)1−ν
p˜i∗(t) =
µ− α
Nm
ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜∗Q(t)K(t) νL(t) 1−ν =
µ− α
Nm
ξm− 1
ξm
Y (t) (1.23)
where the last equation follows from substituting expressions (1.18) and (1.19)
for, respectively, R(t) and w(t).
Note that the optimal solution for p˜i(t) can potentially be negative if
term µ − α is so. This property comes from the fact that R&D effort enters
the profit function in the fixed-cost form. In what follows, we require that the
19
term be non-negative, which sets the upper bound on the number of firms per
industry
α 6 µ = 1
ξm− 1 ⇔ m 6 m¯ =
1 + α
αξ
(1.24)
As the final step in deriving a firm’s optimal solution, combining (1.21)
and (1.22) allows one to express γ˜∗(t) as a function of the economy’s production
factors. By plugging (1.22) into (1.21) and using y˜(t) = q˜(t)Q(t)
Nm
F (K(t) ;L(t)), we
have
γ˜∗(t) =
αE
N
ξ−2
ξ−1
(
ξm− 1
ξm2−α+2β
) 1
1−(α−β)
Q(t)F (K(t) ;L(t)) (1.25)
One can show that both q˜∗ and γ˜∗(t) (once the dynamics of Q(t), K(t)
and L(t) is controlled for)28 may be related to the degree of competition in the
hump-shaped fashion – the following propositions specify the conditions under
which this obtains.
Proposition 1.1. Let “mq = αβξ and α < 1 + β. Then q˜
∗ is increasing ∀m < “mq
and is decreasing otherwise, so that “mq is q˜∗(t)’s global maximum. Therefore,
when α > 2βξ ⇔ “mq > 2 and “mq < m¯, the hump-shaped pattern in the relation-
ship between competition and innovation outcomes becomes observable.
Proof. Follows from calculating dq˜
dm
and applying the method of intervals. 
The hump-shapedness of q˜∗ is achieved through the superposition of two
forces: on one hand, if we assume for a moment that β = 0, q˜∗ becomes an
increasing function of the mass of firms in an industry: as follows from (1.12), each
industry’s price is fixed (relative to the price of the consumption good), which,
together with a firm’s pricing rule (1.15), has the general-equilibrium implication
that for any fixed value of q˜∗, firms’ effective marginal costs ψ(t)
q˜∗ increase in the
28Controlling for industry-specific and time-specific effects is a standard feature of empirical
analyses in the field – see Aghion et al. (2005), Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), Askenazy et al.
(2013).
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degree of competition, which prompts them to invest more in R&D as an attempt
to drive effective costs down through increasing their productivity, and greater
R&D effort translates into better R&D outcomes (the escape-costs effect).29 On
the other hand, the effect’s impact is counteracted by the ‘fishing-out’ effect
discussed above. As suggested by Proposition 1.1, the escape-costs effect prevails
for lower values of m (below “mq), whereas the opposite is true for m > “mq.
Note that, as suggested by the formula for “mq, the relative strength of the
escape-costs effect decreases in the elasticity of substitution ξ: if it is low, then
the mark-up wedge µ between costs and prices is further from zero, and hence
an increase in m has a greater impact on µ, prompting firms to invest more in
R&D. In addition, rather naturally, the markedness of the hump-shaped pattern
increases in α, since higher productivity of innovation induces more R&D effort.
Proposition 1.2. Let “mγ = 2−α+2β1−α+2β
1
ξ
. If α < 1 + 2β, then γ˜∗(t) is increas-
ing ∀m < “mγ and is decreasing otherwise, so that “mγ is γ˜∗(t)’s global max-
imum. Therefore, when 2 < “mγ < m¯, the hump-shaped pattern in the relation-
ship between competition and innovation effort becomes observable. Otherwise
when α > 1 + 2β, γ˜∗(t) is an increasing function of m.
Proof. Follows from calculating dγ˜
∗(t)
dm
and applying the method of intervals. 
In the case of the hump-shaped pattern in R&D effort, the escape-costs
effect is present in γ˜∗(t) both directly, as reflected by term ψ(t)
q˜
in (1.20) (and
equivalently, term ξm−1
ξm
in (1.21)) and indirectly, as encapsulated in productivity
term q˜∗ entering y˜(t) = q˜∗F
(
K(t)
m
; L(t)
m
)
. In addition, the presence of q˜∗ also serves
as a channel for the indirect depletion effect, which is further reinforced by the
division effect: a larger number of producers m entails that each one of them
can attract a smaller share of the economy’s capital and labour, which in turn
29Naturally, greater costs create stronger incentives to innovate in our model: if, for the sake
of the argument, a firm’s costs amount to £100, then doubling its productivity level reduces
effective costs by £50. By contrast, if the costs’ level is £2, then the impact a two-fold increase
in q˜ saves a firm only £1 per unit of output.
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reduces a firm’s scale of production and, by that means, shrinks its opportunities
to spread R&D costs across their output.
Comparing the mechanics of the hump-shaped patterns in γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗ sug-
gests that since in the case of the former the negative (division) effect replaces the
depletion effect, as well as both are enhanced (through the indirect escape-costs
effect and a combination of the indirect depletion effect, respectively), depending
on which of them is reinforced more strongly, we may expect either of the situ-
ations “mq > “mγ and “mγ > “mq to occur. This gives rise to the possibility of the
discrepancy in the behaviour of the two functions when the turning point of one
of them is outside the range [m
¯
; m¯]. The situations of particular interest for us
are those when the hump-shapedness in R&D outcomes is observable, while that
in R&D effort is not. This can be the case if either “mγ 6 2 < “mq (R&D effort de-
tectably decreases inm, R&D accomplishment is hump-shaped) or “mq < m¯ 6 “mγ
(R&D effort detectably increases in m, R&D accomplishment is hump-shaped).
We set a detailed discussion of these conditions aside until Section 1.3, after we
specify the steady-state dynamics of the model’s economy, for which we turn to
enquiring into the behaviour of the aggregate household.
1.2.4 Representative Household and Long-Run Equilibrium
Moving on to the consumption side of the economy, we model it as the
aggregate household comprising L(t) = L0ent individuals, with a CRRA-type
instantaneous utility function, so that its lifetime utility equals
U =
+∞∫
0
e−ρt
c(t) 1−θ − 1
1− θ L(t) dt (1.26)
where c(t) is consumption per capita, C(t) = c(t)L(t) is total consumption, and
ρ > n is the consumers’ time-discount factor.
The household’s members are assumed to own together all firms and pro-
duction factors (capital and labour) in the economy, so that their income is com-
posed of firms’ profits p˜i(t)Nm and total factor payments (w(t)L(t) – for labour
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and (R(t)− δ)K(t) – for capital, where δ is the rate of capital depreciation).
The household splits its assets between consumption and investment, tak-
ing firms’ profits and factor prices as given, which gives rise to the standard
intertemporal budget constraint
K˙(t) = (R(t)− δ)K(t) + w(t)L(t) + p˜i(t)Nm− C(t) (1.27)
Equation (1.27) can be transformed using (1.18), (1.19) and (1.23)
K˙(t) =
ξm (1− α) + α
ξm
N
1
ξ−1 q˜∗Q(t)K(t) νL(t) 1−ν − C(t) (1.28)
Maximising (1.26) with respect to (1.28) constitutes a canonical Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans dynamic optimisation problem with a Cobb-Douglas production
function and CRRA preferences. Therefore, one can argue that the model exhibits
saddle-path convergence to the unique steady state, in which the economy’s wage
rate and per capita variables (namely output, capital and consumption) grow at
the rate of ln q˜
∗
1−ν .
30 In addition, at the steady state the effective capital to labour
ratio K(t)
Q(t)
1
1−ν L(t)
equals a fixed number kSS determined by the Euler equation31
RSS ≡ νq˜∗ ξm− 1
ξm
N
1
ξ−1
(
kSS
)ν−1
= ρ+ δ +
θ ln q˜∗
1− ν ⇒
⇒ kSS =
νN 1ξ−1 ξm−1ξm q˜∗
ρ+ δ + θ ln q˜
∗
1−ν
 11−ν (1.29)
Pinning down the long-run growth rates of the economy’s variables and
its effective capital to labour ratio (1.29) completes specifying the solution of the
30Naturally, the last conclusion suggests that the economy’s total output, capital and con-
sumption grow in the long-run at the rate of q˜
∗
1−ν + n. Therefore, the growth rates of both
aggregate and per-capita quantities in the economy inherit the hump-shapedness properties
of q˜∗.
31For a detailed derivation and discussion of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model’s properties
see, e.g., (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Section 1.2), (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Chapter 2),
(Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 8).
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model. In the next section, we turn to investigating the situations of discrepancy
in the shape of relations between q˜∗ and γ˜∗(t) on one hand, and m on the other.
1.3 Quantitative Assessment of the Model
Despite the fact that both γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗ are hump-shaped with respect
to the degree of competition m, a situation of discrepancy in the behaviour of
these functions can occur if the maximum point of one of them is outside the
interval [m
¯
; m¯].
Given the motivation of this chapter, we are interested in looking into
the conditions under which q˜∗ is hump-shaped, whereas γ˜∗(t) is not (which, given
that γ˜∗(t) is a hump-shaped function, suggests that it has to be observably mono-
tone in the range [m
¯
; m¯]). This can be the case if “mq (the turning point of q˜∗)
lies within the interval of m’s permissible values [m
¯
; m¯], while “mγ (the turning
point of γ˜∗(t)) is outside it. In light of these considerations, we formally define
the discrepancy in the behaviour of γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗ as follows.
Definition. Functions q˜∗ and γ˜∗(t) exhibit a discrepancy in their behaviour if the
turning point “mq of the former belongs to the interval [m
¯
; m¯], while the turning
point “mγ of the latter resides outside it. Equivalently, a situation of discrepancy
occurs when either of the two following conditions holds.
m
¯
< “mq < m¯ 6 “mγ (1.30)
“mγ 6 m
¯
< “mq < m¯ (1.31)
Equations (1.30) and (1.31) describe the cases when γ˜∗(t) increases (re-
spectively, decreases) for any m ∈ [m
¯
; m¯], while q˜∗ retains its hump-shapedness
(see Figures 1.3a and 1.3b for the illustration). For the sake of brevity, we refer
to these situations as HS-I (hump-shaped, increasing) and HS-D (hump-shaped,
decreasing) discrepancies, respectively.
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“mq “mγm
¯
m¯
q˜∗
γ˜∗(t)
m
γ˜∗(t), q˜∗
(a) Discrepancy case №1, eq. (1.30).
“mq“mγ m
¯
m¯
q˜∗
γ˜∗(t)
m
γ˜∗(t), q˜∗
(b) Discrepancy case №2, eq. (1.31).
Figure 1.3: The cases of discrepancy in the behaviour of γ˜∗(t) and q˜∗.
Given that “mq, m¯, “mγ depend on three parameters (namely the productiv-
ity of individual R&D effort α, congestive impact of aggregate R&D effort β,
elasticity of substitution between sectors’ products ξ), we are going to simplify
enquiring into conditions (1.30), (1.31) by restricting the range of ξ’s values to
those implied by existing literature, and thus concentrating on mapping out the
relationships between α and β, which underlie (1.30) and (1.31). Unfortunately,
our task is hampered by the incompatibility of our model (where each industry
is populated with a multitude of firms) with existing estimates in macro liter-
ature (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tambalotti
(2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010)), where the estimates of ξ are obtained un-
der the assumption of each industry’s being monopolised. This consideration
motivates the next section, where we derive, in a stylised fashion, the values of ξ
compatible with our model’s setting.
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1.3.1 Preliminary Considerations – the Value of the Elasti-
city of Substitution
Our approach to assessing the value of ξ is akin to the line of argumentation
used in Atkeson and Burstein (2008): we are going to equate the model’s mark-
up µ to mark-up values inferred from existing data and backup ξ from them, for
which, given µ’s functional form, we need to gauge the number of firms in an
industry m first.
We would like to precede the assessment of m with a discussion of what
real-life concepts may match our model’s notion of industry. Clearly, it cannot be
equated to the industry in the sense of a unit in an industrial classification table:
our assumption of Cournot-competition on the intra-industry level implies that
each firm takes into account how its decisions affect the whole industry, which
clearly suggests that, while determining the value of m, we need to take into
account the ‘compactness’ of the corresponding group of firms. In the spirit of
the models due to Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979), we focus on interpreting
this ‘compactness’ in spatial terms, which is why we assess the value of m as the
average number of firms32 per ‘industrial-table’ industry per local economy unit.
The last consideration has led us to using US business data, because (primarily
for the purposes of labour market research) the US territory has been split into
709 the so-called commuting zones,33 which are interpreted as local economy
units (see, e.g., (Killian and Hady, 1988, pp. 3–5), Tolbert and Sizer (1996),
(Walden, 2008, Ch. 5)).
In addition, in order to reflect the homogeneity of each industry’s product,
in our evaluation of m we use the number of six-digit NAICS industries, which
constitute the most detailed level of the US industrial classification and, hence,
are expected to be comprised of the most substitutable products.34 Resorting to
32We take the latest available data on the total number of firms (for year 2013) from the
Statistics of US Businesses and Business Dynamics Statistics databases.
33Data source: U.S. Commuting Zones and Labour Market Areas: Documentation.
34As an example, mayonnaise and ketchup are likely to be less substitutable than two ketchup
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Table 1.1: The ranges of ξ’s values for a selection of countries
(mark-up estimates from (Oliveira Martins et al., 1996, Tables 1, 2)).
Country
m = 7 m = 10
ξ
¯
ξmed ξ¯ ξ
¯
ξmed ξ¯
France 0.350 0.937 3.714 0.245 0.656 2.6
Sweden 0.475 1.036 2.184 0.333 0.725 1.529
USA 0.407 1.571 4.905 0.285 1.100 3.433
data from the Statistics of US Businesses database yields the total of 978 six-digit
industries.
Depending on whether the figures on the total number of US firms are
taken from the Statistics of US Businesses database or the Business Dynamics
Statistics database,35 the resulting number of firms per model’s industrym equals
either 7 or 10.
We recover the range of ξ’s values by drawing upon the body of literature
on mark-up estimation (see, e.g., Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), Klette (1999),
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)). In particular, we use mark-up estimates for
samples of industries in France and Sweden from Oliveira Martins et al. (1996),
which, when coupled with the definition of µ, generate the estimates for ξ ran-
ging from 0.245 to 3.714 (for France) and from 0.333 to 2.184 (for Sweden, see
Table 1.1).
brands. The assumption of higher substitutability is in line with existing evidence – see Broda
and Weinstein (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010).
35The discrepancy in numbers partly occurs because firms entering the Business Dynamics
Statistics database are those active during the pay period which covers the 12th of March,
whereas firms in the other database are active at some point in a year.
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1.3.2 Theoretical Considerations
First of all, in the discussion to follow we assume that there are possibilities
for firms to make profits, viz. m
¯
< m¯, or, equivalently
2 <
1 + ξ
αξ
⇔ α < 1
2ξ − 1 (1.32)
In the case of both HS-D and HS-I discrepancy we require the following
condition to hold: m
¯
< “mq < m¯. Given Proposition 1.1, this implies the following
system of inequalities
 α > 2βξα
βξ
< 1+α
αξ
⇔
 α > 2βξα2 < βα + β (1.33)
Note that system (1.33) implies that for its solution 2 < α
βξ
< – i.e. condi-
tion (1.32) is satisfied automatically. Solving (1.33) for α yields the result
α ∈
(
2βξ;
β +
√
β2 + 4β
2
)
(1.34)
A graphic representation of condition (1.34) is shown in Figure 1.4. Naturally,
the range of α’s suitable values is nonempty whenever 2βξ < β+
√
β2+4β
2
, which is
the case when the following condition holds
β <
1
2ξ (2ξ − 1) (1.35)
Expression (1.35) imposes the upper limit on the value of ‘fishing-out’ coeffi-
cient β, above which the level of α required to generate a detectable hump-
shaped pattern, exceeds the mark-up. A noteworthy feature of the conditions
obtained is that, since the derivative of the upper limit in (1.34) increases to
infinity for β → 0, a suitable pair of α (in the interval specified in (1.34)) and β
(satisfying (1.35)) can be chosen for any given value of ξ – put differently, for any
level of ξ the shaded area in Figure 1.4 is nonempty.
28
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
q˜
∗ h
um
p -
sh
ap
ed
α = 2ξβ
α =
β+
√
β2+4β
2
β = 12ξ(2ξ−1) β
α
Figure 1.4: The hump-shapedness conditions for q˜∗ (for ξ = 1.1).
Turning to the conditions of observed monotonicity of R&D effort, it is
decreasing in m if the following condition holds
2− α + 2β
1− α + 2β
1
ξ
6 2⇔ α (2ξ − 1) 6 2 (ξ − 1) + 2β (2ξ − 1) (1.36)
Depending on whether ξ is greater than 1/2 or not, the final condition for α takes
either of two forms: α 6 2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 + 2β for ξ > 1/2, and α >
2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 + 2β for ξ < 1/2.
We can omit the second inequality however, as the corresponding value of “mγ
is outside γ˜∗(t)’s domain. Thus, a decreasing pattern in γ˜∗(t) can occur only
if ξ > 1/2, and the final expression for the corresponding condition is
α 6 2 (ξ − 1)
2ξ − 1 + 2β, ξ >
1/2 (1.37)
Naturally, if α is too large (in the sense of (1.37)), the productiveness of R&D
is sufficiently high to induce further R&D effort and reinforce the escape-costs
effect to the degree when “mγ is pushed further right into interval [m
¯
; m¯], which
makes γ˜∗(t) observably hump-shaped.
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Figure 1.5: The unobserved hump-shapedness conditions for γ˜∗(t) (for ξ = 1.1).
The intersection point and values of β above it correspond to the situation in which
condition (1.39) is violated.
An increasing pattern in R&D effort obtains if
2− α + 2β
1− α + 2β
1
ξ
> 1 + α
α
1
ξ
⇔ α− β > 1
2
(1.38)
Note that unlike all previous conditions, equation (1.38) imposes a constraint
on α not only in relative, but also in absolute terms: since β > 0, α cannot
be smaller than 1/2. The last consideration, in conjuncture with the stipulation
that m
¯
< m¯, imposes the upper limit on ξ (in the form of a necessary condition) –
even though ξ does not enter (1.38) directly. Given that 1+α
αξ
is a decreasing
function of α, replacing it with β+ 1
2
yields the inequality 1+β+
1
2
(β+ 12)ξ
= 3+2β
(1+2β)ξ
> 1+α
αξ
,
which suggests the following necessary condition for ξ
3 + 2β
(1 + 2β) ξ
> 2⇔ ξ < 3 + 2β
2 (1 + 2β)
<
3
2
(1.39)
As the final step in this section, let us specify the conditions for the pres-
ence of HS-I and HS-D discrepancies. As to the former, it occurs in the event of
(at least partial) overlap of the orange area in Figure 1.4 and the blue area in Fig-
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Figure 1.6: The HS-D discrepancy region (the hatched area) for ξ = 1.05.
ure 1.5, which is the case when 2ξβ 6 2(ξ−1)
2ξ−1 +2β. Depending on whether ξ > 1 or
otherwise, the last expression becomes either β 6 1
2ξ−1 or β >
1
2ξ−1 , respectively.
The latter condition can be omitted though, as it implies that α > 2ξβ = 2ξ
2ξ−1 >
1
2ξ−1 – the latter result is incompatible with the requirements that q˜
∗’s hump-
shapedness is observable: α < 1
ξ “mq−1 <
1
ξm
¯
−1 =
1
2ξ−1 . Thus we can argue that for
HS-D discrepancy to occur, the elasticity of substitution has to exceed one, and β
has to be smaller than 1
2ξ−1 . Given our assumption that ξ > 1/2, the condition
obtained for β is weaker than that required for the observability of q˜∗’s hump-
shapedness (1.35): q˜∗−hump-shaped⇒ β < 1
2ξ(2ξ−1) <
1
2ξ−1 , which suggests that
whenever q˜∗ is hump-shaped and ξ > 1, HS-D discrepancy is observable
q˜∗ − hump-shaped
ξ > 1
⇒ HS -D discrepancy (1.40)
In light of the conclusions by Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), we expect condition ξ >
1 to hold for Sweden, and, as suggested by our estimates in Table 1.1, it is indeed
satisfied for the median estimate of ξ when m = 7.
As regards HS-I discrepancy, we require, in graphic terms, that the orange
area in Figure 1.4 overlap with the red area in Figure 1.5, which is the case when
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Figure 1.7: The HS-D discrepancy region (the hatched area) for ξ = 0.85.
β +
1
2
6 β +
√
β2 + 4β
2
⇔ β + 1 6
√
β2 + 4β
β2 + 2β + 1 6 β2 + 4β
β > 1
2
(1.41)
Given that we consider the situation of HS-I discrepancy, condition (1.39) of q˜∗’s
hump-shapedness has to hold, so that
ξ < 1 (1.42)
Note that condition (1.42) is satisfied for the assessed median values of ξ for
France (see Table 1.1), where, given the results by Askenazy et al. (2013), we
expect HS-I discrepancy to occur.
Putting together conditions (1.41) and (1.42) alongside the stipulation
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that q˜∗ is hump-shaped, yields the final result
q˜∗ − hump-shaped
β > 1
2
ξ < 1
⇒ HS -I discrepancy (1.43)
Combining conditions (1.40) and (1.43) suggests that, conditional on q˜∗
being observably hump-shaped, γ˜∗(t) is so as well (and, thus, no discrepancy
occurs), if ξ < 1 and β 6 1
2
.
Having specified the analytical conditions for both HS-D and HS-I discrep-
ancy, we would naturally like to check whether the restrictions imposed on α, β
and ξ are consistent with available pieces of empirical evidence – we address this
question in greater detail in the next section.
1.3.3 Empirical Plausibility of the Results
In order to check the validity of our theoretical conclusions, we need to
relate α and β to a variable whose range of values can be inferred from exist-
ing empirical literature, and check whether the constraints we impose on the
parameters, are compatible with that range. Our candidate to that end is the
parameter known in the empirical literature as ‘the return on R&D’36 ζ which is
estimated using the following equation37
ln
(
y˜t+1
y˜t
)
= b0 + b1 ln
(
k˜t+1
k˜t
)
+ b2 ln
(
l˜t+1
l˜t
)
+ ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
+ ut (1.44)
Et
{
ln
(
y˜t+1
y˜t
)
− b1 ln
(
k˜t+1
k˜t
)
− b2 ln
(
l˜t+1
l˜t
)}
= b0 + ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
(1.45)
36We use the quotation marks here, as ζ can be interpreted as the return on R&D investment
if R&D effort is assumed to stack up in the form of research capital. In our model though the lat-
ter is not present directly (although one can potentially interpret total factor productivity Q(t)
in this vein) – see (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991, pp. 2–3) for a detailed discussion.
37(Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991, p. 3).
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where ut is a temporal sequence of independent identically distributed random
variables. Given the model’s parameterisation and the absence of stochasticity
in it, b1 = ν, b2 = 1− ν, which reduces equation (1.45) to
ln
Qt+1
Qt
= b0 + ζ
γ˜t
y˜t
(1.46)
Given that discrete data for Qt is generated by Q(t) (i.e., Qt = Q(t) at any dis-
crete point of time t), we have that Qt+1 = q˜∗Qt.38 Using the definition of y˜(t),
equation (1.22) can be transformed as follows: q˜∗ 1−(α−β) =
(
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
)α−β
m−β. Plug-
ging these results into (1.46) establishes the connection between α and β on one
hand, and ζ on the other
α− β
1− (α− β)
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
− β
1− (α− β)m = b0 + ζ
γ˜∗(t)
y˜(t)
(1.47)
As follows from (1.47), α−β
1−(α−β) = ζ ⇔ α − β = ζ1+ζ , which allows us to take
difference α− β to data.
In a comprehensive survey of ζ’s estimates, Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen
(2010) list a sufficiently wide range of values for France from 16% to 128%;39
as regards Sweden, we use the estimate of 50.7% from Griffith, Redding, and
Van Reenen (2004).40 These values can support empirically the situations of both
HS-D (Aghion et al. (2005) vs. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)) and HS-I (Aghion
et al. (2005) vs. Askenazy et al. (2013)) discrepancy. Starting with the former,
condition (1.40) stipulates that q˜∗ be hump-shaped, and that the elasticity of
substitution be no smaller than one. As regards the former, given (1.47), it is
38To see that, consider two functions At : At+1 = λAt ⇔ At = λtA0 and A′(t) : A˙′(t) =
ωA′(t) ⇔ A′(t) = A′0eωt. Discrete data for At is generated by A′(t) if A0 = A′0 and eω = λ.
With regards to Qt this implies Qt+1 = eln q˜
∗
Qt = q˜
∗Qt.
39See (Hall et al., 2010, Tables 2–5) for the full list of estimates for different countries.
40We use the authors’ estimate of return on innovation net of technology transfer contribu-
tion – see (Griffith et al., 2004, Table 3).
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satisfied for the values of α such that

α
(α− ζ1+ζ )ξ
> 2
α <
α− ζ
1+ζ
+
√
(α− ζ1+ζ )
2
+4(α− ζ1+ζ )
2
⇔ ζ < α < ζ
1 + ζ
· 2ξ
2ξ − 1 (1.48)
The set of α’s values is non-empty (or, equivalently, (1.48) is compatible with
condition (1.32) for the non-negativity of firms’ profits) when
ζ <
ζ
1 + ζ
· 2ξ
2ξ − 1 ⇔ ζ <
1
2ξ − 1 (1.49)
The range of ξ’s values prescribed by condition (1.49) covers the empirical estim-
ate of ζ for Sweden 50.7%, when 0.507 < 1
2ξ−1 ⇔ ξ < ξ¯ ≈ 1.486. Given that ξ > 1
(as stated in (1.40)), the last consideration suggests the range of ξ’s values
of (1; 1.486), which fits our estimate of ξ’s median value for Sweden (for m = 7),
thus suggesting that the situation of HS-D discrepancy is compatible with the
pieces of empirical evidence presented.
As to the HS-I discrepancy, we still require q˜∗ to be hump-shaped, so that
condition (1.49) holds. In addition, given (1.43), α − β = ζ
1+ζ
> 1
2
⇔ ζ > 1.
Thus, the range of ζ’s suitable values is
(
1; 1
2ξ−1
)
, which, given (1.43), is non-
empty: ξ < 1 ⇒ 1
2ξ−1 >
1
2−1 = 1. Thereby, so long as ξ < 1, the range obtained
overlaps with the upper tail of the interval of empirical estimates [16%; 128%],
which confirms the plausibility of the conditions for the HS-I discrepancy as well.
This inference concludes the section.
1.4 Summary
In this chapter we have explored theoretically the possibility of discrepancy
in the behaviour of R&D effort and R&D outcomes (R&D accomplishment) as
functions of competition.
We have shown that, since in the context of their relationship with com-
petition, R&D outcomes and R&D effort are affected by non-identical sets of
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factors (viz. the escape-costs effect and congestion (‘fishing-out’) effect for the
former, and the escape-costs effect and the division effect for the latter), the
two can exhibit different kinds of detectable behaviour: even though both func-
tions are hump-shaped with respect to the degree of competition m, the turning
point of R&D effort can reside outside the permissible range of m’s values, which
makes it observably increasing or observably decreasing function, thus, coupled
with the hump-shapedness of R&D outcomes, producing observed discrepancy in
the behaviour of the two aspects in innovation with respect to the degree of com-
petition. Conditions imposed on our model’s parameters in order to generate the
discrepancy, seem to comply with existing ranges of their empirical counterparts’
estimates.
One merit of our approach is that it reconciles the contradictory conclu-
sions drawn in Aghion et al. (2005) on one hand (the presence of the hump-shaped
pattern in the relationship between innovation (measured in terms of R&D out-
comes) and competition) and in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), Askenazy et al.
(2013) on the other (rejection of the hump-shaped pattern hypothesis in the re-
lationship between innovation, as proxied by R&D effort, and competition).
We hope that our illustration of the possibility that the two aspects of
innovation cannot necessarily be equated to each other (in terms of their rela-
tions with competition), will inform further attempts to confirm empirically the
hypothesis of the hump-shaped pattern.
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Chapter 2
R&D Cyclicality and Composition
Effects: A Unifying Approach
Existing empirical studies do not concur on whether R&D spending is pro-
cyclical or countercyclical: the former hypothesis is supported by studies of ag-
gregate R&D spending, whereas the latter is vindicated by firm-level evidence.
In this chapter, we reconcile the two facts by advancing a general equilib-
rium framework, in which, while a single firm’s R&D spending profile is counter-
cyclical, aggregate R&D spending is procyclical owing to procyclical fluctuations
in the number of R&D performers.
Our findings suggest that economic crises might be beneficial for economic
performance by fostering individual R&D effort. An advantage of our framework
is that it brings together conflicting pieces of empirical evidence, while incorpor-
ating and building upon Schumpeter’s hypothesis of countercyclical innovation.
2.1 Introduction
An influential part of Joseph Schumpeter’s legacy is the idea that economic
crises allow an economy to restructure itself on a more efficient basis (Schumpeter
(1943)). This leads one to think of economic downturns as a way to induce re-
search and development (R&D) activities, thereby suggesting that, in accordance
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with Schumpeter’s view, R&D spending should exhibit countercyclical behaviour.
This prediction has been explored extensively on both theoretical1 and empirical
levels. A noteworthy feature of the latter strand of research is the micro/macro
dichotomy of the results obtained. Macro-data (economy-wide and industry data)
based studies (see, e.g., Fatás (2000), Rafferty (2003), Wälde and Woitek (2004),
Comin and Gertler (2006)) show R&D spending to be procyclical. By contrast,
firm-data based results in Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, and Eymard (2012),
Lopéz-García, Motero, and Moral-Benito (2012), Beneito, Rochina-Barrachina,
and Sanchis-Llopis (2015) point in the opposite direction.
One theory proposed to accommodate both procyclicality and countercyc-
licality of R&D within a single framework is based on the liquidity constraint
hypothesis advanced in Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2010). Even
though firms would like to make their R&D spending profiles countercyclical,
they are unable to do so because of insufficient access to loanable funds. In all
aforementioned firm-data based papers, taking into account a measure of credit
tightness indeed makes R&D spending procyclical.
Of importance, however, is the feature of the liquidity constraint approach
that, while bringing together pro- and countercyclicality of R&D, the liquidity
constraint hypothesis does not provide one with a way of explaining – in procyc-
lical terms – countercyclical R&D spending by financially unconstrained firms,
which constitute a significant share of the total number of firms in the firm-data
based papers discussed.2
1An early example of the mathematical formalisation of Schumpeter’s hypothesis is
Caballero and Hammour (1994), who develop a creative-destruction model of an industry to
show that a fall in demand and the ensuing shakedown can cleanse an industry of less efficient
firms/plants, thus shifting resources in it to more productive units. Another example is the
opportunity cost theory advanced by Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), which is discussed below
in this section.
2In particular, financially unconstrained firms make approx. 67%, 77% and 46% of the total
number of firms in the datasets employed, respectively, by Aghion et al. (2012), Lopéz-García
et al. (2012) and Beneito et al. (2015). See (Aghion et al., 2012, pp. 1008–1009), (Lopéz-García
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In addition, the liquidity constraint hypothesis leaves unanswered the
question why, by contrast with the firm level, economy-wide and industry-wide
R&D spending exhibits procyclical properties even without considering credit
constraints. In addition, and related to the previous point, it does not consider
the micro/macro dimension of the discrepancy in R&D’s cyclical behaviour.
Finally, the relevance of the liquidity constraint hypothesis for explaining
the micro/macro discrepancy in the cyclical behaviour of R&D, however, is fur-
ther undermined by limited industry-level evidence to support it: Ouyang (2011)
finds the predictions of the hypothesis to be valid only in the case of demand-
driven cyclical fluctuations. Yet, a few manifestations of the opportunity cost
theory (e.g. Bental and Peled (1996), Matsuyama (1999, 2001), Francois and
Lloyd-Ellis (2003), see discussion below) suggest that the opportunity cost effect
can be induced by supply side dynamics as well. The results obtained by Ouyang
(2011) further strengthen the idea that the procyclicality of R&D spending on
the macro-level is due to factors other than credit constraints.
In this chapter, we argue that the difference between macro- and micro-
based results cited above is because of a composition effect: even though an
individual firm’s R&D spending is countercyclical, its aggregate dynamics (on the
industry or economy level) can be procyclical owing to changes in the number
of firms investing in R&D (because of, for example, entry/exit dynamics). For
instance, if an economy is in a trough, an increase in individual R&D can be
offset by a drop in the number of firms engaging in R&D (the opposite is true for
booms).
We base our conjecture on the combination of the following motivating
observations: first of all, it is widely recognised in industrial organisation (IO)
literature that the probability of a firm’s engaging in R&D depends positively on
its size.3 Naturally, in the situation of a crisis one would expect firms’ sizes (as
measured by, e.g., sales or employment) to drop, thereby driving down both the
et al., 2012, Table 2, p. 32), (Beneito et al., 2015, Table 1, p. 352).
3See, e.g., (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 1, p. 928).
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volume of each cohort of firms of a given size, and the share of R&D performers
within it – together the two observations suggest that during crises a smaller share
of a lower number of firms engages in R&D in an industry, thus enabling one to
expect that economic cycles produce a procyclical aggregation-based effect on the
amount of R&D in an industry, as channelled through procyclical dynamics in
the number of R&D-performing firms.
The key difference between the approach adopted in this chapter and the
one encapsulated in the liquidity constraint hypothesis lies in that we do not
try to present a framework consistently accommodating contradicting pieces of
empirical evidence in opposition to Schumpeter’s hypothesis. Rather, we develop
a theory, which, on one hand, reconciles discrepancies in macro- and micro- em-
pirical results, and, on the other hand, embeds and builds upon Schumpeter’s
hypothesis.
We illustrate our point by presenting a tractable general-equilibrium model,
in which firms’ R&D spending shows countercyclical behaviour, whereas that on
the industry and economy-wide levels is procyclical. This results from introducing
a two-level structure in an economy, whereby the final good is produced using in-
dustries’ outputs, which themselves are aggregated from differentiated products
made by competing monopolist firms. Each monopolist engages in two (lim-
itedly substitutable) activities: production and R&D, which are, respectively,
procyclical and countercyclical owing to the opportunity cost effect. If, however,
substitutability between the two activities is not high enough (so that not too
large a share of a firm’s resources is shifted between production and R&D dur-
ing an economic cycle), drops in individual R&D spending during upturns are
dampened sufficiently to be offset by increases in aggregate industry R&D spend-
ing resulting from the entry of new firms (the opposite dynamics obtains during
downturns).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.1.1 we re-
view literature relevant to our research; in Sections 2.2.1–2.2.4 the baseline model
is introduced (2.2.1–2.2.3) and solved (2.2.4); in Section 2.3 we examine empir-
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ical validity of the results obtained. In Sections 2.4, 2.5 the effect of technology
accumulation is investigated and evaluated. In Section 2.6 we consider the pro-
cyclicality of aggregate R&D spending, when a firm’s decisions to do R&D and
to stay in business are separated from each other. The last section concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the rich literature on cyclicality of innovation. In
the empirical dimension, one could list a number of works largely characterised
by the macro/micro dichotomy discussed above (see Table 2.1).4
On the theoretical front, given the reconciliatory purpose of our paper and
its general-equilibrium setting, it is related most closely to the branches of theor-
etical general-equilibrium literature on both countercyclicality and procyclicality
of innovation. With regards to the former, we can mention the works by Bental
and Peled (1996), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Matsuyama (1999, 2001) and
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003).
Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) have introduced explicitly the opportunity
cost hypothesis by considering the dynamics of R&D in two settings: in one
(the ‘World 1’ model) R&D has disruptive impact on production (i.e., engaging
in R&D requires channelling some resources from production), which makes it
countercyclical, since a firm’s costs of diverting funds from production to R&D are
procyclical. By contrast, the situation when R&D is non-disruptive (viz., R&D
can be funded directly by buying the final good instead of reallocating resources,
in the ‘World 2’ model) leads to the procyclical behaviour of innovation, since
4Barlevy (2007) uses firm-level data to show a firm’s growth rate of R&D spending to be
an increasing function of the industry’s growth (i.e. suggesting R&D’s being procyclical). One
could argue though that an industry’s growth, being an industry-wide aggregate indicator,
can channel the impact coming from other firms in the industry through, e.g., intrasectoral
competition; in addition, sectoral growth can pick the impact of targeted government spending
in the sector (see Cozzi and Impullitti (2010) for an investigation into the effects of sectoral
government spending on R&D).
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Table 2.1: Empirical findings on the cyclicality of R&D.
Study Level of
data
Sample
R&D
cyclicality
Salient findings
Fatás (2000) Country USA,
1961 –1996
Procyc.
Growth rates of total R&D
and GDP are positively cor-
related
Rafferty (2003) Country USA,
1953 –1999
Procyc.
Real firm-financed R&D and
GDP are positively cointeg-
rated
Wälde and
Woitek (2004)
Country G7 countries,
1973 –2000
Procyc.
Cyclical components of
R&D per capita and GDP
per capita are positively
correlated
Comin and
Gertler (2006)
Country USA,
1948 –2001
Procyc.
Short- and medium-run cyc-
lical components of R&D
and GDP are positively cor-
related
Barlevy (2007) Industry 7 719 firms, USA,
1978 –20045
Procyc.
Growth rates of firms’ real
R&D expenditures and the
industry’s real output/value
added are positively correl-
ated
Aghion et al.
(2012)
Firms
≈13 000 firms,
France,
1994 –2004
Ctrcyc. R&D
6 is negatively correl-
ated with changes in a firm’s
sales; the relationship be-
comes procyclical for finan-
cially constrained firms
Lopéz-García
et al. (2012)
Firms 3 278, Spain,
1991 –2010
Ctrcyc.
Beneito et al.
(2015)
Firms 3 361 firm, Spain,
1990 –2006
Ctrcyc.
there is no opportunity cost based trade-off between the two activities.
In Matsuyama (1999, 2001),7 the model’s economy alternates between the
7The key difference between the two papers is that in Matsuyama (1999) the Solow-type
assumption is made of a fixed saving rate, whereas in Matsuyama (2001) it is endogenous, in
the style of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model.
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states of capital accumulation (‘the Solow mode’, after the celebrated model of
a relationship between economic growth and factor accumulation due to Solow
(1956), when the economy’s resources are devoted exclusively to competitive pro-
duction of existing goods) and that of product expansion (‘the Romer mode’,
after the model of endogenous product expansion due to Romer (1990), when,
alongside producing existing varieties, part of the economy’s output is directed to
the creation of new goods, whose supply is monopolised for one period). During
intervals of accumulation, the build-up of capital reduces the economy’s interest
rate and, thus, the cost of creating new varieties relative to the value of innova-
tion, which ultimately induces the expansion phase when the interest rate reaches
a certain threshold value.8 This mechanism can be thought of as an indirect mani-
festation of the opportunity cost reasoning as well, since expansion in the model
begins once the opportunity cost of diverting funds from production to the cre-
ation of new varieties becomes sufficiently low (i.e., non-positive, which occurs
when one-period profits from innovation become non-negative).
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) advance a model of cyclically clustered
innovation, in the spirit of the implementation cycles approach due to Shleifer
(1986). In the model, ‘disruptiveness’ of R&D manifests itself in labour’s being
split between production and R&D. Within each endogenous cycle, the initial
wage level (which also acts as the (scaled) cost of innovating) is too high for
R&D to pay off, so no innovation occurs, all labour is directed to production, and
the economy stagnates, which in turn results in wages starting to fall relatively to
the value of innovation. Once the two quantities are equal, the opportunity cost
effect comes into operation, and an increasingly higher share of labour is diverted
to R&D, so that new discoveries are made, but not implemented. At the end
of the cycle, implementation of accumulated discoveries occurs en masse, thus
resulting in an instantaneous expansion, which pushes up the economy’s wage
rate, and thereby initiates a new cycle.
8In addition to the case of alternating between the two modes, the economy can perpetually
stay in either of them, depending on the model’s parameterisation.
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The model due to Bental and Peled (1996) has features present in three
other papers discussed above: as in Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), direct ‘dis-
ruptiveness’ of R&D obtains: firms spend capital on either searching for new
discoveries or on production using the most advanced technology from the last
period; as in Matsuyama (1999, 2001), the dynamics of the opportunity cost of
searching for and creating new technologies is driven by accumulation of capital:
as a result of its build-up, firms’ returns on production increasingly diminish, thus
ultimately making R&D attractive enough for firms to embark on; as in Francois
and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) the discovery and implementation of new technologies (the
two in Bental and Peled (1996) occur simultaneously) are followed by a halt in
exerting R&D effort for some time owing to the opportunity cost effect.
Similarly to all aforementioned papers, we consider the behaviour of R&D
on the firm level in the framework of the opportunity cost theory.9 Since, how-
ever, we are not interested in mechanisms behind economic fluctuations per se,
our model does not generate endogenous cycles (as in Bental and Peled (1996),
Matsuyama (1999, 2001) and Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003)), but rather uses
the cyclicality of productivity in production as a modelling ‘input’, which induces
cyclical reallocation of funds between production and R&D.10
As regards theoretical papers on the procyclicality of R&D spending, the
following can be mentioned: Wälde (2005), Barlevy (2007), Francois and Lloyd-
Ellis (2009), Aghion et al. (2010), Bambi, Gozzi, and Licandro (2014).
In Wälde (2005), investing in R&D results in the stochastic arrival of
a new technology (embodied in a new more productive vintage of the capital
good). It has a by-product of increasing the economy-wide level of labour pro-
9In particular, by making producers choose between allocating their facilities to production
and to R&D, we make the latter ‘disruptive’, as in the ‘World 1’ model in Aghion and Saint-Paul
(1998) and the model in Bental and Peled (1996) discussed above.
10Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) employ a technically similar approach by allowing the dy-
namics of aggregate demand in their model to be driven by a two-state Markov process, which
results in cyclical reallocation of funds between production and R&D.
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ductivity, which in turn pushes the economy’s capital-to-effective labour ratio
below the equilibrium level. Thus, the economy’s dynamics is represented by
periods of convergence to steady-state capital to effective labour ratios, which
are interrupted by intermittent arrivals of new technologies. Under the model’s
parameterisations investigated in the paper, R&D spending is a linear function
of the economy’s stock of capital,11 which leads to its dynamics replicating that
of capital and output.
Barlevy (2007) considers procyclicality and countercyclicality of R&D in
a single framework by investigating a model of Schumpeterian growth with ‘dis-
ruptive’ R&D, which requires labour to be diverted from production. While it
is socially optimal for R&D to be countercyclical (because of its ‘disruptiveness’,
which induces the opportunity cost effect), the market outcome can result in pro-
cyclical R&D, which is driven by the presence of fixed costs incurred by firms.
As those are measured in units of the final good, they inherit the countercyclical
properties of the latter’s price.12 The resulting countercyclicality of fixed costs
exerts procyclical pressure on firms’ expected profits, which in turn brings about
procyclicality of R&D in the model.
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2009) suggest a model of R&D procyclicality,
which builds upon the authors’ earlier theory introduced in Francois and Lloyd-
Ellis (2003). The key addition to the framework in Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
(2003) concerns splitting the process of innovating into three subsequent stages:
R&D, commercialisation, and implementation. R&D is performed by using the
final good, which makes it ‘non-disruptive’ and thereby procyclical (in line with
the logic of the ‘World 2’ model in Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998)); by contrast,
11The linearity of R&D spending R with respect to the stock of capital K comes from the
fact that the expected technology arrival rate λ is modelled as a function of the ratio of the two
quantities λ = f
(
R
K
)
: under special parameter restrictions it becomes fixed, which establishes
the result stated: R = f−1(λ)K.
12This property follows from extensively documented countercyclical behaviour of price
mark-ups – see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005), Comin and Gertler (2006), Galí, Gertler, and
López-Salido (2007), Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010).
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commercialisation (during which entrepreneurs draw upon the stock of ideas gen-
erated by R&D) requires diverting labour from production, which results in its in-
heriting the countercyclical properties of R&D in Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003),
owing to the reasons outlined above in the discussion of the paper.
Aghion et al. (2010) consider pro- and countercyclicality of R&D within a
unified framework (similarly to Barlevy (2007)), in which the cyclical behaviour
of R&D is driven by the presence of credit constraints.13 In the model, each
entrepreneur allocates his funds between short-run capital investment and long-
run R&D investment (i.e., R&D is ‘disruptive’), which, when he is not bound
by credit constraints, brings about standard countercyclical dynamics in R&D
owing to the opportunity cost effect. If, however, an entrepreneur is financially
constrained and expects to be hit by adverse liquidity shocks, R&D spending
can become procyclical: since there is no unlimited access to loanable funds,
entrepreneurs have to cover liquidity risks by drawing upon their own assets
generated by short-run investment projects (as funds allocated to long-run R&D
investment are immobilised). In the model, downturns are characterised by a
higher probability of a liquidity shock, which prompts entrepreneurs to shift their
wealth to short-run investment, which induces procyclicality of R&D.
Bambi et al. (2014) consider a standard Romer-type model of expanding
input varieties with an exogenous implementation lag of new inputs, which, by
rendering the model’s variety growth equation delayed, can induce cyclical beha-
viour in the growth rate of the economy’s mass of inputs.14 Given that the model
is based on the framework introduced by Romer (1990), total output is a power
function of the mass of varieties, which allows it to inherit the cyclical patterns
in the dynamics of the mass of inputs. Thus, the two quantities co-oscillate,
thereby making the mass of varieties (which can be interpreted as accumulated
R&D) procyclical.
This chapter contributes to the last body of literature reviewed by intro-
13A simplified version of the model is presented in Aghion et al. (2012).
14See (Banks, 1994, Ch. 6) for an introduction to lagged differential equations.
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ducing a novel mechanism generating R&D procyclicality on the aggregate level
through the composition effect, as embodied in firm entry/exit dynamics. The
key difference between the papers discussed above and our work is that R&D
procyclicality manifests itself not on the individual firm level, but on that of in-
dustries, alongside R&D countercyclicality on the firm level. In other words, by
contrast with the papers discussed above, we do not seek to present a mechanism
that makes firms’ R&D spending procyclical – instead, our approach allows firms’
R&D spending to be countercyclical (in line with the empirical micro-based res-
ults cited above), while producing procyclical R&D dynamics for industries by
adding the composition effect.
2.2 The Baseline Model
The model below introduces a three-level economy where the final good
is produced by competitive firms using a Cobb-Douglas technology to combine
labour with the composite of outputs provided by homogeneous competitive in-
dustries. Each industry’s output is made from products supplied by competing
monopolist firms engaging in both production and R&D, of which the latter is
countercyclical. The mass of monopolist firms in each industry varies procyclic-
ally, and will be shown to act as the driving force of the composition effect behind
the procyclicality of aggregate R&D spending.
The model captures a number of stylised facts on innovation within the
strands of growth and IO literature
1. Macro facts
(a) Aggregate output and productivity are procyclical (RBC literature);
(b) Price mark-ups are countercyclical (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005),
Comin and Gertler (2006), Galí et al. (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010));
(c) Net entry of firms is procyclical (see Campbell (1998), Clementi and
Palazzo (2016)).
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2. IO facts
(a) A firm’s R&D spending increases monotonically in the firm’s size (see,
for example, (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 2));
(b) The elasticity of R&D spending with respect to the firm’s size is
unity (see, e.g., (Cohen and Klepper, 1996, Stylised fact 3)).
2.2.1 Aggregate Production
Suppose that the final (consumable) good Y (t) is produced by competitive
firms using fixed amount of labour L and the composite capital good aggregated
from intermediate inputs supplied by the constant mass N of symmetric indus-
tries. The production technology is linear homogeneous and takes the form
Y (t) = 1
1−ν
 N∫
0
y(i; t) 1−νdi
Lν = Ny(t) 1−νLν
1− ν (2.1)
where y(i; t) is the product of the i-th industry, L is the economy’s labour force,
and ν is the elasticity of Y (t) with respect to L (and the share of wage income
in the economy’s output). We assume that all industries are homogeneous, so
that ∀i y(i; t) = y(t), which gives rise to the last expression in (2.1). The term 1
1−ν
is used for normalisation purposes. The price of the final good is chosen as the
numeraire. Time is continuous.
Each industry’s output y(i; t) is produced competitively by means of a
CES production technology, using intermediate inputs y˜(i; j; t) supplied by ho-
mogeneous monopolist firms
y(i; t) = y(t) =
 m(i;t)∫
0
y˜(i; j; t)
ξ−1
ξ dj

ξ
ξ−1
= m(t)
ξ
ξ−1 y˜(t) (2.2)
where m(i; t) = m(t) is the dynamically changing mass of intermediate producers
in the i-th industry (which is the same across all industries), and ξ is the elasticity
of substitution between the products of each two producers. In the next two sec-
tions, m(t) embodies the composition effect, and it is its procyclical fluctuations
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that act as the force offsetting the countercyclicality of individual R&D effort (to
be introduced in Section 2.2.2). Throughout the chapter, we use tildes to denote
firm-specific quantities. We assume that there are no barriers for the entry/exit
of firms to industries.
In line with existing empirical evidence,15 we assume that the elasticity of
substitution between firms’ products exceeds that between industries’ goods
ξ >
1
ν
⇔ νξ > 1 (2.3)
The reason for our choice of assigning production technologies (i.e. aggreg-
ation with labour on the economy-wide level and a simple CES aggregator on the
industry level) is that doing it otherwise by applying technology (2.1) on the
industry level, results in ν playing the double role of determining both the elasti-
city of output with respect to labour and a firm’s relative mark-up (ν and ν
1−ν ,
respectively), which would bring ambiguity in the quantitative assessment of the
model carried out in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Individual Firms
Suppose that intermediate inputs are made by firms using production facil-
ities x˜(i; j; t) = x˜(t), which can be maintained at the constant marginal costs of ψ.
The facilities are created using a one-to-one linear production technology from the
final good acquired from the economy’s consumers. If the facilities are used exclus-
ively for production, a firm’s output equals z(t) x˜(t), where z(t) = z¯+ zˆ(t) > 0 ∀t
is the economy-wide productivity level, which has the fixed component (z¯) and
the cyclical component with a bounded image (zˆ(t) ∈ [zL; zH ] ∀t).16,17 Follow-
15See, e.g., Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2010).
16We do not specify whether zˆ(t) is stochastic (e.g. a Markov stochastic process with two
states as in Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) and Barlevy (2007)) or a deterministic (e.g. trigo-
nometric) function, as it does not affect the model’s key conclusions.
17Without loss of generality, the cyclical component zˆ(t) is stipulated to have zero
mean lim
t→+∞
1
tE0
(∫ t
0
zˆ(τ) dτ
)
= 0⇔ lim
t→+∞
1
tE0
(∫ t
0
z(τ) dτ
)
= z¯.
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ing the spirit of real business cycle (RBC) literature (see, e.g., Kydland and
Prescott (1982), King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988)), we assume z(t) to be the
source of fluctuations in the model’s economy. In what follows, we use z(t) as
the cycle indicator, so that some function B(t) is procyclical if (B(t))′z(t) > 0,
and is countercyclical otherwise.18 Although cyclicality is usually understood in
terms of a variable’s alignment with fluctuations of output, the shift to z(t) in
our model is justified by the procyclicality of output in terms of z(t) (see equa-
tions (2.24), (2.25)).
If a firm allocates part of its facilities γ˜(i; j; t) = γ˜(t) < x˜(t) to R&D, its
production function takes the form19
y˜(t) =
(
(z(t) (x˜(t)− γ˜(t))) η−1η + (ζγ˜(t)) η−1η
) η
η−1 (2.4)
where η is the elasticity of substitution between production and R&D; ζ stands for
the intrinsic productivity of R&D.20 Motivated by empirical evidence (see (Gri-
liches, 1998, Ch. 13)) and similarly to other theoretical works in the field (see,
e.g., Comin and Gertler (2006), Barlevy (2007)), we keep ζ constant across the
cycle.
18Our approach is similar to the one employed in Aghion et al. (2010) (see (Aghion et al.,
2010, p. 252)).
19Equation (2.4) implies equal importance of production and R&D in creating output – while
this might appear restrictive, attaching arbitrary weights ς and 1− ς to the two activities does
not affect any of the model’s conclusions.
20By assuming R&D outcomes to be a linear function of R&D spending, we leave outside
consideration the stochastic nature of R&D (which is usually modelled as a Poisson process with
the arrival rate of ηγ˜(t) – see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
Our reasoning for this is that the absence of individual stochasticity keeps all monopolist firms
homogeneous, thus significantly improving the tractability of our model and keeping it focused
on conveying its key message on the role of aggregation in generating procyclical R&D. In
addition, the assumption of linear R&D technology can be reconciled with that of stochastic
R&D outcomes if each firm is posited to have access to a sufficiently large number of R&D
projects, so that the individual uncertainty of each one of them does not affect the dynamics
of the firm’s aggregate R&D portfolio (because of, for example, the law of large numbers).
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Expression (2.4) allows one to think of the model’s R&D as an activity
that, only so long as carried out, generates synergy effects with production and has
no effect on a firm’s future productivity, i.e., it ignores the impact of technology
accumulation. In order to focus on our key results though, we leave aside dealing
with this consideration until Section 2.4.
In what follows, our focus is on the situation where η > 1, so that in-
vestment in production facilities and in R&D facilities are gross substitutes, and
the predictions of the opportunity cost theory become operational: indeed, as
will be shown below, during downturns (viz. when z(t) is low), a firm can use
substitutability between research and production to mitigate (at least partly) the
impact of a slowdown by reassigning a larger share of its facilities to R&D (the
opposite is true for intervals of z(t)’s high values).21,22
Each firm seeks to maximise its profits by choosing the level of output y˜(t)
and the share of facilities devoted to R&D
p˜i(t) = p˜(t) y˜(t)− ψx˜(t)− Φ (2.5)
max
y˜(t),γ˜(t)
{p˜(t) y˜(t) − ψx˜(t)− Φ}
0 6 γ˜(t) < x˜(t)
(2.6)
where Φ is the fixed cost of staying in an industry, expressed in units of the final
21Mathematically, expression (2.4) can be thought of as a generalisation of the approach used
in the model due to Aghion et al. (2010) (see equations (2)–(4) therein) and the stylised model
in (Aghion et al., 2012, Sections 2.1, 2.2), wherein the elasticity of substitution between short-
run investment and long-run R&D investment is infinity. In our model, however, for the sake
of tractability the trade-off between producing and researching is not inter-, but intratemporal,
since this chapter does not focus on the role of intertemporal factors affecting R&D decisions (i.e.
credit constraints).
22Our mechanism of inducing cyclical reallocation of facilities between production and R&D
through combining substitutability between the two activities with the fluctuations of the pro-
ductivity associated with one of them, is akin to those used by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) in studying the phenomenon of structural transformation.
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good. In addition, when maximising (2.6), each firm is assumed to ignore its
impact on the economy’s and an industry’s aggregate quantities Y (t) and y(t).
2.2.3 Households
To close the model, we assume that the representative household of size L
supplies inelastically the economy’s labour force, and owns collectively all firms in
the economy. The household’s preferences are characterised by a standard twice
differentiable instantaneous utility function: u(c(t)), u′(c(t)) > 0, u′′(c(t)) < 0.
The household’s lifetime utility takes the form
U =
+∞∫
0
e−ρtu(c(t)) dt (2.7)
where ρ is the intertemporal discount factor.
Finally, the household’s total income comprises firms’ profits and labour
income, and, since the economy has no investment goods, is spent exclusively on
consumption, which gives rise to the budget constraint
C(t) ≡ c(t)L = Nm(t) p˜i(t) + w(t)L (2.8)
where C(t) and c(t) are, respectively, total and per capita consumption, and w(t)
is the wage rate.
2.2.4 Solution
We shall start with stating competitive producers’ inverse demand func-
tions, which can be derived from the corresponding profit maximisation problems.
In the case of the final good, the functions are
p(t) =
(
L
y(t)
)ν
(2.9)
w(t) =
νY (t)
L
(2.10)
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for, respectively, each intermediate good and labour, where p(t) is the price of an
industry’s output. As regards intra-industry demand functions, those take the
form
p˜(t) =
p(t) y(t)
1
ξ
y˜(t)
1
ξ
(2.11)
Using (2.9) and (2.11) allows one to solve an intermediate producer’s prob-
lem (2.6). First of all, the division of facilities between production and R&D
can be pinned down by solving the following cost-minimisation problem
min
x˜(t),γ˜(t)
{ψ x˜(t)} s.t.(
(z(t) (x˜(t)− γ˜(t))) η−1η + (ζγ˜(t)) η−1η
) η
η−1 6 y˜(t)
(2.12)
The optimal allocation of a firm’s facilities, as implied by (2.12), is
y˜(t) = Z(t) x˜∗(t)⇔ x˜∗(t) = y˜(t)
Z(t)
, Z(t) ≡ (ζη−1 + z(t) η−1) 1η−1 (2.13)
γ˜∗(t) =
ζη−1
ζη−1 + z(t) η−1
x˜∗(t) =
ζη−1
(ζη−1 + z(t) η−1)
η
η−1
y˜∗(t) =
(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
y˜∗(t)
Z(t)
(2.14)
where, given the absence of technology accumulation, Z(t) is the total productiv-
ity of a firm’s facilities arising from their optimal allocation across production
and R&D. Z(t)’s functional form suggests it to be procyclical, which is why it
will be used thereafter as cycle indicator instead of z(t) for tractability’s sake.
The first feature to note in (2.14) is that the share of R&D facilities γ˜
∗(t)
x˜∗(t)
is always smaller than 1 or, equivalently, a firm always engages in both produc-
tion and R&D. As suggested by (2.14), when investing in R&D is a substitute
for investing in production facilities (i.e. η > 1), γ˜∗(t) exhibits countercyclical
properties (viz. (γ˜∗(t))′z(t) < 0), in accordance with the prescriptions of the op-
portunity cost theory. Note also that, in line with stylised fact 2.a (see p. 48), a
firm’s R&D spending ψγ˜∗(t) increases in its scale of production y˜(t), and the two
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quantities are proportional to each other (i.e., the elasticity of the former with
respect to the latter is unity, as stipulated by stylised fact 2.b, p. 48).
Expression (2.13) reflects the synergy effect of R&D as embedded in the
‘preference for diversity’ (or, alternatively, ‘taste for variety’) feature of the CES
production technology (2.4): as long as substitution between investing in produc-
tion and R&D is not complete (i.e. η < +∞), for any level of R&D productivity ζ
and any size of production facilities x˜(t) optimal engaging in both production and
R&D results in a higher level of output than one stemming exclusively from pro-
duction: (ζη−1 + z(t) η−1)
1
η−1 x˜(t) > z(t) x˜(t). Put differently, optimal engaging in
R&D brings about a boost of productivity (as compared to the situation when
no R&D is performed) of the size of (ζη−1 + z(t) η−1)
1
η−1 − z(t) > 0 for any levels
of intrinsic productivity in R&D and production.
A noteworthy property of production technology (2.4) is that R&D-induced
productivity level Z(t) decreases in η, which reflects the fact that as production
and R&D become more easily substitutable, the importance of each separate
activity diminishes, thereby dragging down the synergy of their joined use.
Plugging (2.11) and (2.14) in profit maximisation problem (2.6) and de-
riving the FOC pins down firms’ prices and volumes
p˜∗(t) =
ξψ
ξ − 1 ·
1
Z(t)
(2.15)
It is worth noting that expression (2.15) implies a firm’s mark-up µ(t) = p˜
∗(t)
ψ
−
1 to be countercyclical, which is widely supported by existing macroeconomic
literature (see stylised fact 1.b, p. 47).
A firm’s sales volume can be derived using (2.2), (2.11) and (2.15)
y˜∗(t) =
Lνξy(t) 1−νξ
p˜∗(t) ξ
(2.16)
y˜∗(t) =
Lm(t)
ξ
ξ−1
1−νξ
νξ
p˜∗(t)
1
ν
(2.17)
Free entry to industries entails zero profits for every firm, which enables
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one to express the number of firms per industry as a function of z(t). To that
end, one can calculate a firm’s output first
p˜∗(t) y˜∗(t)− ψx˜∗(t) = Φ
y˜∗(t) =
ξΦ
p˜∗(t)
=
(ξ − 1)Z(t) Φ
ψ
(2.18)
Combining (2.17) and (2.18) yields the final expression for the equilibrium number
of firms per industry m∗(t)
m∗(t) =
(
L
ξΦ p˜∗(t)
1−ν
ν
) ξ−1
ξ
νξ
νξ−1
=
(
L
ξΦ
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Z(t)
) 1−ν
ν
) ν(ξ−1)
νξ−1
(2.19)
Naturally, (2.19) shows m∗(t) to depend positively on the size of the economy’s
labour force (which effectively determines the scale of the economy – thereby a
larger one has more firms), and to decrease in both cost parameters ψ and Φ.
In addition, as expression (2.19) suggests, firm entry is procyclical: (m∗(t))′z(t) =
(m∗(t))′Z(t) · (Z(t))′z(t) > 0, in line with existing empirical evidence (see stylised
fact 1.c on page 47).
Given (2.18), one can derive the closed-form expression for γ˜(t) ∗
γ˜∗(t) =
(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ − 1) Φ
ψ
(2.20)
Finally, given that the cost of maintaining the facilities of the unitary size is ψ
units of the final good, a firm’s individual R&D spending amounts to
ψγ˜∗(t) =
(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ − 1) Φ (2.21)
Note that since Z(t) increases in z(t) and since η > 1, a firm’s R&D spending is
countercyclical – in line with the predictions of Schumpeter’s hypothesis.
Expression (2.21), together with (2.14), suggests a way of understanding
how a larger amount of individual R&D can be compatible with a smaller number
of R&D performers during a downturn: as the intrinsic productivity in production
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Figure 2.1: Trajectories of z(t),23 ψγ˜(t), ψΓ(t), m∗(t) on the log10 scale.
The values of parameters used are: a = 4, b = 2, ω = 50,
η = 2, ξ = 5, ν = 13 , ψ = 1, Φ = 10, ζ = 4, L = 10.
falls, a firm reacts by shifting part of its facilities to R&D. These actions, while
not being able to completely nullify the adverse impact of a slowdown, maximally
cushion it, thus putting the firm in the least harmful situation possible during a
downturn and thereby reducing the number of firms ceasing to operate.
The behaviour of aggregate R&D spending in an industry ψΓ∗(i; t) =
ψΓ∗(t) ≡ ψγ˜∗(t)m∗(t) is described by the expression
ψΓ∗(t) = ψΓZ(t)
(1−ν)(ξ−1)
νξ−1 −(η−1),
Γ ≡ ζ
η−1 (ξ − 1) ΦL νξ−ννξ−1(
ξΦ
(
ξ−1
ξ
ψ
) 1
ν
−1) νξ−ννξ−1 (2.22)
The pro-/countercyclicality properties of Γ∗(t) are determined by whether
the power term (1−ν)(ξ−1)
νξ−1 −(η − 1) is positive (procyclicality) or negative (counter-
cyclicality). Given the motivation of this chapter, we are interested in specifying
the conditions for the former case
23The economy’s cycle driver z(t) is paramterised as a trigonometric function z(t) = a +
b cos
(
2pit
ω
)
.
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η − 1 < (1− ν) (ξ − 1)
νξ − 1
η <
ξ + ν − 2
νξ − 1 ≡ “η0 (2.23)
Condition (2.23) constrains the range of η’s values from above, so that ψΓ∗(t) is
procyclical when η ∈ (1; “η0). Naturally, if the degree of substitutability between
production and R&D is limited, shifts between the two activities during the cycle
are less pronounced on the firm level and, hence, are reversed on the industry
level by firm entry/exit dynamics (see Figure 2.1).24
To illustrate the last point, suppose to the contrary that η → +∞ (i.e.,
nearly complete substitution between production and R&D takes place), so that
the production technology asymptotically becomes lim
η→+∞
y˜(t) = max {z(t) ; ζ} x˜(t).
Suppose that z(t) > ζ during upturns and vice versa during downturns. In
this case, given (2.20), a firm’s R&D spending is going to be lim
η→+∞
γ˜∗(t) = 0
and lim
η→+∞
γ˜∗(t) = (ξ−1)Φ
ψ
during upturns and downturns, respectively. Obviously,
for any trajectory of the mass of firms per industry25 {m∗(t)}+∞t=0 , an industry’s
R&D spending is going to be zero during upturns, and positive during down-
turns, since shifts in m(t) cannot overcome (asymptotically) complete substitu-
tion of production facilities for R&D ones on the firm level (see an example in
Figure 2.2).
As the last step in solving the model, one can derive the closed-form ex-
pressions for industrial and economy-wide aggregates. The equilibrium output of
an industry can be pinned down by combining (2.18) and (2.19) with the fact
24Note that condition (2.23) equally applies to R&D spending in the whole economy, as the
latter equals R&D spending within an industry, scaled by N .
25One can show that lim
η→+∞m
∗(t) = max {ζ; z(t)} 1−νν
(
L
ξΦ( ξξ−1ψ)
1−ν
ν
) ξ−1
ξ
νξ
νξ−1
.
26The functional form of z(t) and all other parameters’ values are as in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Time trajectories of z(t), ψγ˜∗(t), ψΓ∗(t), m∗(t) on the log10 scale
for high substitutability between production facilities and R&D facilities (η = 40).26
that y(t) = m(t)
ξ
ξ−1 y˜(t)
y(t) = Φ−
1
νξ−1
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Z(t)
) ξ−1
νξ−1
(
L
ξ
) νξ
νξ−1
(2.24)
Plugging (2.24) into (2.1) and (2.10) yields the closed-form results for Y (t)
and w(t)
Y (t) =
Φ−
1−ν
νξ−1
1− ν
(
ξ−
ξ+ν−1
ξ−1
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Z(t)
)1−ν
Lν
) ξ−1
νξ−1
(2.25)
w(t) =
ν
1− ν
(
L
Φ
)1−ν (
ξ−
ξ+ν−1
ξ−1
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Z(t)
)1−ν) ξ−1νξ−1
(2.26)
Equations (2.24)–(2.26) formally establish the positivity of the relation-
ships between z(t) on one hand, and y(t), Y (t), w(t) on the other. Finally, given
that (because of free entry) firms accrue zero profits, the representative house-
hold’s income comprises only its labour component C(t) = w(t)L = νY (t). This
result completes the solution of the model.
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2.3 Evaluating the Model
Having solved the model, we conclude its discussion with assessing the
empirical plausibility of its key result – aggregated procyclicality condition (2.23).
In particular, our approach splits into two steps: firstly, we retrieve the range
of η’s values from existing empirical literature, after which we compare it against
an estimate of “η0.
The first step can be achieved using the estimates of the econometric model
introduced in Aghion et al. (2012) and later employed by Beneito et al. (2015),
whereby the natural logarithm of a firm’s R&D (ln γ˜∗(t) = b0 − (η − 1) lnZ(t)
in our model’s notations)27 is regressed, among others, on the increment of the
natural logarithm of the firm’s sales volume ((ln y˜∗(t))′t =
(y˜∗(t))′t
y˜∗(t) =
Z˙(t)
Z(t)
in our
model’s notations). If −b1 is the coefficient at (ln y˜∗(t))′t in the regression in
hand, it determines the marginal effect of (ln y˜∗(t))′t on ln γ˜
∗(t). In our model,
this effect can be replicated by differentiating ln γ˜∗(t) at fixed time t, with respect
to an external variation in (ln y˜∗(t))′t, denoted as ∆
(ln γ˜∗(t))′∆ = − (η − 1)
 t∫
0
(ln y˜∗(τ))′τ dτ
′
∆
= − (η − 1) = −b1 (2.27)
Equation (2.27) allows one to recover the value of η from b1 as η = 1 + b1. Given
this result, one can turn to the empirical studies mentioned above to land η’s value
in the intervals listed in Table 2.2. Overall, the range of η’s empirical values is
bounded by approximately 2 from above.
Moving on to assessing “η0, following Matsuyama (1999) and Wälde (2005),
we interpret the aggregate capital good as a combination of both physical and
human capital, which puts the estimate of ν at the approximate level of 1/3 (see,
e.g., Parente and Prescott (2000)). As concerns ξ, its estimates are usually placed
27In order to guarantee that ln γ˜∗(t) be well-behaved when R&D is zero, 1 is added to it
in the studies cited in the text. We ignore this transformation in our calculations, as in our
model γ˜∗(t) is always positive.
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Table 2.2: Deduced empirical ranges of η’s values.
Study Country η’s values
Aghion et al. (2012) France [1.032; 1.11]
Beneito et al. (2015) Spain 2.055
in the interval from 3 to 7 (see, e.g., Montgomery and Rossi (1999), Dubé and
Manchanda (2005), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2010)).
Together, the two estimates suggest that individual countercyclicality of R&D
is reversed on the industry level if η belongs to the interval whose lower bound
is 1, and whose upper bound “η diminishes from +∞ to 4 as ξ goes from 3 to 7.
Regardless of the exact value of ξ, our estimates of η are below “η0, which validates
empirical plausibility of condition (2.23).
2.4 Extension №1 – Technology Accumulation
2.4.1 Mechanics of Technology Accumulation
In this section, we extend the baseline model by allowing innovation to
have lasting effects on productivity levels. In particular, we assume that a firm’s
production technology takes the form
y˜(t) = Q(t)
(
(z(t) (x˜(t)− γ˜(t))) η−1η + (ζγ˜(t)) η−1η
) η
η−1 (2.28)
where Q(t) is the economy-wide technology level, whose growth is a spillover of
individual R&D effort,28 in the spirit of Romer (1986):
gQ(t) ≡ Q˙(t)
Q(t)
= λ
(
γ˜(t)
Q(t) 1+χ
)
(2.29)
where λ(·) is an increasing differentiable function λ′(·) > 0 of bounded mean
28One can think of γ˜(t) in (2.29) as the average R&D effort across firms: γ¯(t) =∫ N
0
∫m(i;t)
0
γ˜(i;j;t)
Nm(i;t)djdi, which collapses to γ˜(t) given firms’ homogeneity.
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oscillation (BMO).29 Power term χ > 0 connects the dynamics of Q(t) with that
of a firm’s fixed costs
Φ(t) = φQ(t) χ (2.30)
The relationship between Q(t) and Φ(t), as expressed in (2.30), is introduced
so that we can gain an additional degree of freedom that will be used in the
quantitative assessment of the extension in hand, carried out in Section 2.5. We
impose the following restriction on the range of χ’s values
χ <
1− ν
ν
(2.31)
Condition guarantees that the number of firms m(t), each industry’s output y(t)
and total output Y (t) increase in time in the long-run.30
We divide γ˜(t) by Q(t) 1+χ to reflect the idea that new ideas are harder to
obtain as the economy develops and becomes more complex.31 From the math-
ematical standpoint, this assumption ascertains that the economy attains a bal-
anced growth path with stationary growth rates. All other equations are as in
the baseline model.
As suggested by (2.28) and (2.29), engaging in R&D creates two effects:
a temporary synergetic one (introduced and discussed in Section 2.2) and a per-
manent cost-decreasing one. The latter is channelled through the continuous
instantaneous embedding of individual research effort in the aggregate stock of
public knowledge – i.e., newly discovered technologies become instantly avail-
able for general use, which enhances public knowledge, based upon which further
29The fact that λ(·) is BMO guarantees the existence of Q(t)’s average growth rate (to be
derived below, see (2.40)–(2.42)).
30Formally the results we obtain below (see (2.34), (2.36), (2.37)) suggest that χ’s upper
bound should be min
{
ξ − 1; 1−νν
}
, but the latter expression collapses to 1−νν given condi-
tion (2.3).
31A similar assumption is made in, e.g., Jones (1995), Bental and Peled (1996), Howitt
(1999).
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discoveries are made.
2.4.2 Solution
Going through the same steps as in solving the baseline model, yields the
following results
p˜∗(t) =
ξψ
ξ − 1 ·
1
Q(t)Z(t)
(2.32)
y˜∗(t) =
ξ − 1
ψ
Φ(t)Q(t)Z(t) (2.33)
m∗(t) =
(
L
ξΦ(t)
(
(ξ − 1)Q(t)Z(t)
ξψ
) 1−ν
ν
) ν(ξ−1)
νξ−1
(2.34)
γ˜∗(t) =
(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ − 1) Φ(t)Q(t)
ψ
(2.35)
The industry and economy-wide aggregates are
y(t) = Φ(t) −
1
νξ−1
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Q(t)Z(t)
) ξ−1
νξ−1
(
L
ξ
) νξ
νξ−1
(2.36)
Y (t) =
Φ(t) −
1−ν
νξ−1
1− ν
(
ξ−
ξ+ν−1
ξ−1
(
ξ − 1
ξψ
Q(t)Z(t)
)1−ν
Lν
) ξ−1
νξ−1
(2.37)
The only respect in which the extension’s solution (2.32)–(2.37) differs from that
of the baseline model in Section 2.2.4, is the temporal variability of firms’ fixed
costs Φ(t) and the presence of term Q(t) for the economy’s aggregate accumulated
technology.
As follows from (2.32)–(2.37), by calculating the growth rate of Q(t) one
can pin down those of the economy’s variables. Combining (2.29) with (2.35)
suggests that gQ(t) takes the form
gQ(t) = λ
((
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ − 1)φ
ψ
)
(2.38)
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First of all, given that gQ(t) derives from individual R&D spending γ˜∗(t), it in-
herits the latter’s countercyclical properties. In addition, note that gQ(t) depends
positively on the fixed cost multiplier φ, as higher fixed costs lead to a drop in
the mass of firms m∗(t) and, in turn, an increase in sales volumes (and, as a
result, R&D spending – as follows from stylised fact 2.b) of those remaining in
the market. Since gQ(t) depends on the level of individual R&D effort, it remains
unaffected by the dynamics of m(t), and thus reflects only the positive impact of
a higher φ on individual R&D spending.
Combining (2.29) with (2.38) yields the expression for the technology
level Q(t)
Q(t) = Q0e
∫ t
0 gQ(τ)dτ = Q0e
∫ t
0 λ
(
( ζZ(τ))
η−1 (ξ−1)φ
ψ
)
dτ (2.39)
where Q0 is the initial technology level. Following Wälde (2005), we treat Q(t)
as the product of the trend Q¯(t) and cyclical component Qˆ(t)32
Q¯(t) ≡ Q0eg¯Qt (2.40)
Qˆ(t) ≡ Q(t)
Q¯(t)
= e
∫ t
0
(
λ
(
( ζZ(τ))
η−1 (ξ−1)φ
ψ
)
−g¯Q
)
dτ (2.41)
g¯Q ≡ lim
t→+∞
1
t
t∫
0
Q˙(τ)
Q(τ)
dτ = lim
t→+∞
1
t
t∫
0
λ
((
ζ
Z(τ)
)η−1
(ξ − 1)φ
ψ
)
dτ (2.42)
where g¯Q is the average (or, equivalently, the long-run) growth rate of Q(t). By
analogy with g¯Q, the average growth rates of the economy’s other level variables
can be defined as g¯X = lim
t→+∞
1
t
∫ t
0
X˙(τ)
X(τ)
dτ , and shown to be as follows
Observation 2.1.
g¯y˜ = g¯γ˜ = (1 + χ) g¯Q (2.43)
32The existence of g¯Q follows from λ(·)’s being a BMO function.
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g¯m =
ξ − 1
ξ
νξ
νξ − 1
(
1− ν
ν
− χ
)
g¯Q (2.44)
g¯y =
ξ
ξ − 1 g¯m + g¯y˜ =
ξ − χ− 1
νξ − 1 g¯Q (2.45)
g¯Y = (1− ν) g¯y = (1− ν) ξ − χ− 1
νξ − 1 g¯Q (2.46)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1. 
As regards the cyclical components of the economy’s variables, start-
ing with investigating Qˆ(t) suggests that it can be potentially unsynchronised
with Z(t). To see that (in a heuristic fashion), one can calculate the implicit
derivative of Qˆ(t) with respect to Z(t)
dQˆ(t)
dZ(t)
=
(
λ
((
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ−1)φ
ψ
)
− g¯Q
)
Qˆ(t)
Z˙(t)
= 0⇔
⇔λ
((
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(ξ − 1)φ
ψ
)
= g¯Q
(2.47)
As follows from (2.47), intervals of Qˆ(t)’s monotonicity in general do not coin-
cide with those of Z(t)’s. For the sake of the extension’s results’ generality and
analytical tractability, we rule out this situation by assuming that a downturn
in the economy’s dynamics starts with a discrete jump in the value of Z(t) such
that Z(t) < ζ
(
(ξ−1)φ
ψλ−1(g¯Q)
) 1
η−1
≡ Z¯, whereas an upturn is initiated by a jump
in Z(t) putting its value above Z¯, so that the cyclical patterns in Z(t) and Qˆ(t)
coincide.
As in Wälde (2005), other variables’ cyclical components can be defined
by replacing Q(t) with Qˆ(t) in formulae (2.32)–(2.37). In particular, in order
to investigate the cyclical behaviour of Γ∗(t) ≡ γ˜∗(t)m∗(t), one can express its
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cyclical component as follows
Γˆ∗(t) =
ζη−1 (ξ − 1)φL ν(ξ−1)νξ−1(
ξφ
(
ξ−1
ξ
ψ
) 1
ν
−1) ν(ξ−1)νξ−1 Qˆ(t) (ξ−1)−(1+χ)(1−ν)νξ−1 Z(t) (ξ−1)(1−ν)νξ−1 −(η−1) (2.48)
As equation (2.48) suggests, R&D spending on the industry level is procyclical if
(
Γˆ∗(t)
)′
z(t)
Γˆ∗(t)
=
(ξ − 1)− (1 + χ) (1− ν)
νξ − 1
(
Qˆ(t)
)′
z(t)
Qˆ(t)
+
+
(
(ξ − 1) (1− ν)
νξ − 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
> 0
(2.49)
Although the exact specification of (2.49) depends on the functional form of λ(·),
a necessary and a sufficient condition for (2.49) can be derived even without this
piece of information. We shall start with the former. First of all, one may note
that term ξ−1−(1+χ)(1−ν)
νξ−1
(Qˆ(t))
′
z(t)
Qˆ(t)
is negative since
(Qˆ(t))
′
z(t)
Qˆ(t)
< 0 and ξ−1−(1+χ)(1−ν)
νξ−1 >
0,33 which implies that
(Γˆ∗(t))
′
z(t)
Γˆ∗(t)
<
(
(ξ−1)(1−ν)
νξ−1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
, thereby sug-
gesting the necessary condition
(
(ξ − 1) (1− ν)
νξ − 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
> 0⇒ η < ξ + ν − 2
νξ − 1 ≡ “η
N
1 = “η0 (2.50)
which coincides with condition (2.23) obtained for the economy without techno-
logy accumulation. This result comes from the fact that condition (2.50) is derived
effectively by omitting term
(Qˆ(t))
′
z(t)
Qˆ(t)
, through which the impact of technology ac-
cumulation is projected, and without which the cyclical behaviour of Γˆ∗(t) is
affected only by the dynamics of Z(t), as in the baseline model.
In order to derive a sufficient condition for (2.49), we will use the coun-
tercyclicality of mark-ups (and, equivalently, the model’s prices) to show first
that
(Qˆ(t))
′
z(t)
Qˆ(t)
> − (Z(t))
′
z(t)
Z(t)
. To that end, note that, as the cyclical form of (2.32)
33The last assertion follows from the assumptions that χ < 1−νν and νξ − 1 > 0 ⇔ ξ >
1
ν : ξ − 1 > 1ν − 1 = (1− ν)
(
1
ν − 1 + 1
)
> (1− ν) (1 + χ)⇒ ξ − 1− (1− ν) (1 + χ) > 0.
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(pˆ∗(t) = ξψ
ξ−1 · 1Qˆ(t)Z(t)) suggests, since prices are countercyclical, and since their cyc-
lical behaviour is determined by that of Qˆ(t)Z(t), the latter has to be procyclical.
As the product’s components fluctuate in the opposite directions – i.e., Qˆ(t) is
countercyclical, Z(t) is procyclical – for its overall procyclicality to obtain, Z(t)’s
procyclicality has to dominate Qˆ(t)’s countercyclicality, viz.
(
Qˆ(t)Z(t)
)′
z(t)
>
0⇔
(
Qˆ(t)
)′
z(t)
Z(t) + (Z(t))′z(t) Qˆ(t) > 0, which gives rise to the desired inequal-
ity stated above. Combining it with (2.49) yields the sufficient condition
(
Γˆ∗(t)
)′
z(t)
Γˆ∗(t)
>
(
(ξ − 1) (1− ν)
νξ − 1 −
ξ − 1− (1 + χ) (1− ν)
νξ − 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
(
(1 + χ) (1− ν)− ν (ξ − 1)
νξ − 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
> 0
η <
χ (1− ν)
νξ − 1 ≡ “η
S
1 (2.51)
Given that condition (2.51) is sufficient, it is more stringent than the necessary
condition (2.50) – i.e., the upper limit it imposes on η, is lower than that implied
by (2.50)), since ξ − 1 > (1 + χ) (1− ν) (see footnote 33). Such a result comes
from the fact that the sufficient condition deals with the case of the highest
permissible degree of Qˆ(t)’s countercyclicality feeding into and reinforcing that
of γ˜(t). Since therefore the countercyclicality of γ˜(t) is more pronounced (as
compared to the baseline case), it can be offset by the dynamics of m(t), if a
smaller share of firms’ facilities is shifted between production and R&D, which is
controlled by a lower η.
2.5 Evaluating the Extension
Following the logic and structure of Section 2.3, we focus on the range of η’s
values first. Despite the presence of additional temporal terms Φ(t) and Q(t) in
the expressions for a firm’s output (2.33) and R&D spending (2.35), one could
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argue that η’s deduced values obtained in Section 2.3 still carry through, as
the impact of both of these terms is, in essence, economy-wide and, as a res-
ult, would be captured by time-specific fixed effects used by both Aghion et al.
(2012) and Beneito et al. (2015) in their estimating procedures.34 Thus, the
relationship between a firm’s output fluctuations and R&D, as characterised in
the cited studies’ results, is driven, in our model’s terms, by the interaction
between − (η − 1) lnZ(t) and Z˙(t)
Z(t)
, as in Section 2.3.35
The remainder of this section focuses on the evaluation of condition (2.51),
for which one first needs to assess the range of χ’s values. To that end, we first
combine data on the growth rates of U.S. total output (g¯Y ≈ 0.027)36 and those
of the number of U.S. firms (g¯m ≈ 0.011)37 during the period from 1977 to 2013,
to express that of a firm’s production levels g¯y˜ = g¯Y1−ν − ξg¯mξ−1 . Parameter χ can
be evaluated by assuming a linear relationship between g¯y˜ and g¯m: g¯y˜ = ag¯m =(
gY¯ /gm¯
1−ν − ξξ−1
)
gm¯, and then by pinning down χ as a function of gY¯ /gm¯, ξ and ν38
g¯y˜
g¯m
=
1 + χ
ξ−1
ξ
νξ
νξ−1
(
1−ν
ν
− χ) = gY¯ /gm¯1− ν − ξξ − 1 ⇔
⇔ χ =
(
gY¯
gm¯
− 1
)
(1− ν) (ξ − 1)
gY¯
gm¯
ν (ξ − 1)− (1− ν) <
1− ν
ν
∀ν, ξ : νξ > 1
(2.52)
Combining (2.51) and (2.52) casts “ηS1 as a monotonically decreasing function of ξ,
which drops from +∞ to 0.685 as ξ goes from 3 to 7. In particular, the estimates
of η derived from the results by Aghion et al. (2012) and Beneito et al. (2015)
are guaranteed to be accommodated by condition (2.51) – regardless of λ(·)’s
34(Aghion et al., 2012, Table 3), (Beneito et al., 2015, Table 2).
35We keep our argument in the text more heuristic, with a more formal proof banished to
Appendix A.1.2.
36We retrieve the growth rates of Y (t) from data on real output in the U.S. in Feenstra et al.
(2015).
37Data source: Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
38Note that regardless of g¯y˜g¯m ’s exact value, expression (2.52) satisfies restriction (2.31), so
long as condition (2.3) holds.
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functional form – for ξ < 5.57 and ξ < 4.5, respectively.
2.6 Extension №2 – Separate Decisions on R&D
and Staying in Business
Throughout the last two sections, the driving force behind the reversal of
R&D’s countercyclical behaviour on the aggregate level, has been modelled to be
the entry/exit of firms in an industry. In this section we generalise our framework
to allow for a situation when firms that do not perform R&D, can still remain
active – i.e. when engaging in R&D is decoupled from staying in business.
The extension in hand can be motivated by the fact that R&D performers
do not make the majority of firms active in an industry: as an illustration, turning
to data on R&D personnel numbers in OECD countries, and assuming (quite
unrealistically) that each R&D performer employs just one staff member to do
all R&D, leaves one with a very rough upper estimate of 12−210 R&D performers
per thousand firms for a subsample of OECD countries (see Figure 2.3), which
suggests that at least three quarters of firms in an OECD country’s average
industry do not engage in R&D.
2.6.1 Introducing R&D Non-Performing Firms
To incorporate the separation of the decisions on performing R&D and
staying in business in the simplest form possible, we first introduce the explicit
cost of R&D in the shape of an increase in an R&D performer’s fixed costs to Φ+
from the level of Φ− incurred by firms focusing exclusively on production (R&D
non-performers).40
39Data on R&D personnel and numbers of firms were retrieved, respectively, from OECD
Research and Development Statistics Database and OECD SDBC Structural Business Statistics
Database.
40A similar assumption of a positive differential in fixed costs between an industry’s sole
R&D performer and R&D non-performing fringe (with the latter enjoying zero fixed costs) is
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Figure 2.3: R&D personnel per 1000 firms for selected OECD countries, 2013.39
Secondly, we assume that two goods produced within the same group
(i.e. R&D performers or R&D non-performers) are closer substitutes for each
other than goods from different groups, which can be interpreted in the sense
that the difference between R&D performers’ and R&D non-performers’ goods is
more fundamental than between two goods by produced within the same group.
Mathematically, we reflect this consideration by introducing the nested structure
to the production technology of an industrial good (2.4)
y(t) =

mR(t)∫
0
y˜R(j; t)
ξ−1
ξ dj +
 mP (t)∫
0
y˜P (s; t)
µ−1
µ ds

µ
µ−1 · ξ−1ξ

ξ
ξ−1
=
=
((
mR(t)
µ
µ−1 y˜R(t)
) ξ−1
ξ
+
(
mP (t)
µ
µ−1 y˜P (t)
) ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
≡
≡
(
yR(t)
ξ−1
ξ + yP (t)
ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
(2.53)
made in Barlevy (2007).
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where µ ≡ κξ, κ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between products within the
groups of R&D performers and R&D non-performers; the R and P indices denote
variables pertaining to, respectively, R&D performers and R&D non-performers.
Therefore, the choice each firm faces is between engaging in R&D and,
as a result, producing its good with lower marginal costs at the price of higher
fixed costs, or refraining from R&D – and thus saving on the fixed costs – but
losing effectiveness in production (in terms of marginal costs). In either case, a
firm faces stronger competition from other producers in the same group (R&D
performers or R&D non-performers).
The rest of equations and parameter restrictions are as in the baseline
model (see Sections 2.2.1–2.2.3).
2.6.2 Solution
Given that all firms still employ production technology (2.4), a firm alloc-
ates its facilities to production and R&D in the same way as prescribed by (2.14),
which yields the expressions for a firm’s output and the share of a firm’s facilities
allocated to R&D
y˜s(t) = Zs(t) x˜s(t) , Zs(t) =
 Z(t) , s = Rz(t) , s = P (2.54)
γ˜s(t) =

(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
y˜R(t)
Z(t)
, s = R
0, s = P
(2.55)
In order to derive the expression for a firm’s price and output, one can first note
that, given the homogeneity of the economy’s industries, the formulae for inverse
factor demand functions (2.9) and (2.10) still carry through, so p(t) is as expressed
in (2.9). Given that, an analogue of the baseline model’s expression for inverse
demand for a firm’s product (2.11) still holds
p˜s(t) =
y(t)
1−νξ
ξ ys(t)
1
µ
− 1
ξ
y˜s(t)
1
µ
(2.56)
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Solving a firm’s profit maximisation problem given (2.54) and (2.56), pins down
a firm’s price
p˜∗s(t) =
µψ
µ− 1 ·
1
Zs(t) (2.57)
Combining (2.56) with (2.57) enables one to re-express a firm’s and an
industry’s outputs as follows (see Appendix A.1.3)
y(t) = L
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1
ν
I(t) 1ν(ξ−1) (2.58)
y˜∗s(t) =
L
ms(t)
µ−ξ
µ−1
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1
ν
Zs(t) ξ I(t)
1−νξ
ν(ξ−1) (2.59)
where I(t) ≡ Z(t) ξ−1mR(t)
ξ−1
µ−1 +z(t) ξ−1mP (t)
ξ−1
µ−1 . Combining (2.57) with (2.59)
allows one to obtain the expression for the level of profits a firm accrues
p˜i∗s(t) =
p˜∗s(t) y˜
∗
s(t)
µ
− Φs = L
µms(t)
µ−ξ
µ−1
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1−ν
ν
Zs(t) ξ−1 I(t)
1−νξ
ν(ξ−1) − Φs,
Φs =
 Φ+, s = RΦ−, s = P
(2.60)
The assumption of free entry to an industry gives rise to the final expressions for
a firm’s output and R&D spending
y˜∗s(t) =
(µ− 1) Φ+
ψ
Zs(t) (2.61)
γ˜∗R(t) =
(
ζ
Z(t)
)η−1
(µ− 1) Φ+
ψ
(2.62)
As before, R&D spending of an individual firm is countercyclical, as Z(t) is
procyclical, and η > 1. Combining (2.59) with (2.61) enables one to re-express
71
the mass of firms of each type as a function of I(t)
m∗s(t) =
(
L
µΦs
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1−ν
ν
Zs(t) ξ−1 I(t)
1−νξ
ν(ξ−1)
)µ−1
µ−ξ
⇒
⇒m∗R(t) =
(
Φ−
Φ+
·
(
Z(t)
z(t)
)ξ−1)µ−1µ−ξ
m∗P (t)
(2.63)
As suggested by the second line in (2.63), the share of R&D producers in
the total mass of firms in an industry m
∗
R(t)
m∗P (t)+m
∗
R(t)
=
(
1 +
(
Φ+
Φ− ·
(
z(t)
Z(t)
)ξ−1)µ−1µ−ξ)−1
decreases in z(t): such a result can be put down to the fact that R&D non-
performers’ profits oscillate more widely than those of their R&D performing
counterparts – in particular, the former grow faster during upturns, and decline
more during downturns. This consideration can be ascribed in turn to the diver-
sifying nature of engaging in R&D, as embedded in the ‘preference for diversity’
property of production technology (2.59): unlike R&D non-performers, during
an upturn, R&D-performing firms cannot reap in full the benefits of higher pro-
ductivity in production z(t), as part of their facilities is diverted to R&D, whose
productivity stays constant. On the other hand, engaging in R&D during a
downturn allows R&D performers to soften the impact of lower productivity in
production z(t) through diversification between production and R&D.
In order to fully characterise the solution of the model, one needs to ex-
press I(t), which can be done by combining its definition with (2.63)
I(t) =
(
L
µ
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1−ν
ν
) ν(ξ−1)
νµ−1
((
Z(t) µ−1
Φ+
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
+
(
z(t) µ−1
Φ−
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
) ν(µ−ξ)
νµ−1
(2.64)
Bringing together (2.63) and (2.64) enables one to pin down the closed-form
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expressions for m∗R(t) and m∗P (t)
m∗R(t) =
(
L
µΦ+
(
µ− 1
µψ
Z(t)
) 1−ν
ν
) ν(µ−1)
νµ−1
1 +(Φ+
Φ−
(
z(t)
Z(t)
)µ−1) ξ−1µ−ξ−
νξ−1
νµ−1 ·µ−1ξ−1
(2.65)
m∗P (t) =
(
L
µΦ−
(
µ− 1
µψ
z(t)
) 1−ν
ν
) ν(µ−1)
νµ−1
1 +(Φ−
Φ+
(
Z(t)
z(t)
)µ−1) ξ−1µ−ξ−
νξ−1
νµ−1 ·µ−1ξ−1
(2.66)
Together conditions (2.55) and (2.65) determine aggregate R&D spending in an
industry ψΓ∗(t). Although the algebraic complexity of the resulting expression
precludes one from analysing the cyclical properties of ψΓ∗(t) directly, one can
still gain an insight into its behaviour by deriving a necessary and a sufficient
condition for ψΓ∗(t)’s being procyclical, which can be shown to take the following
forms
Observation 2.2 (Necessary Condition for ψΓ∗(t)’s procyclicality). If
function ψΓ∗(t) is procyclical, the following condition must hold
η 6 µ+ ν − 2
νµ− 1 ≡ “η
N
2 < “η0 (2.67)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4. 
Observation 2.3 (Sufficient Condition for ψΓ∗(t)’s procyclicality). Sup-
pose that condition (2.67) holds. Then function ψΓ∗(t) is procyclical if the fol-
lowing condition holds
η 6 1 + (1− ν) (µ− 1)
νµ− 1 ·
1
1 + νξ−1
νµ−1 · µ−1ξ−1
(
Φ+
Φ−
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
≡ “ηS2 < “ηN2 < “η0 (2.68)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4. 
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One can verify that condition (2.67) is stronger than its counterpart from
the baseline model (2.23): a higher substitutability between R&D producers’
goods µ suggests fiercer competition between them, which in turn reduces their
numbers, thus dampening the composition effect on aggregate R&D spending.
Sufficient condition (2.68) is, naturally, more restrictive than (2.67), as it also
takes into account countercyclical competitive pressure exerted on R&D per-
formers by R&D non-performers, whose entry to the industry is procyclical.
One can finish solving the model by plugging the formula for I(t) (2.64)
into the expression for an industry’s output y(t) (2.58)
y(t) =
(µ− 1)L
ψ
(
L
µ
(
µ− 1
µψ
) 1−ν
ν
((
Z(t) µ−1
Φ+
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
+
(
z(t) µ−1
Φ−
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
)) ν(µ−ξ)
νµ−1
(2.69)
Given (2.1), (2.10) and (2.69), the equilibrium expressions for total output Y (t),
the wage rate w(t) = νY (t)
L
and consumption C(t) = νY (t) can be derived, thus
completing the extension’s solution.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have explored the role of the composition effect, as
manifesting itself in fluctuations of the numbers of R&D performers, in reconciling
contradictory results in empirical macro- and micro-studies on the cyclicality of
R&D spending.
In all three versions of the chapter’s framework, our results suggest that
when the amplitude of shifts between production and R&D a firm’s resources un-
dergo across an economic cycle, is sufficiently low, the predictions of Schumpeter’s
hypothesis, while operational on the firm level, are reversed on the industry and
the economy-wide level through changes in the numbers of R&D performers,
which, by being procyclical, thereby offset countercyclical fluctuations of R&D
spending on the individual firm level, and transform them into procyclical macro-
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oscillations.
Furthermore, our quantitative assessments suggest that the shift in cyclic-
ality between the micro-level and macro-level is empirically plausible, which leads
to two major implications. From the methodological perspective, the chapter sug-
gests that exploring the relationship between business cycles and R&D must take
place on the level of individual firms rather than economies/sectors, as in the
latter case the results are likely to be confounded by fluctuations of the extens-
ive margin. The other upshot is that downturns have their redeeming value of
fostering innovation. This conclusion brings about a major policy implication of
countercyclical R&D stimulation.
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Chapter 3
Intersectoral Linkage as a Factor of
Economic Growth
This chapter documents the presence of a positive link between the intens-
ity of using intermediates by a country’s industries and its economic growth. We
explain the finding by advancing a framework of endogenous growth in an economy
with interconnected industries, whereby sectoral productivity growth is amplified
by the interconnection, and the degree of amplification grows in the strength of sec-
toral connections. We use the framework to derive the optimal growth-enhancing
structure of an economy, which is when all industries source their intermediates
from a single sector (the star network) characterised by the largest concentration
potential – a novel indicator which captures how fast is a sector’s productivity
growth and how much it itself relies on intermediates.
3.1 Introduction
There has been a growing recognition of the impact the system of links
between sectors in an economy (usually termed ‘intersectoral linkage’ or ‘produc-
tion network’) exerts on its macroeconomic outcomes by serving as an amplifying
channel for various micro-level phenomena. A particular emphasis has been put
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on investigating the macro-propagation of micro-shocks1 and amplification of dis-
parities in living standards across countries.2 To the best of our knowledge, how-
ever, existing literature has not studied systematically the relationship between
intersectoral linkage and one of key macro-indicators with micro-origins – namely,
economic growth.
As a motivating example for the existence of this relationship, consider Fig-
ure 3.1 which plots the average intensity of intermediate consumption (industries’
using each other’s products) in 1995 (i.e., the average strength of intersectoral
connections in an economy), against economies’ growth rates in 1995–2011. A
precursory examination of the graph suggests the presence of a clear positive link
between how strongly sectors rely on each other’s products, and economic growth.
The existence of this link poses three natural questions:
1. How robust is its presence empirically?
2. What are the underpinnings of this positive relationship?
3. If there is a relationship between intersectoral connections and growth,
which structure of the former is the most growth-enhancing?
To answer the first question, we assemble a panel dataset by combining
data from Penn World Tables by Feenstra et al. (2015) with information on flows
of products between sectors (for different countries) from OECD Input-Output
Tables compiled and harmonised by the OECD.3 We document a statistically sig-
nificant positive link between the average intensity of intermediate consumption
1To mention a few examples, Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) and
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2017) investigate the role of production networks in,
respectively, transforming micro-shocks into macro-volatility and the formation of heavy tails
in macro-indicators’ distributions.
2See Jones (2011).
3To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to employ OECD’s Input-Output
Tables in the context of studying macroeconomic production networks.
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Figure 3.1: The relationship between the average share of intermediates in 1995 and
the average growth rate in 1995–2011 for a cross-section of economies.4
Data source: see Section 3.2.1.
and economic growth in the presence of a wide range of standard explanatory
variables from growth regressions.
To tackle the last two questions, we advance a novel theoretical frame-
work of an endogenously growing interconnected economy, which builds upon
the canonical model of an interconnected economy with perfect competition, first
developed by Long and Plosser (1983) and lately popularised by Jones (2011)
and Acemoglu et al. (2012). The paper’s framework explains the link depicted
in Figure 3.1 through the presence of a multiplier effect inherent in production
networks, first posited theoretically by Hulten (1978): an increase in the pro-
ductivity of a firm enhances that of its downstream counteragents, and if the
original firm itself uses their products as inputs, it benefits also indirectly from
its own enhanced productivity which further affects firms downstream etc., which
4The solid line is the regression line derived for the whole sample, the dashed line is that
for the sample without two outliers: Brunei (BRN) and Saudi Arabia (SAU). Both lines’ slopes
are statistically significant at the 5% level.
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increases further the economy’s observable aggregate growth rate. One of this pa-
per’s contributions is to show both empirically and theoretically that the strength
of Hulten’s multiplier effect increases as industries become more reliant on using
each other’s products as intermediates.
The paper’s framework makes very sharp analytical predictions on which
structure of the intersectoral linkage enhances its growth the most. In particular,
it shows that an economy grows at its fastest when all industries use the product of
one sector5 characterised by high productivity growth rates and sufficient reliance
on intermediates. Quantitatively, these two criteria are captured by the notion
of a sector’s concentration potential introduced in this paper.
This work is related to a few strands of literature. Its closest link is with
papers studying different aspects of the growth-interconnection nexus. A seminal
work in the field is by Hulten (1978), who uses a reduced-from model to intro-
duce the idea of the multiplier driven by intermediate consumption. Modelling
explicitly the structure of connections between sectors, allows us to advance fur-
ther Hulten’s results by showing that stronger interconnections between sectors
make the multiplier effect more pronounced, as well as pinning down the optimal
growth-enhancing structure of an economy’s interlinkage. Other papers in the
area include Ngai and Samaniego (2009), who show that ignoring the effect of
production networks can bias sectoral productivity growth accounting, since in
this case a productivity shift in a supplying industry can be wrongly ascribed
to the consuming sector. Carvalho and Voigtländer (2015) demonstrate that
technology adoption (in the form of implementing new inputs in production) is
facilitated by the presence of a linkage between firms, since firms are likelier to
use inputs employed by their suppliers.
Furthermore, our work is connected with the branch of research initiated
by the contributions of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and Hausmann and Hidalgo
(2011), who use network analysis techniques to explore the relationship between
growth and development on one hand, and features of the network which connects
5In network studies, such a configuration of an interlinkage is called the star network.
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economies to varieties of products they export.
Additionally, this paper is connected with the strand of research on the in-
terplay between the use of intermediates and economic growth and development,
where one could mention the following works: Jones (2011) (cited above) shows
how misallocation of resources between sectors can propagate in the presence of
an intersectoral linkage through Hulten’s multiplier, to generate cross-country
income disparities on the scale observed in data.6 Moro (2012a) argues that the
dynamics of intrinsic productivity in the use of intermediates is an important
factor affecting the evolution of observed total factor productivity. Moro (2012b)
studies the connection between a drop in the volatility of the U.S. economy’s ag-
gregate productivity in the course of its structural transformation, and connects
it with heavier reliance on intermediates in manufacturing, as compared to ser-
vices. Grobovšek (2013) shows that a significant share of cross-country differences
in levels of labour productivity is accounted for by disparities between their effi-
ciencies in the production of intermediates. Cavalcanti and Giannitsarou (2017)
investigate the accumulation of human capital in an economy comprising a set
of interconnected households to show that homogeneous distribution of human
capital can be achieved in the long-run in a well-connected network.
More generally, the paper belongs to the growing body of literature on
the macro-impact of the interlinkage; apart from the aforementioned works by
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2017), recent contributions to the
area include Acemoglu et al. (2015) who show that the network of interbank loans
can act as a stabiliser for a bank system if shocks hitting it are relatively low in
the magnitude – otherwise mutual connections become an amplifier spreading
financial contagion across the system. See Carvalho (2014) for an introduction to
6The theory advanced by Jones (2011) is closely connected with the O-ring theory devel-
opment due to Kremer (1993). According to the latter, just like a fault in a component can
render the whole product dysfunctional, economic development can be hampered by a small
deficiency in even one of its factors. In the case of Jones (2011), such a deficiency takes the
form of misallocation within a sector, which propagates to have a significant effect on the overall
economic performance.
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the literature’s core theoretical concepts, and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Salehi (2016) for a detailed review of the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 ex-
plores further evidence on the link between sectoral interconnection and economic
growth; Section 3.3 introduces the paper’s framework of endogenous growth in
an interconnected economy. Section 3.4 spells out the framework’s key theoret-
ical predictions, while Section 3.5 reports current results on testing them for a
calibrated version of the framework. The last section concludes.
3.2 Evidence on the Link between Interconnection
and Growth
This section starts with introducing the dataset used in the section’s empir-
ical exercises (Section 3.2.1), and then proceeds with discussing the methodology
and presenting the findings (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Dataset Description
The dataset comprises a balanced panel of 63 countries (including all
OECD members and all G20 members)7, covering the period from 1995 to 2011.
In total, the dataset encompasses no less than 66% and 70% of, respectively,
the world’s total output and employment. The data come from two sources: we
use the information on intersectoral connection from the OECD Input-Output
Tables – a set of harmonised 33 industries by 33 industries input-output tables8
compiled by the OECD – to gauge sectoral reliance on intermediates RI by the
ratio of total sales of intermediates to a sector, to its total sales. All other socio-
economic indicators used in the paper are from Penn World Tables 9.0 by Feenstra
et al. (2015).
7See Table A.1 for the full list of countries.
8See Table A.2 for the list of industries included.
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3.2.2 Methodology and Results
We test the presence of a relationship between the strength of intersectoral
links and economic growth by running the regression as follows
Gr∆ti;t = const+ b1RI
a
i;t−1 + bxi;t−1 (3.1)
where Gr∆ti;t is economy i’s growth rate averaged over ∆t years starting with
year t, RIai;t−1 is the level of reliance on intermediates (measured as the ratio
of intermediate inputs to a sector, to the sector’s gross output) averaged across
its industries for year t − 1: RIai;t−1 ≡ 1N
∑N
j=1
Int. Salesji;t−1
Total Salesji;t−1
(N is the number of
industries, j is a sector’s index), which is the same as the measure used in plotting
Figure 3.1. Finally, xi;t−1 is the list of controlling regressors’ values in t− 1.
We compile x in such a way as to rule out the impact of other common
growth factors:9 in particular, we include the logarithms of initial levels of GDP
per capita, the logarithms of human capital, population growth rates and saving
rates.
In addition, the findings by Acemoglu et al. (2012) reveal a connection
between an economy’s sectoral interlinkage and volatility, of which the latter is
shown to impede growth (see Ramey and Ramey (1995)). To control for the im-
pact of this potential channel, we incorporate aggregate volatility in our estimates
by adding the moving standard deviation of an economy’s growth rate to the list
of controls x.
Furthermore, as we do not distinguish between domestic and foreign in-
termediates when calculating RI, one could argue that regression (3.1) can pick
the positive relationship between growth and openness to international trade.10
9See Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) for a detailed review of common growth re-
gressors, and Levine and Renelt (1992) for a discussion of their robustness.
10The idea dates back to Adam Smith. More recent contributions focus on trade as a
conduit for dissemination of new ideas and include Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Grossman
and Helpman (1991b), Eaton and Kortum (2002). See Grossman and Helpman (2015) for a
review.
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To rule this out, we use different measures of trade openness (the results below
are presented for the share of real total trade in real output). Finally, we include
dummies for world geographical regions as defined by the World Bank.11
In order to dampen the impact of short-run fluctuations, we set the aver-
aging period ∆t in (3.1) equal to ∆t ∈ {5; 6; 7; 8}. We choose 8 as ∆t’s maximal
length so that there is more than one time observation per country in our dataset.
In addition to working with the panel, we repeat the exercise in the cross-section
setting, where all regressors’ values are taken for the dataset’s initial year 1995,
and the growth rates are averaged for the 1995− 2011 period (i.e., ∆t = 16). The
11See https://data.worldbank.org/country.
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results are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: The relationship between economic growth in 1995–2011 and
the average reliance on intermediates RIa.
Dep. var. Growth rate of GDP per worker averaged across ∆t years
∆t = 5 yrs ∆t = 6 yrs ∆t = 7 yrs ∆t = 8 yrs ∆t = 16 yrs
RIa
0.032∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.047∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.049∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.047∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.037∗∗
(0.017)
ln(hc)
0.016∗∗
(0.007)
0.030∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
ln(Y/L)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
gL
−0.536∗∗∗
(0.037)
−0.388∗∗∗
(0.113)
−0.225∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.299∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.400∗∗
(0.185)
s
0.004
(0.010)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.011
(0.009)
const
0.144∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.147∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.149∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.136∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.016)
Regional
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 63 63 63 63 63
Periods 3 2 2 2 1
R2 0.683 0.786 0.893 0.937 0.987
R2adj 0.658 0.762 0.880 0.930 0.984
NOTES ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
1. ln(hc) and ln(Y/L) are the logarithms of initial levels of human capital and GDP
per capita, gL is the population growth rate, s is the savings rate;
2. In order to control for cross-country heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional weighting
was used alongside calculating standard errors robust to cross-section heteroske-
dasticity;
3. The case of ∆t = 16 corresponds to a simple cross-country regression estimated
using the weighted LS.
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Table 3.2: The relationship between economic growth in 1995–2011 and
the median reliance on intermediates RIm.
Dep. var. Growth rate of GDP per worker averaged across ∆t years
∆t = 5 yrs ∆t = 6 yrs ∆t = 7 yrs ∆t = 8 yrs ∆t = 16 yrs
RIm
0.024∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.048∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.015)
ln(hc)
0.016∗∗
(0.007)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.016∗∗
(0.006)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)
ln(Y/L)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.001)
gL
−0.533∗∗∗
(0.045)
−0.367∗∗
(0.152)
−0.226∗∗∗
(0.037)
−0.295∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.425∗∗∗
(0.153)
s
0.004
(0.010)
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.013∗∗∗
(0.005)
const
0.146∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.156∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.138∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.135∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.140∗∗∗
(0.018)
Regional
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 63 63 63 63 63
Periods 3 2 2 2 1
R2 0.683 0.786 0.893 0.937 0.987
R2adj 0.658 0.762 0.880 0.930 0.984
NOTES
See Table 3.1.
The table shows the presence of a strong positive link between the av-
erage reliance on intermediates and the growth rate. As a robustness check,
we repeat the exercise above for the median reliance on intermediates RIm ≡
median
(
Int. Sales1i;t−1
Total Sales1i;t−1
; . . . ;
Int. SalesNi;t−1
Total SalesNi;t−1
)
, with the results (see Table 3.2) consist-
ent with the findings above for RIa.
The concurrence of the empirical results on the presence of a relationship
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between the strength of sectoral interlinkage and economic growth motivates a
theoretical exploration of the matter, to which we move in the next section.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
We begin the discussion of the paper’s theoretical framework by intro-
ducing in Section 3.3.1 a simplified model capturing the paper’s intuition that
stronger intersectoral connection implies stronger amplification of productivity
growth on the economy-wide level, as increased productivity of a firm can bene-
fit not only firms further downstream, but the original firm as well if it draws
some its inputs from those, thus creating a virtuous cycle increasing an economy’s
aggregate growth. In Section 3.3.2 we proceed to consider a richer theoretical set-
ting with endogenously growing interconnected economy, whereby technological
growth is an outcome of optimal innovation choices by competing monopolist
firms.
3.3.1 Introductory Theoretical Illustration
As a means of illustrating the paper’s intuition, consider the following
stylised model. Suppose that an economy operates in continuous time, and is
represented by N perfectly competitive firms, each using a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology with labour and other firms’ products (intermediate goods)
as inputs
yi(t) =
qi(t)
ζi
li(t)
1−ν
(
N∏
j=1
yij(t)
αij
)ν
(3.2)
where yi is the i-th firm’s output, qi(t) is its productivity, li(t) and yij(t) are,
respectively, the amounts of labour and other firms’ products it employs in
period t; ν ∈ [0; 1) is the total share of intermediate products in the i-th firm’s
sales, and αij ∈ [0; 1] is j-th firm’s share within that share; coefficient ζi ≡
(1− ν)1−ν∏Nj=1 (ναij)ναij is introduced for normalisation purposes. In this sec-
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tion, we simplify the exposition by assuming that all intermediate inputs are used
with the same intensity, so that ∀i, j = 1 ÷ N , αij = α = 1N . Together all αijs
can be represented jointly by a technological matrix A ≡ α1N = 1N1N , where 1N
is an N ×N matrix of ones.
In light of (3.2), and since the firms are perfect competitors, one can
straightforwardly show that the vector of equilibrium prices’ natural logarithms p∗(t)
is described by the matrix expression as follows12
p∗(t) = lnw(t) eN − (EN − νA)−1 q(t) = lnw(t) eN −
(
EN +
ν
1− ν A
)
q(t)
(3.3)
where eN and EN are, respectively, theN×1 vector of ones and theN×N identity
matrix; q(t) is the vector of the natural logarithms of firms’ productivities.
Assume that each firm’s product is consumed by the representative house-
hold with symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences
C(t) = N
N∏
i=1
ci(t)
1
N (3.4)
where ci(t) is the consumption of the i-th firm’s product. The expression is multi-
plied by N for normalisation purposes. The household comprises L(t) individuals,
each supplying inelastically one unit of labour.
The household’s optimising behaviour entails that aggregate spending on
consumption (which is equivalent to the economy’s GDP, given the absence of
capital investment) amounts to P (t)C(t), where P (t) ≡
(∏N
i=1 pi(t)
) 1
N is the
economy’s price index. In what follows, we use the household’s optimal con-
sumption bundle as the numeraire, which entails that P (t) = 1 ∀t.
Combining the solution for the system of equilibrium prices (3.3) with the
definition of the aggregate price index P (t) yields the following expression for the
12See the derivation in Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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natural logarithm of the equilibrium wage rate
lnP ∗(t) = 0 = lnw(t)− 1
N
eTN
(
EN +
ν
1− νA
)
q(t)⇔
⇔ lnw(t) = 1
1− ν
N∑
i=1
ln qi(t)
N
(3.5)
where (·) T is the transposition operator.
As labour is the only primary production factor in the economy, total
labour compensation constitutes the economy’s value added, so that w(t)L(t) is
the total output, and w(t) = y(t) is GDP per capita. When combined with (3.5),
this suggests the following expression for the economy’s growth rate at t
˙(lnw(t)) =
w˙(t)
w(t)
≡ g(t) = 1
1− ν
N∑
i=1
gi(t)
N
(3.6)
where gi(t) ≡ q˙i(t)qi(t) is the growth rate of firm i’s productivity. The term 11−ν
in the rightmost expression in (3.6) reflects the impact of the interconnection
between firms on the growth rate. The key feature of the term is that it is strictly
greater than one, and increases in ν. This implication comes directly from the
amplification effects inherent in production networks and encapsulated in the
idea of Hulten’s multiplier introduced by Hulten (1978): an increase in firm i’s
productivity translates into that of its output, which leads to the expansion for
all firms downstream from i.13 This in turn induces second- and higher-order
effects for all firms further downstream.14 Thereby, the resulting overall growth
in the economy exceeds the productivity growth rate of any single industry. This
result is further generalised in Section 3.3.2.
13Potentially, a firm’s higher productivity can have an impact on its upstream counteragents
as well, but this effect is reflected only when the elasticity of substitution between a firm’s inputs
is different from unity, i.e. when production technology (3.2) is CES instead of Cobb-Douglas –
see Baqaee (2016) for a discussion.
14The same mechanism is explored by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2017)
in the context of micro-shock propagation, and by Jones (2011) for the amplification of
misallocation-driven distortions.
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Suppose that at t all firms’ productivities are characterised by vector q(t).
During a period starting at t, an episode of technological growth occurs, within
which the i0-th firm sees an increase in its productivity at the rate of gi0(t) = η.
Given (3.6), the growth rate of the economy’s output per capita g(t) during the
episode is
g(t) = g =
1
1− ν
η
N
(3.7)
Note that in the case when intersectoral linkage is absent in the economy – that is,
when ν = 0 (so that industries use only primary production factors represented
by labour) – expression (3.6) transforms as follows
gˆ(t) = gˆ =
η
N
⇔ g = gˆ
1− ν (3.8)
Comparing expressions (3.7) and (3.8) confirms the intuition of (3.6): the pres-
ence of interlinkage serves as an amplifier of economic growth, as the growth rate
of an economy with interconnections g always exceeds that of its counterpart
without a linkage gˆ. In the next section, we explore the amplifying properties of
production networks in the context of a richer framework by introducing endogen-
ous productivity choices and generalising the structure of intersectoral production
networks.
3.3.2 Extended Theoretical Framework
Aggregate Household and Industries
Consider an economy with N industries. All industries’ goods are con-
sumed by a representative household with a weighted version of Cobb-Douglas
preferences introduced in (3.4)
C(t) =
N∏
i=1
(
ci(t)
βi
)βi
,
N∑
i=1
βi = 1 (3.9)
If pi(t)s denote the prices of industries’ goods, one can show that βis determine the
shares of industries’ products in the household’s total spending (which still equals
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GDP in the absence of capital investment): pi(t) ci(t) = pi(t) yi(t) = βiP (t)C(t).
The aggregate price index P (t) is equal to P (t) =
∏N
i=1 pi(t)
βi ⇔ lnPt = βTpt,
where β is the m × 1 vector of βis. We assume that each product is consumed,
so that βi > 0 ∀i. As before, P (t) = 1 ∀t.
The household is assumed to comprise L(t) individuals, each one of whom
supplies inelastically one unit of labour at any t. The population size changes
over time at a fixed rate gL
L˙(t) = gLL(t)⇔ L(t) = L0egLt (3.10)
where L0 is the economy’s initial population.
Collectively, all individuals supply labour and own every firm in the eco-
nomy; all resulting income is spent on consumption
C(t) = Y (t) = w(t)L(t) + Π(t) (3.11)
where w(t) is the wage rate, and Π(t) is the income from receiving the profits of
all firms in the economy.
Each industry operates by aggregating goods supplied by monopolistically
competitive firms, using the following symmetric CES technology
yi(t) = mi(t)
1+κi
 1
mi(t)
mi(t)∫
0
y˜i(k; t)
ξi−1
ξi dk

ξi
ξi−1
(3.12)
where i is the industry’s index, mi(t) is the mass of monopolist firms in the
industry, y˜i(k; t) is the output of the k-th firm, and ξi > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between the products of any two firms in the industry.15,16 In what
15Note that by positing that the elasticity of substitution between firms’ products is strictly
greater than one, we indirectly assume that firms’ goods are more substitutable than industries’,
as the elasticity of substitution between the latter is unity (which follows from the household’s
preferences being Cobb-Douglas). Such a relationship between the elasticities is borne out by
existing evidence – see, e.g., Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2010).
16While ξ is fixed in this section for greater ostensivity, we take into account its potential
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follows, we use tildes to denote firm-level variables.
We follow Ethier (1982), Bènassy (1998), Acemoglu, Antrás, and Help-
man (2007) in adding the term mi(t)
1+κi− ξiξi−1 , κi > −1 to the standard CES
aggregator function in (3.12) to have separate modelling control over the elasti-
city of substitution between firms’ products (captured by ξi) on one hand, and
the so-called returns from specialisation (expressed by κi – see equations (3.32)
and (3.33)) on the other.17 This choice is justified by the fact that, as will be
argued below, the nature of returns to specialisation (i.e. increasing, constant or
decreasing) determines how changes in the mass of firms in industries impact on
the economy’s growth rate.
Given (3.12) together with the standard assumption of price-taking beha-
viour by producers of an industry’s good, one can invoke the standard result that
the demand for the product of each firm is
y˜i(k; t) =
(
pi(t)
p˜i(k; t)
)ξi
yi(t) (3.13)
where p˜i(k; t) is the price of k-th variety, and pi(t) is the equilibrium price of an
industrial good
pi(t) = mi(t)
−κi
 1
mi(t)
mi(t)∫
0
p˜i(k; t)
1−ξidk

1
1−ξi
(3.14)
Finally, we make the following assumptions on the firm dynamics within
an industry. Firstly, while each single firm is the only supplier of its good, there is
free entry and exit for monopolist suppliers in an industry á la Dixit and Stiglitz
temporal variability in the quantification exercises in Section 3.5.1.
17The notion of returns to specialisation has its counterpart in consumer behaviour theory,
known as preference for diversity (‘taste for variety’). They capture how more efficient (in
terms of produced output or derived utility) is the use of many inputs relative to that of a sole
input. Formally, the degree of returns to specialisation can be calculated as the elasticity of
function s(m), which is defined as the ratio of output produced with a multitude m of inputs
supplied in quantity of s/m each, to that resulting from a single input supplied at amount s,
see Bènassy (1996, 1998) for further details.
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(1977). Each firm is ‘small’, so that it does not take into account the impact of its
decisions on industry aggregates pi(t) and yi(t). We assume that the productivity
level of each firm entering an industry at t (denoted as q˜Ei (t)) is determined by
the mean of the industry’s current productivity distribution
q˜Ei (t) =
mi(t)∫
0
q˜i(k; t)
mi(t)
dk (3.15)
In addition, we normalise the productivity of all firms active in all industries at 0,
to unity.
Thirdly, each industry is characterised by an exogenous rate of obsoles-
cence δi > 0, so that at each moment an active firm can permanently cease to
operate with the probability δi. Put equivalently, of mi(t) firms active in the
industry at t, only (1− δi)mi(t) continue to operate further. More formally,
the dynamics of the mass of firms in industry i is described by the differential
equation as follows
m˙i(t) = m
E
i (t)− δimi(t) (3.16)
where mEi (t) is the mass of entrants to an industry. Parameter δi plays the role
of the discount factor in a firm’s problem introduced in the next two sections.
Firms
Production Technology and Innovation
Each firm produces its output with a Cobb-Douglas technology, using
labour and industries’ goods
y˜i(k; t) =
q˜i(k; t)
ζi
l˜i(k; t)
1−νi
(
N∏
j=1
y˜ij(k; t)
αij
)νi
(3.17)
where q˜i(k; t) is the productivity level of k-th firm, and l˜i(k; t) and y˜i(k; t) are
the amounts of labour and each of intermediate inputs it employs; for each i,
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all αijs are assumed to add up to one, so that each firm operates a technology
with constant returns to scale
m∑
j=1
αij = 1, ∀i = 1÷ n (3.18)
Given (3.18), together αijs comprise a stochastic matrix A.18 Coefficient νi still
stands for the share of intermediate inputs in the k-th firm’s sales, but is now
industry specific. Together all νis comprise vector ν. Note that the weights
assigned to each intermediate input are not firm-, but industry-specific.
Each firm can engage in research and development activities (R&D) to
increase its productivity level. Suppose that through spending zi(k; t), units of
the numeraire good, a firm sees the increase in its productivity level as follows
˙˜qi(k; t) =
γi
χi
zi(k; t)
ωi q˜i(k; t)
1−χi (3.19)
where γi > 0, the term q˜i(k; t) 1−χi reflects the increasing difficulty of productivity
enhancement, and 0 < ωi 6 1 captures the degree of diminishing returns from a
firm’s innovative activities. We assume χi to be sufficiently large: χi > ξi − 1, so
that the difficulty of further innovation grows fast enough to keep a firm facing
the trade-off between extracting profits and innovating;19 1
χi
is a normalising
coefficient.
In light of (3.17) and the discussion above, a firm’s profits take the follow-
ing form
p˜ii(k; t) ≡ p˜i(k; t) y˜i(k; t)− w(t) l˜i(k; t)−
N∑
j=1
pj(t) y˜ij(k; t)− zi(k; t) (3.20)
where the first term represents a firm’s sales, whereas the remaining three are its
spending on, respectively, primary inputs (labour), intermediates and R&D.
18The stochastic matrix is a nonnegative square matrix characterised by the property
that Ae = e, where e is the vector of ones of the compatible dimensionality.
19From the mathematical perspective, stipulating that χi > ξi − 1 allows a firm’s prob-
lem (introduced in Section 3.3.2) to have a solution.
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Optimal Behaviour
Each firm seeks to maximise the expected flow of its profits Π˜i(k; t)20 by
setting the optimal price p˜∗i (k; t) and deciding on optimal amounts of inputs (i.e.,
labour and intermediate products) given their prices, and on the optimal R&D
strategy
Π˜i(k; t0) =
+∞∫
t0
e−δi(t−t0)p˜ii(k; t0) dt −→ max
p˜i(k;t0), l˜i(k;t0),
{y˜ij(k;t0)}nj=1, zi(k;t0)
(3.21)
subject to (3.13) and (3.19), where t0 is the time of entry.
Before turning to the solution of a firm’s problem, it is worth noting that,
since there is free entry to each industry, the expected flow of a firm’s profits has to
be zero at every t, which can be straightforwardly shown to imply that p˜ii(k; t) = 0
at any t, or equivalently
zi(k; t)
ωi = p˜i(k; t) y˜i(k; t)− w(t) l˜i(k; t)−
N∑
j=1
pj(t) y˜ij(k; t) , ∀t (3.22)
Starting with the static aspect of problem (3.21), given the demand equa-
tion (3.13) and production technology (3.17), one can derive the following result.
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal pricing and cost structure). The share of each
production factor in a firm’s sales is described by the formulae21
pj(t) y˜
∗
ij(k; t)
p˜∗i (k; t) y˜
∗
i (k; t)
= ξi−1
ξi
νiαij ≡ νiαij
µi
(3.23)
w(t) l˜∗i (k; t)
p˜∗i (k; t) y˜
∗
i (k; t)
= ξi−1
ξi
(1− νi) ≡ 1− νi
µi
(3.24)
20Alternatively, one can think of Π˜i(k; t) as the discounted flow of profits with δi’s being the
discount factor.
21Expressions (3.23), (3.24) enable one to interpret the ad hoc RI indicator in Section 3.2
as the elasticity of a sector’s output with respect to the composite intermediate input.
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where µi ≡ ξiξi−1 is the constant relative mark-up optimally charged by each firm
over its marginal cost ψ˜i(k; t); the latter depends on a firm’s productivity q˜i(k; t)
and the industry-specific component ψi(t)
p˜∗i (k; t) =
ξi
ξi − 1 ψ˜i(k; t) =
ξi
ξi − 1
ψi(t)
q˜i(k; t)
ψi(t) ≡ w(t) 1−νi
(
N∏
j=1
pj(t)
αij
)νi (3.25)
Furthermore, under the optimal pricing strategy (3.25), the free-entry condi-
tion (3.22) transforms as follows
zi(k; t) =
p˜∗i (k; t) y˜
∗
i (k; t)
ξi
(3.26)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1. 
Turning to the characterisation of a firm’s R&D decisions, one can show
that in the optimum a firm’s productivity grows over time at a constant rate
specified in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.2 (Optimal productivity dynamics). The optimal solution
of problem (3.21) given (3.19), (3.20), (3.25) and the free-entry condition (3.22),
implies that a firm’s productivity q˜∗i (k; t) and R&D investment profile z∗i (k; t) are
firm-independent industry-specific exponential functions of t, which assume the
form22
q˜∗i (k; t) = q˜
∗
i (t) = q˜
E
i (t0) e
δi
φi
(t−t0) (3.27)
z∗i (k; t) = z
∗
i (t) = γ
− 1
ωi
i q˜
E
i (t0)
χi
ωi e
δiχi
φiωi
(t−t0) (3.28)
where φi is defined as φi ≡ (ξi − 1)ωi + χiωi (1− ωi). Thereby, the productivity of
all firms in industry i grows at a constant rate equal to δi
φi
.
22We slightly abuse notation by not stating q˜∗i (t) and z˜∗i (t) to be functions of the time
of entry t0: this is done in anticipation of the result that in fact both q˜∗i (k; t) and z˜∗i (t) are
independent of t0, so that all firms in an industry are homogeneous – see Corollary 3.2.1.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.2. 
Note that a firm’s productivity growth rate δi
φi
depends positively on the obsol-
escence rate δi. This result is brought about by the fact that expression (3.27)
embeds the assumption of free entry: as δi increases, a firm’s expected flow of
profits drops, thus reducing entry in industry. This results in fewer firms each
with higher sales, which prompts them to invest in R&D at a higher rate, so that
each unit of its increased output is produced at a lower cost.23
Conversely, an increase in χi or ωi reduces the productivity growth rate δiφi .
A higher χi implies that current productivity growth is impeded more by the ex-
isting stock of knowledge (i.e. it is harder for firms to come by new ideas). Sim-
ilarly, a higher ωi entails that returns from R&D diminish faster, thus prompting
firms to invest in R&D at a smaller rate. In both cases, lower effectiveness of
innovation discourages firms from engaging in R&D, which reduces the resulting
productivity growth rate.
An important implication of the fact that firms’ growth rates are industry-
specific, is the homogeneity of firms within an industry, as argued in the corollary
below.
Corollary 3.2.1. All firms in every industry at any t are homogeneous, and a
firm’s productivity and R&D spending are described by the formulae
q˜∗i (t) = q˜i(0) e
δi
φi
t
= e
δi
φi
t (3.29)
z˜∗i (t) = γ
− 1
ωi
i e
δiχi
φiωi
t (3.30)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3. 
The homogeneity of firms within each industry simplifies significantly the
characterisation of industrial and economy-wide aggregates, to which we turn
23As an alternative argument, one could follow Cohen and Klepper (1996) by stating that
larger sales allow a firm to spread further its R&D costs, thus enabling it to innovate more.
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next.
Equilibrium Aggregate Variables
The implications of the intra-industry homogeneity of firms are two-fold:
first of all, in conjunction with the assumption of free entry, this suggests that each
firm breaks even exactly, thus leaving labour compensation w(t)L(t) as the only
source of the representative household’s income. Given that, total consumption
in the economy C(t) equals total labour income, thereby changing equation (3.11)
accordingly
C(t) = Y (t) = w(t)L(t) (3.31)
As in the illustrating example in Section 3.3.1, since the economy’s total value
added comprises only labour compensation, the growth rate of output per capita
equals that of the wage rate.
Secondly, given the homogeneity of firms in each industry, industrial ag-
gregates yi(t) and pi(t) take the form
yi(t) = mi(t)
1+κi y˜i(t) (3.32)
pi(t) = mi(t)
−κi p˜i(t) (3.33)
As follows from (3.32), parameter κi is by definition the degree of returns to
specialisation in industry i.24 Expressions (3.32) and (3.33) connect returns to
specialisation κi with the response of industrial price indices to entry: if the
returns are decreasing (i.e. κi ∈ (−1; 0)), the entry of more firms increases the
marginal cost of producing the industrial good, which, given that its producers
are competitive, directly translates into a higher price index pi(t). Symmetric
arguments apply to two other cases of constant (κi = 0) and increasing (κi ∈
(0; 1)) returns to specialisation.
24See footnote 17 and the references cited there.
97
Combining (3.33) and (3.32) allows one to express mi(t) as a function of
aggregate output Y (t) = C(t)
pi(t) yi(t) = mi(t) p˜
∗
i (t) y˜
∗
i (t)⇔ mi(t) =
pi(t) yi(t)
p˜∗i (t) y˜
∗
i (t)
=
βiY (t)
ξiz∗i (t) ωi
(3.34)
where the second equality follows from applying the free-entry condition (3.26).
As follows from (3.34), the mass of firms in an industry decreases in a firm’s
R&D spending, which stems from the fact that R&D, being effectively a fixed
cost (from the production perspective), determines the size of a firm under free
entry, which naturally suggests that more R&D translates into larger firms, of
which fewer can be accommodated within an industry.
As in the introductory example in Section (3.3.1), one can derive the eco-
nomy’s growth rate by pinning down its system of equilibrium industrial price
indices. To that end, combining equations (3.25) and (3.33) yields
pi(t) =
ξi
ξi − 1 mi(t)
−κi
w(t) 1−νi
(∏N
j=1 pj(t)
αij
)νi
q˜∗i (t)
(3.35)
One can use the solution of the system of equations implied by (3.35) to show
that the growth rate of the economy takes the form specified in the proposition
below.
Proposition 3.3 (The economy’s equilibrium growth rate). Given the sys-
tem of equations generated by (3.35) ∀i, the economy’s output per capita grows
at the constant rate g
g = βTΛν (gq + dg(κ) gm) (3.36)
where Λν ≡ (EN − dg(ν) A)−1 is the Leontiev inverse, gq and gm are, respect-
ively, the vectors of firm productivity growth rates δi
φi
and firm mass growth
rates (specified below in (3.38)) across all industries; κ is the vector of κis (de-
grees of returns to specialisation); dg(·) is the diagonalisation operator transform-
ing an N × 1 vector x into the N × N matrix X with x’s elements on its main
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Both gq and gm are time-independent.
98
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4. 
Note that the impact of a change in the mass of firms in an industry can be either
positive or negative depending on the returns to specialisation κis. Naturally, if
those are positive, an increase in the mass of firms operating in an industry lead
to a drop in the industry’s price index, thereby producing an expansionary impact
on firms further downstream through the decrease in their costs.
Switching to the growth rates in (3.34), and transforming the result to
the vector form, yields gm = (g + gL) e − dg(χ) dg(ω) gq. When combined
with (3.36), the last expression yields a closed-form solution for the economy’s
growth rate g
g = βTΛν (gq + dg(κ) ((g + gL) e− dg(χ) dg(ω) gq))
g =
σ
1− σgL +
1
1− σβ
TΛν (EN − dg(κ) dg(χ) dg(ω)) gq (3.37)
where σ ≡ βTΛνκ. As the final step, the growth rates of firm masses in in-
dustries gm can be recovered by combining the vectorised growth rate version
of (3.34) mentioned above, with (3.37)
gm = (g + gL) e− dg(χ) dg(ω) gq (3.38)
Expression (3.38) completes the solution of the model.
A particularly simple and analytically tractable characterisation of equa-
tion (3.36) emerges in the case of an economy with constant returns to specialisa-
tion in each industry (i.e. κi = 0 ∀i), so that the growth rate in (3.36) becomes a
function of productivity growth rates δi
φi
in industries, and equation (3.36) reduces
to
g = βTΛνgq ≡ βT (EN − dg(ν) A)−1 gq (3.39)
If one was to interpret gq as a vector of productivity shocks’ logarithms instead
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of productivity growth rates, equation (3.39) is the matrix equivalent of expres-
sions (2), (3) in Acemoglu et al. (2017).
Despite being a particular case of expression (3.37), equation (3.39) cap-
tures two key aspects of the interaction between the intersectoral linkage and
growth: first of all, the exact structure of connections between sectors in the eco-
nomy (as expressed through A) affects the economy’s growth rate; secondly, so
does the extent of industries’ products being used as intermediates (as controlled
through the vector of intermediates’ shares ν). The sections to follow focus on
studying more closely an economy described by (3.39).
3.4 Theoretical Implications of the Model
The examination of equation (3.39) suggests two sharp predictions on the
relationships between the growth rate of an economy on one hand, and the shares
of intermediates ν and the structure of technology matrix A on the other. Start-
ing with the former, one can formally show that an interconnected economy grows
faster than its counterpart without an intersectoral linkage. Furthermore, an in-
crease in industries’ shares of intermediates translates into faster growth. To
see that, first note that in the absence of interlinkage (i.e. when ν = 0N), the
economy’s growth rate gˆ becomes
gˆ = βT (EN − dg(0N) A)−1 gq = βTgq (3.40)
One can use expressions (3.39) and (3.40) to formally show that an interconnected
economy is guaranteed to grow faster than an economy without intersectoral
linkage (which we will term a basic economy), and furthermore, an economy grows
faster as its production becomes more reliant on intermediate products (i.e. g
increases as ν becomes larger, everything else held constant).
Proposition 3.4. Let gˆ = βTgq be the growth rate of a basic economy. Then for
any choice of production matrix A, g > gˆ. Furthermore, the gradient of the growth
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rate with respect to shares of intermediates ∂g
∂ν
is strictly nonnegative ∂g
∂ν
> 0 so
long as at least one industry experiences growth.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.5. 
This result is a direct generalisation of the conclusion in Section 3.3.1:
through transmitting downstream the impact of productivity growth in an in-
dustry, a production network amplifies the effect of intra-industry growth epis-
odes, thereby making an interconnected economy grow faster. Moreover, if the
interlinkage plays a more pronounced role in production (i.e. when νis are larger),
the amplification effects stemming from it, intuitively become more marked.
Turning to the link between technology matrix A and growth rate g, it is
instructive to consider first a particular case of an economy described in (3.39),
for which all industries are characterised by the same share of intermediates
in production νi = ν, ∀i. In this setting, one can formally establish that an
interconnected economy grows at its fastest when all its sectors are connected
only with the fastest-growing industry, and the latter uses only its own product
as the only intermediate. Such a configuration of a linkage is known as the star
network, whose corresponding production matrix (denoted as 1N(i0) thereafter)
has a column of ones in the i0th position, and zeros elsewhere. The result is
established in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that ν = νe ⇔ dg(ν) = νEN , and let i0 denote
the index of the industry with the maximal growth rate gmax = gi0 ≡ max
i=1÷N
{
δi
φi
}
.
Then the growth rate of an economy described by (3.39), attains its maximal value
when the economy’s underlying structure is described by production matrix 1N(i0).
Furthermore, the maximum is strict if only one sector grows at the rate of gmax.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.6. 
One should note that Proposition 3.5 mirrors the conclusions drawn by
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2017) that the impact of micro-
shocks is propagated more strongly in economies with a more concentrated inter-
101
linkage. If one were to liken productivity shifts to perfectly persistent nonrandom
shocks (however oxymoronic this may sound), then our framework suggests that
the impact of such a ‘shock’ on the economy is maximal if the technology struc-
ture of the economy is aligned in such a way as to propagate it maximally from
the source. This is naturally the case when an economy’s interlinkage is focused
entirely on the industry within which productivity growth is the fastest. This
result can be generalised for the case when industries’ shares of intermediates are
heterogeneous. One can first introduce the following notation
Definition. The concentration potential of industry i is di ≡ δi/φi1−νi .
Proposition 3.6. Let i1 denote the index of an industry with the highest con-
centration potential di1 ≡ δi1/φi11−νi1 = dmax ≡ maxi=1×N
{
δi/φi
1−νi
}
. Then the growth rate
of an economy described by (3.39), attains its maximal value when the economy’s
underlying structure is described by production matrix 1N(i1). Furthermore, the
maximum is strict if only one sector is characterised by the maximal value dmax.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.6. 
The gist of Proposition 3.6 is that maximal growth is achieved when an
economy’s interlinkage is concentrated on the industry which, when being the
focal point of the interlinkage, produces the maximal impact on the economy’s
growth rate. As follows from the definition of the concentration potential and
Proposition 3.6, such a status is determined by two considerations: how fast
an industry grows, and how much its production relies on intermediates. To
see the importance of the latter factor, consider an industry characterised by
fast productivity growth and low reliance on intermediates.25 In this case, if
the industry becomes the focus of the economy’s productive network (and, in
particular, its own supplier), the indirect impact of productivity growth within it
on the economy is channelled only through the industry itself, since it draws only
25Formally the requirement of weak reliance on intermediates is equivalent to saying that
there exists another industry with a higher concentration potential.
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on its own product as the intermediate. Since the industry does not rely much
on intermediates, its indirect impact on itself is liable to stay weak, thus limiting
the strength of the overall effect of its productivity growth on the economy.
Therefore, while the productivity growth rate δi/φi captures the strength
of an industry’s initial impact on economic growth, that of its indirect impact is
also affected by how intensely the industry uses intermediates, which in particular
determines how much it itself is affected by productivity shifts within it.
Given the model’s theoretical predictions, the next step is naturally to
validate them empirically. As a preceding step, however, one needs to map the
model’s elements to data – we turn to this question in the next section.
3.5 Testing the Predictions
3.5.1 Calibration of the Model
This section discusses the paper’s approach to quantifying the theoret-
ical framework developed in Section 3.3.2, using the dataset introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. We start with a few brief introductory remarks concerning how values
for the model’s parameters β and A can calculated from input-output tables (Sec-
tion 3.5.1), after which Section 3.5.1 describes extracting values for sectoral mark-
ups µis and shares of intermediates ν. Section 3.5.1 focuses on various approaches
to calculating technology growth rates.
First Step: Consumption Shares βi and
Technology Matrices A
The calibration of the model requires quantifying five of its objects: vector
of consumption shares β, technology matrix A, vector of sectoral mark-ups µ,
vector of intermediate shares ν and vector of productivity growth rates in indus-
tries gq. This section focuses on the first three, as those can be derived directly
from the same statistical object – a country’s input-output table, which contains
data on flows of goods and services between industries, as well as the amount
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Figure 3.2: A schematic example of an input-output table.
of industries’ production used in final consumption, and the volume of value ad-
ded within each industry.26 A schematic example of an input-output table is
presented in Figure 3.2.
From Figure 3.2, consumption shares βis can be derived using their defin-
ition by dividing consumption of an industry’s product by total consumption. In
particular, we derive the consumption of a sector’s product as the sum of con-
sumption by households, non-profit organisations and the government (domestic
consumption) plus imports minus changes in inventories.
The key to extracting an economy’s technology matrix A is equation (3.23),
which connects the observable intensity in sectors’ use of other sectors’ products
with the an industry’s share of intermediates νi, mark-up µi and components
of the technology matrix A as follows: Salesij
Salesi
=
νiαij
µi
. Summing the expression
across all js yields
∑N
j=1
Salesij
Salesi
= νi
µi
, thereby pinning down αij as the ratio of the
26The description in the text concerns the so-called industry-by-industry input-output table,
whose alternative is the product-by-product input-output table capturing flows between pro-
duction of different goods. We focus on the former characterisation following the structure of
datasets available for this paper.
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two expressions’ left-hand sides
αij =
νiαij
µi∑N
j=1
νiαij
µi
=
Salesij
Salesi∑N
j=1
Salesij
Salesi
(3.41)
Given (3.41), A can be extracted from the matrix of intermediate uses (marked
orange in Figure 3.2) by normalising each of its columns by the sum of its ele-
ments, and then transposing the result.
A closer examination of equation (3.23) shows why, while all αijs can be
extracted directly from an input-output table, νis cannot: as firms in the paper’s
framework are not competitive, production factors they use are remunerated at
levels below their marginal products – this introduces the wedge between elast-
icities of output νiαij and 1 − νi, and corresponding factor shares in sales νiαijµi
and 1−νi
µi
, making it impossible to infer νis directly from the last two conditions
without the knowledge of sectoral mark-ups µi.
Second Step: Sectoral Mark-ups µi and Shares of Intermediates νi
The paper’s main approach to estimating mark-ups is by calculating the
share of an industry’s net operating surplus (NOPS, which can be broadly thought
of as a macro analogue of operating profits) in its total output net of taxes. Unfor-
tunately, our data sources contain information on NOPS for approximately 64%
of observations, which has led us to using cruder estimates for remaining µis. In
particular, data on gross operating surplus (GOPS) have larger coverage than
those on NOPS, but this indicator comprises both NOPS and industries’ cap-
ital consumption (i.e. capital depreciation in sectors), thus producing positively
biased estimates of mark-ups. To compensate for the bias, we take the average
of GOPS-based estimates of µis and a lower estimate of an industry’s operating
surplus, for which we use the share of an industry’s domestic investment in fixed
capital (the so-called gross fixed capital formation, GFCF), in its total output.27
27Our reasoning for this choice of lower estimate is motivated by the fact that GFCF, being a
form of investment, has to be ultimately financed from the revenues generated by an industry’s
operations.
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Finally, whenever information on GOPS was missing, we estimated µis either
using the measure based on domestic GFCF or (in the absence of information
on the latter), the ratio of total GFCF to total sales of an industry’s products
including imports.
While differing from more analytical methods developed in the special-
ised literature (see, e.g., Hall (1988), Klette (1999), De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012)), the paper’s approach produces results remarkably consistent with those
in the papers cited above, with the average and median mark-ups’ equalling,
respectively, 1.131 and 1.100 (see Figure A.2 for the distribution of mark-up es-
timates).
With µis’ estimates, condition (3.23) becomes overidentified, as for every
industry i its share of intermediates νi can be calculated as νi =
Salesij
Salesi
µi
αij
for any
choice of the intermediate j. This ambiguity can be resolved by regressing the
vector of µi
Salesij
Salesi
on the vector of technological coefficients αij for all j, thereby
pinning νi down as follows
νi = µi
∑N
j=1 αij
Salesij
Salesi∑N
j=1 α
2
ij
= µi
N∑
j=1
Salesij
Salesi
(3.42)
where the rightmost expression in (3.42) follows from (3.41).28
As the four parameters β, A, µ, and ν can be extracted from input-output
tables, one can quantify them using the dataset introduced in Section 3.2.1 – see
Appendix A.4 for the description of the results.
As the final step in quantifying the model’s parameters, one can use the
acquired knowledge of β, ν and A to derive industries’ productivity growth rates,
which is the focus of the next section.
28Alternatively, expression (3.42) can be derived by estimating νi for every intermediate j
as SalesijSalesi
µi
αij
, and then aggregating the results using the weighted average with weights equal to
the technological coefficients of the corresponding intermediates νi =
∑N
j=1 αij
(
Salesij
Salesi
· µiαij
)
=
µi
∑N
j=1
Salesij
Salesi
.
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Third Step: Productivity Growth Rates δi
φi
While data for β and A can be extracted directly from a country’s stand-
ard input-output table, recovering industries’ shares of intermediates and growth
rates can be achieved only indirectly through using either a firm’s production
function (3.17) (the direct approach)29 or its price function (3.25) (the dual ap-
proach).
The first method relies on the industry-level version of (3.17), which can
be derived by multiplying both sides of the expression by the mass of firms mi(t)
mi(t) y˜i(t) = yi(t) =
q˜i(t)
ζi
(
mi(t) l˜i(t)
)1−νi ( N∏
j=1
(mi(t) y˜ij(t))
αij
)νi
(3.43)
where mi(t) l˜i(t) ≡ li(t) is an industry’s consumption of primary production
factors, and mi(t) y˜ij(t) ≡ yij(t) is the amount of industry j’s real output used in
industry i. Given (3.43), the growth rates of q˜∗i (t)s can be quantified empirically
as follows
ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
= ln
(
yi;t+1
yi;t
)
− (1− νi) ln
(
li;t+1
li;t
)
− νi
N∑
j=1
αij ln
(
yij;t+1
yij;t
)
(3.44)
All N productivity growth rates ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
can be exactly identified from condi-
tion (3.44) applied to every i.
The main complication in employing the method above is that an accurate
assessment of primary factors’ volumes would involve imputing amounts of capital
services used in industries. The latter is approximated by estimates of the stock
of capital in an industry, which itself requires making assumptions on capital
depreciation rates, as well as asset composition and initial levels of capital.
An alternative to the approach above is to use a firm’s pricing condi-
tion (3.25) which, when multiplied by price index P (t), brings about the expres-
29The approach is used in such productivity databases as PDB and PDBi by OECD, and
EU KLEMS.
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sion
P (t) pi(t) = µi
(P (t)w(t))1−νi
(∏N
j=1 (P (t) pj(t))
αij
)νi
q˜∗i (t)
(3.45)
where the absence of tildes at pi(t) and pj(t)s underscores that formula (3.45)
holds for industries’ price indices as much as for individual firms, owing to the
assumption that κ = 0. With this equivalence in mind, one can recover P (t) p∗i (t)s
from data as sectoral price indices, and P (t)w(t) as nominal GDP per capita.
Thereby, the empirical equivalent of (3.45) is
$i;t = µi
(
nGDPt
Lt
)1−νi (∏N
j=1$j;t
αij
)νi
q˜∗i;t
(3.46)
where term
∏N
j=1$j;t
αij can be interpreted as the price index of intermediates
used in industry i. Switching to the growth-rate form of (3.46) enables one to
isolate the growth rate of q˜i;t, thus yielding the final result
ln
(
$i;t+1
$i;t
)
= (1− νi) ln
(
nGDPt+1/Lt+1
nGDPt/Lt
)
+νi ln
(∑N
j=1 αij$j;t+1∑N
j=1 αij$j;t
)
−ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
(3.47)
ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
= νi ln
(∑N
j=1 αij “$j;t+1∑N
j=1 αij “$j;t
)
− ln
(
“$i;t+1
“$i;t
)
(3.48)
where “$i;t ≡ $i;tnGDPt/Lt is the ratio of an industry’s price index to the coun-
try’s output per capita. Together equations of type (3.48) form a system from
which ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
can be exactly identified.
Note that irrespective of the method used, each of the exactly identified
systems of equations (either based on (3.44) or on (3.48)) can be transformed into
an over-identified one by adding the expression for the growth rate (3.39), which
opens the way to calculating ln
(
q˜∗i;t+1
q˜∗i;t
)
using the GMM.
Comparing the two approaches above suggests that while both require
the knowledge of industrial price indices – either direct for $i;ts in the dual
approach, or for the imputation of real quantities of intermediates yij;t, the latter
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method also involves making further assumptions concerning capital assets used
in industries. For this reason the indirect approach seems a more desirable option.
3.5.2 Empirical Analysis
As mentioned in the last section, values for four out five primitives in the
framework (namely, β, A, µ and ν) can be extracted from countries’ input-output
tables (i.e. from the dataset introduced in Section 3.2.1), while calculating sec-
toral growth rates requires the extra input of sectoral prices. Even though the last
aspect is still work in progress, having the values for shares of intermediates νis
enables one to revisit exploring the relationship between reliance on intermediates
and economic growth, as the paper’s model makes a more specific prediction of
the presence of a positive link between ν and g, as follows from Proposition 3.4.
We test this implication by repeating the exercise from Section 3.2.2 with
average value of νi used instead of the ad hoc RIa indicator
Gr∆ti;t = const+ b1ν¯i;t−1 + bxi;t−1 (3.49)
Applying the methodology of Section 3.2.2 to equation (3.49) yields results strongly
consistent with the findings presented in Section 3.2.2,30 with the signs as pre-
dicted by the model (see Table 3.3). As in Section 3.2.2, the positive link between
the use of intermediates and economic growth passes the robustness check of
substituting the median share of intermediates νmed for ν¯, as demonstrated in
30While the insignificance of ν¯ and νmed for the five-year period specification admittedly
does not support our theoretical predictions, it is clearly outweighed by the strong significance
of both ν¯ and νmed across all other averaging intervals, and the coefficients’ consistence with
the results presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2.
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Table 3.4.
Table 3.3: The relationship between economic growth in 1995–2011 and
the mean share of intermediates ν¯.
Dep. var. Growth rate of GDP per worker averaged across ∆t years
∆t = 5 yrs ∆t = 6 yrs ∆t = 7 yrs ∆t = 8 yrs ∆t = 16 yrs
ν¯
0.009
(0.015)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.057∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.063∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.007)
ln(hc)
0.017∗∗
(0.008)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.028∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.008)
ln(Y/L)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.002)
gL
−0.540∗∗∗
(0.054)
−0.352∗∗∗
(0.087)
−0.276∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.310∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.325∗
(0.170)
s
0.009
(0.011)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.008)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.005
(0.008)
const
0.161∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.142∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.124∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.158∗∗∗
(0.013)
Regional
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 63 63 63 63 63
Periods 3 2 2 2 1
R2 0.658 0.909 0.791 0.941 0.989
R2adj 0.631 0.898 0.767 0.935 0.986
NOTES ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
1. ln(hc) and ln(Y/L) are the logarithms of initial levels of human capital and GDP
per capita, gL is the population growth rate, s is the savings rate;
2. In order to control for cross-country heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional weighting
was used alongside calculating standard errors robust to cross-section heteroske-
dasticity;
3. The case of ∆t = 16 corresponds to a simple cross-country regression estimated
using the weighted LS.
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Table 3.4: The relationship between economic growth in 1995–2011 and
the median share of intermediates νmed.
Dep. var. Growth rate of GDP per worker averaged across ∆t years
∆t = 5 yrs ∆t = 6 yrs ∆t = 7 yrs ∆t = 8 yrs ∆t = 16 yrs
νmed
−0.001
(0.011)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
ln(hc)
0.017∗∗
(0.007)
0.033∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.020∗∗
(0.008)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.004)
ln(Y/L)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.001)
gL
−0.538∗∗∗
(0.063)
−0.344∗∗∗
(0.091)
−0.307∗∗∗
(0.027)
−0.281∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.391∗∗∗
(0.143)
s
0.009
(0.013)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.010)
−0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.008∗
(0.005)
const
0.168∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.155∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.138∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.013)
Regional
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 63 63 63 63 63
Periods 3 2 2 2 1
R2 0.650 0.838 0.777 0.832 0.989
R2adj0.623 0.819 0.751 0.813 0.987
NOTES ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
See Table 3.3.
3.6 Summary
This paper has explored the role of intersectoral connection as an ampli-
fying factor of economic growth. Our results suggest that stronger connections
between industries result in stronger growth through the presence of Hulten’s mul-
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tiplier – an increase in the productivity of a firm increases that of its downstream
counteragents, which can then affect the original firm indirectly if it sources some
of its inputs from them.
This work has two direct avenues for further development. First of all, the
author’s ongoing project is the empirical testing of the framework’s predictions on
the optimal structure of the intersectoral interlinkage. This validation is based
on the knowledge of sectoral productivity growth rates (which can be derived
from sectoral prices along the lines discussed in the paper), which can be used
to identify industries with the highest concentration potential, and to examine
whether economies concentrated on those, tend to grow faster.
The second direction concerns studying the properties of the general model
introduced in the framework, and in particular, examining how robust the star
network is – as the optimal growth-enhancing configuration of the sectoral inter-
linkage – in these conditions.
Finally, throughout this work sectoral technologies (as jointly represented
by technology matrix A) have been assumed to be exogenous – while this suffices
for the scope of the present research, in future it would be instructive to consider
a framework with endogenised technology choice following the frameworks ad-
vanced by Acemoglu (2002, 2007), Jones (2005) and Caselli and Coleman (2006).
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Conclusion
As one famous but variably attributed31 saying goes, to believe that in-
finite growth is possible with finite resources, one has to be an economist or a
madman. Perhaps, productivity growth and, in particular, technological growth
constitutes the main reason why economists are included as a separate group
in this insightful quote. Indeed, humanity’s ability to produce more and better
from a given amount of inputs, has been arguably one of the most important long-
run drivers of socio-economic development starting from the Neolithic revolution
about 12 000 years ago.
This dissertation has sought to improve the state of our understanding of
three innovation- and technology-related phenomena. The first two are innova-
tion and technology growth factors: competition between innovating firms and
business cycles, and one is a transmission channel from technological growth to
economic growth – the presence of production interdependencies between firms
within an economy.
In particular, Chapter 1 suggests a way of understanding how a nonlinear
relationship between competition and innovation can remain hidden if there is no
consensus on which indicator is used to measure the innovative activity. Chapter 2
argues that innovation effort can be both procyclical and countercyclical – that
is, business cycles can appear to contribute both positively and negatively to
it, depending on whether it is considered on the macro-level of industries and
economies, or the micro-level of individual firms. Finally, Chapter 3 offers a way
31To the best of the author’s knowledge, this apophthegm has been ascribed to either Amer-
ican economist Kenneth E. Boulding or British broadcaster Sir David F. Attenborough.
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of thinking about production links between industries as – in its own right – a
magnifying factor for productivity growth occurring within firms, which amplifies
and channels it to the level of the whole economy, as well as pinning down the
link structure which delivers the maximal strengthening of sectoral growth.
A natural way to extend the first two chapters is to seek more direct empir-
ical support to theories advanced therein. This would require working with firm-
level datasets which include information on R&D (i.e., Compustat for the U.S.
or AMADEUS for Europe). As concerns the last chapter, three key avenues for
further exploration are, first, the investigation of the framework’s generalised ver-
sion with scaled effects in an economy’s sectors, including its calibration; second,
empirical validation of the framework’s predictions on the optimal structure of
an intersectoral linkage, and finally, endogenising the structure of connections
between sectors.
The author hopes that the findings arrived at and presented in this disser-
tation will stand the profession in good stead in its continuous quest for bettering
our knowledge on the phenomenon of productivity growth and technological in-
novation.
114
Bibliography
Daron Acemoglu. Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Tech-
nical Change and Wage Inequality. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113
(4):1055–1089, November 1998.
Daron Acemoglu. Directed Technical Change. The Review of Economic Studies,
69(4):781–809, October 2002.
Daron Acemoglu. Equilibrium Bias of Technology. Econometrica, 75(5):1371–
1410, October 2007.
Daron Acemoglu. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009.
Daron Acemoglu and Dan Cao. Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents. Journal
of Economic Theory, 157:255–294, May 2015.
Daron Acemoglu, Pol Antrás, and Elhanan Helpman. Contracts and Technology
Adoption. The American Economic Review, 97(3):916–943, June 2007.
Daron Acemoglu, Vasco M. Carvalho, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-
Salehi. The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica, 80(5):
1977–2016, September 2012.
Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Systemic Risk
and Stability in Financial Networks. The American Economic Review, 105(2):
564–608, February 2015.
115
Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Networks,
Shocks and Systemic Risk. In Yann Bramoullé, Andrea Galeotti, and
Brian W. Rogers, editors, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks,
chapter 21, pages 569–607. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2016.
Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Microeconomic
Origins of Macroeconomic Tail Risks. The American Economic Review, 107
(1):54–108, January 2017.
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt. A Model of Growth Through Creative De-
struction. Econometrica, 60(2):323–351, March 1992.
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt. Endogenous Growth Theory. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1998.
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt. Growth with Quality-Improving Innovations:
An Integrated Framework. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, editors,
Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, chapter 8, pages 67–110. North Holland,
Oxford, UK, 2005.
Philippe Aghion and Gilles Saint-Paul. Virtues of Bad Times. Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 2(3):322–344, September 1998.
Philippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter
Howitt. Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):701–728, May 2005.
Philippe Aghion, George-Marios Angeletos, Abhijit Banerjee, and Kalina Man-
ova. Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and the Composition of Invest-
ment. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(3):246–265, April 2010.
Philippe Aghion, Philippe Askenazy, Nicolas Berman, Gilbert Cette, and Laurent
Eymard. Credit and the Cyclicality of R&D Investment: Evidence from
France. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(5):1001–1024, Oc-
tober 2012.
116
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, and Peter Howitt. Growth Econometrics. In Phil-
ippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth,
Vol. 2B, chapter 1, pages 515–563. North Holland, Oxford, UK, 2014.
Kenneth J. Arrow. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing. The Review
of Economic Studies, 29(3):155–173, June 1962.
Philippe Askenazy, Christophe Cahn, and Delphine Irac. Competition, R&D,
and the Cost of Innovation: Evidence form France. Oxford Economic Papers,
65(2):293–311, April 2013.
Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein. Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and Inter-
national Relative Prices. The American Economic Review, 98(5):1998–2031,
December 2008.
Mauro Bambi, Fausto Gozzi, and Omar Licandro. Endogenous Growth and
Wave-Like Business Fluctuations. Journal of Economic Theory, 154(5):68–111,
September 2014.
Robert B. Banks. Growth and Diffusion Phenomena: Mathematical Frameworks
and Applications. Texts in Applied Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, New York,
NY, 1994.
David R. Baqaee. Cascading Failures in Production Networks. Working paper,
Harvard University, September 2016.
Gadi Barlevy. On the Cyclicality of Research and Development. The American
Economic Review, 97(4):1131–1164, September 2007.
Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2 edition, 2004.
Jean-Pascal Bènassy. Taste for Variety and Optimum Production Patterns in
Monopolistic Competition. Economics Letters, 52(1):41–47, July 1996.
117
Jean-Pascal Bènassy. Is There Always Too Little Research in Endogenous Growth
with Expanding Product Variety? European Economic Review, 42(1):61–69,
January 1998.
Pilar Beneito, María Engracia Rochina-Barrachina, and Amparo Sanchis-Llopis.
Ownership and the Cyclicality of Firms’ R&D Investment. International En-
trepreneurship and Management Journal, 11(2):343–359, June 2015.
Benjamin Bental and Dan Peled. The Accumulation of Wealth and the Cyclical
Generation of New Technologies: A Search Theoretic Approach. International
Economic Review, 53(2):687–718, August 1996.
Paul Bishop and Nick Wiseman. External Ownership and Innovation in the
United Kingdom. Applied Economics, 31(4):443–450, April 1999.
Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and John van Reenen. Market Share, Market
Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 66(3):529–554, 1999.
Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein. Globalization and the Gains from
Variety. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):541–585, May 2006.
Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein. Product Creation and Destruction:
Evidence and Price Implications. The American Economic Review, 100(3):
691–723, June 2010.
Ricardo J. Caballero and Mohamad L. Hammour. The Cleansing Effect of Re-
cessions. The American Economic Review, 84(5):1350–1368, December 1994.
Jeffrey R. Campbell. Entry, Exit, Embodied Technology, and Business Cycles.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(2):371–408, April 1998.
Gerald Carlino and William R. Kerr. Agglomeration and Innovation. In Gilles
Duranton, J. Verner Henderson, and William C. Strange, editors, Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 5. North Holland, Oxford, UK, 2015.
118
Vasco M. Carvalho. From Micro to Macro via Production Networks. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 28(4):23–47, Autumn 2014.
Vasco M. Carvalho and Nico Voigtländer. Input Diffusion and the Evolution of
Production Networks. Working Paper 20025, NBER, March 2015.
Francesco Caselli and John Coleman. The World Technology Frontier. The
American Economic Review, 96(3):499–522, June 2006.
Tiago V.V. Cavalcanti and Chryssi Giannitsarou. Growth and Human Capital: A
Network Approach. The Economic Journal, 127(603):1279–1317, August 2017.
Suk Bong Choi, Lee Soo Hee, and Christopher Williams. Ownership and Firm
Innovation in a Transition Economy: Evidence from China. Research Policy,
40(3):441–452, April 2011.
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of
Political Economy, 113(1):1–45, February 2005.
Gian Luca Clementi and Berardino Palazzo. Entry, Exit, Firm Dynamics, and
Aggregate Fluctuations. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(3):
1–41, July 2016.
Wesley M. Cohen and Steven Klepper. A Reprise of Size and R&D. The Economic
Journal, 106(437):925–951, July 1996.
Diego Comin and Mark Gertler. Medium-Run Economic Cycles. The American
Economic Review, 96(3):523–551, June 2006.
Guido Cozzi and Giammario Impullitti. Government Spending Composition,
Techical Change and Wage Inequality. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 8(6):1325–1358, December 2010.
119
Claude d’Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, and Louis-André Gérard-
Varet. Strategic R&D Investment, Competitive Toughness and Growth. Inter-
national Journal of Economic Theory, 6(3):273–295, September 2010.
Jan De Loecker and Frederic Warzynski. Markups and Firm-Level Export Status.
The American Economic Review, 102(6):2437–2471, October 2012.
Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity. The American Economic Review, 67(3):297–308, June 1977.
Margarida Duarte and Diego Restuccia. The Role of the Structural Transforma-
tion in Aggregate Productivity. Marketing Science, 125(1):129–173, February
2010.
Jean-Pierre Dubé and Puneet Manchanda. Differences in Dynamic Brand Com-
petition across Markets: An Empirical Analysis. Marketing Science, 24(1):
81–95, Winter 2005.
Steven N. Durlauf, Paul A. Johnson, and Jonathan R.W. Temple. Growth Eco-
nometrics. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, editors, Handbook of
Economic Growth, Vol. 1, chapter 8, pages 555–677. North Holland, Oxford,
UK, 2005.
Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum. Technology, Geography, and Trade. Eco-
nometrica, 70(5):1741–1779, September 2002.
Wilfred J. Ethier. National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern
Theory of International Trade. The American Economic Review, 72(3):389–
405, June 1982.
Antonio Fatás. Do Business Cycles Cast Long Shadows? Short-Run Persistence
and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 5(2):147–162, June 2000.
Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. The Next Generation
of the Penn World Table. The American Economic Review, 105(10):3150–3182,
October 2015.
120
Patrick Francois and Huw Lloyd-Ellis. Animal Spirits through Creative Destruc-
tion. The American Economic Review, 93(3):530–550, June 2003.
Patrick Francois and Huw Lloyd-Ellis. Schumpeterian Cycles with Pro-Cyclical
R&D. Review of Economic Dynamics, 12(3):550–530, October 2009.
Xavier Gabaix and Rustam Ibragimov. Rank – 1/2: A Simple Way to Improve
the OLS Estimation of Tail Exponents. Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics, 29(1):24–39, January 2011.
David Gale. The Theory of Linear Economic Models. McGraw-Hill, New York,
NY, 1960.
Jordi Galí. Monopolistic Competition, Endogenous Markups, and Growth.
European Economic Review, 38(3–4):748–756, April 1994.
Jordi Galí. Product Diversity, Endogenous Markups and Development Traps.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 36(1):39–63, February 1995.
Jordi Galí, Mark Gertler, and J. David López-Salido. Markups, Gaps, and the
Welfare Costs of Business Fluctuations. The Review of Economics and Statist-
ics, 89(1):44–59, February 2007.
Gino Gancia and Fabrizio Zilibotti. Horizontal Innovation in the Theory of
Growth and Development. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, ed-
itors, Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, chapter 3, pages 111–170. North
Holland, Oxford, UK, 2005.
Richard Gilbert. Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the
Competition–Innovation Debate? Innovation Policy and the Economy, 6:159–
215, 2006.
Rachel Griffith, Stephen Redding, and John Van Reenen. Mapping the Two Faces
of R&D: Productivity Growth in a Panel of OECD Industries. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 86(4):883–895, November 2004.
121
Zvi Griliches. R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1998.
Jan Grobovšek. Development Accounting With Intermediate Goods. SIRE Dis-
cussion Paper SIRE-DP-2013-42, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics,
2013.
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Quality Ladders in the Theory of
Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(1):43–61, January 1991a.
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Trade, Knowledge Spillovers and
Growth. European Economic Review, 35(2–3):517–526, April 1991b.
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Globalization and Growth. The
American Economic Review, 105(5):100–104, May 2015.
Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse, and Pierre Mohnen. Measuring the Returns
to R&D. In Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, editors, Handbook of
the Economics of Innovation, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1033–1082. Elsevier,
Oxford, UK, 2010.
Robert E. Hall. The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry.
Journal of Political Economy, 96(5):921–947, October 1988.
Ricardo Hausmann and César A. Hidalgo. The Network Structure of Economic
Output. Journal of Economic Growth, 16(4):309–342, December 2011.
César A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann. The Building Blocks of Economic
Complexity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(26):10570–
10575, June 2009.
Harold Hotelling. Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153):
41–57, March 1929.
Peter Howitt. Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs
Growing. Journal of Political Economy, 107(4):715–730, August 1999.
122
Charles R. Hulten. Growth Accounting with Intermediate Inputs. The Review of
Economic Studies, 45(3):511–518, October 1978.
Giammario Impullitti. Global Innovation Races, Offshoring and Wage Inequality.
Review of International Economics, 24(1):171–202, February 2016.
Giammario Impullitti and Omar Licandro. Trade, Firm Selection and Innovation:
The Competition Channel. The Economic Journal, 128(608):189–229, February
2018.
Ron S. Jarmin and Javier Miranda. The Longitudal Business Database. Centre
for Economic Studies Discussion Paper CES-WP-02-17, Centre for Economic
Studies, US Census Bureau, 2002.
Charles I. Jones. R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 103(4):759–784, August 1995.
Charles I. Jones. Growth: With or without Scale Effects? The American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(2):139–144, May 1999.
Charles I. Jones. The Shape of Production Functions and the Direction of Tech-
nical Change. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):517–549, May 2005.
Charles I. Jones. Misallocation, Economic Growth and Input-Output Economics.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(2):1–28, April 2011.
Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. Investment
Shocks and Business Cycles. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(2):132–145,
March 2010.
Molly Sizer Killian and Thomas F. Hady. The Economic Performance of Rural
Labor Markets. In David L. Brown, Norman Reid, Herman Bluestone, David A.
McGranahan, and Sara M. Mazie, editors, Rural Economic Development in the
1980’s: Prospects for the Future, chapter 8, pages 181–200. U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Washington, DC, 1988.
123
Robert G. King, Charles I. Plosser, and Sergio T. Rebelo. Production, Growth
and Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 21(2–3):195–232, March–May 1988.
Tor Jakob Klette. Market Power, Scale Economies and Productivity: Estimates
from a Panel of Establishment Data. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 47
(4):451–476, December 1999.
Tor Jakob Klette and Zvi Griliches. Empirical Patterns of Firm Growth and R&D
Investment: A Quality Ladder Model Interpretation. The Economic Journal,
110(463):363–387, April 2000.
Tor Jakob Klette and Samuel Kortum. Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innova-
tion. Journal of Political Economy, 112(5):986–1018, October 2004.
Michael Kremer. The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108(3):551–575, August 1993.
Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. Time t Build and Aggregate Fluctu-
ations. Econometrica, 50(6):1345–1370, November 1982.
Ross Levine and David Renelt. A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth
Regressions. The American Economic Review, 82(4):942–963, September 1992.
Albert N. Link. Firm Size and Efficient Entrepreneurial Activity: A Reformu-
lation of the Schumpeter Hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 88(4):
771–782, August 1980.
John B. Long and Charles I. Plosser. Real Business Cycles. Journal of Political
Economy, 91(1):39–69, February 1983.
Paloma Lopéz-García, José Manuel Motero, and Enrique Moral-Benito. Business
Cycles and Investment in Intangibles: Evidence from Spanish Firms. Working
Paper 1219, Banco de España, May 2012.
124
Francesca Lotti, Enrico Santarelli, and Marco Vivarelli. Defending Gibrat’s Law
as a Long-Run Regularity. Small Business Economics, 32(1):31–44, January
2009.
Jaques Mairesse and Mohamed Sassenou. R&D and Productivity: A Survey of
Econometric Studies at the Firm Level. Working Paper 3666, NBER, March
1991.
Stephen Martin. Advanced Industrial Economics. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford,
UK, 2 edition, 2002.
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Greene. Microeconomic
Theory. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1995.
Kiminori Matsuyama. Growing through Cycles. Econometrica, 67(2):335–347,
March 1999.
Kiminori Matsuyama. Growing through Cycles in an Infinitely Lived Agent Eco-
nomy. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):220–234, October 2001.
Alan L. Montgomery and Peter E. Rossi. Estimating Price Elasticities with
Theory-Based Priors. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4):413–423, November
1999.
Alessio Moro. Biased Technical Change, Intermediate Goods and Total Factor
Productivity. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 16(2):184–203, April 2012a.
Alessio Moro. The Structural Transformation between Manufacturing and Ser-
vices and the Decline in the US GDP Volatility. Review of Economic Dynamics,
15(3):402–415, July 2012b.
Liwa Rachel Ngai and Christopher A. Pissarides. Structural Change in a Multi-
sector Model of Growth. The American Economic Review, 97(1):429–443,
March 2007.
125
Liwa Rachel Ngai and Roberto M. Samaniego. Mapping Prices into Productivity
in Multisector Growth Models. Journal of Economic Growth, 14(3):183–204,
September 2009.
Stephen J. Nickell. Competition and Corporate Performance. Journal of Political
Economy, 104(4):724–746, August 1996.
OECD. Research and Development Statistics, 2016a. URL http://stats.oecd.
org/. (Accessed on 25.11.2016).
OECD. SDBC Structural Business Statistics (ISIC Rev. 4), 2016b. URL http:
//stats.oecd.org/. (Accessed on 25.11.2016).
OECD. Input-Output Tables, 2017. URL http://oe.cd/i-o. (Accessed on
10.08.2017).
Joachim Oliveira Martins, Stefano Scarpetta, and Dirk Pilat. Mark-Up Ratios
in Manufacturing Industries: Estimates for 14 OECD Countries. OECD Eco-
nomics Department Working Paper 162, OECD Economics Department, 1996.
Daria Onori. Competition and Growth: Reinterpreting their Relationship. The
Manchester School, 83(4):398–422, July 2015.
Min Ouyang. On the Cyclicality of R&D. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
93(2):542–553, May 2011.
Stephen L. Parente and Edward C. Prescott. Barriers to Riches. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 2000.
Pietro F. Peretto. Sunk Costs, Market Structure and Growth. International
Economic Review, 37(4):895–923, November 1996.
Winfried Pohlmeier. On the Simultaneity of Innovations and Market Structure.
Empirical Economics, 17(2):253–272, June 1992.
Giorgio E. Primiceri, Ernst Schaumburg, and Andrea Tambalotti. Intertemporal
Disturbances. Working Paper 12243, NBER, May 2006.
126
Matthew C. Rafferty. Do Business Cycles Influence Long-Run Growth? The
Effect of Aggregate Demand on Firm-Financed R&D Expenditures. Eastern
Economic Journal, 29(4):607–618, Autumn 2003.
Garey Ramey and Valerie A. Ramey. Cross-Country Evidence on the Link
Between Volatility and Growth. The American Economic Review, 85(5):1138–
1151, December 1995.
Luis A. Rivera-Batiz and Paul M. Romer. Economic Integration and Endogenous
Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2):531–555, May 1991.
Paul M. Romer. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 94(5):1002–1037, October 1986.
Paul M. Romer. Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, 98(5):S71–S102, October 1990.
Steven C. Salop. Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. The Bell
Journal of Economics, 10(1):141–156, Spring 1979.
Frederic M. Scherer. Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output
of Patented Inventions. The American Economic Review, 55(5):1097–1125,
December 1965.
Frederic M. Scherer. Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and
Engineers. The American Economic Review, 57(3):524–531, June 1967.
Joseph A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Allen and Unwin,
London, UK, 1 edition, 1943.
Andrei Shleifer. Implementation Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 94(6):
1163–1190, December 1986.
Frank Smets and Raf Wouters. An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Associ-
ation, 1(5):1123–1175, September 2003.
127
Robert M. Solow. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1):65–94, February 1956.
Robert M. Solow. Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 39(3):312–320, August 1957.
John Sutton. Gibrat’s Legacy. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(1):40–59,
March 1997.
Trevor W. Swan. Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation. Economic Record,
32(2):334–361, November 1956.
George Symeonidis. Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian
Hypotheses and Some New Themes. Working Paper 161, OECD Economics
Department, September 1996.
Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall and Andreas Poldahl. Is There Really an Inverted
U-Shaped Relation between Competition and R&D? Economics of Innovation
and New Technology, 15(2):101–118, 2006.
Charles M. Tolbert and Molly Sizer. U.S. Commuting Zones and Labor Market
Areas: A 1990 Update. ERS Staff Paper AGES-9614, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Rural Economy Division, September
1996.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Commuting Zones
and Labor Market Areas: Documentation, July 2012. URL http://www.ers.
usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market-areas/
documentation.aspx. (Accessed on 24.01.2016).
Klaus Wälde. Endogenous Growth Cycles. International Economic Review, 46
(3):867–894, August 2005.
Klaus Wälde and Ulrich Woitek. R&D Expenditure in G7 Countries and the
Implications for Endogenous Fluctuations and Growth. Economic Letters, 82
(1):91–97, January 2004.
128
Michael L. Walden. North Carolina in the Connected Age: Challenges and Op-
portunities in a Globalizing Economy. The University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill, NC, 2008.
Alwyn Young. Growth without Scale Effects. Journal of Political Economy, 106
(1):41–63, February 1998.
129
Appendix A
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Proof of Observation 2.1
Before establishing the asserted result, we shall prove the following Lemma
Lemma A.1.1.1. From lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
(∫ t
0
z(τ) dτ
)
= z¯ follows that lim
t→+∞
E0z(t)
t
= 0.
Proof. The lemma can be proven by differentiating lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
(∫ t
0
z(τ) dτ
)
= z¯
with respect to t and applying the Leibniz integral rule
d
dt
lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z(τ) dτ
 = dz¯
dt
lim
t→+∞
E0z(t)
t
− lim
t→+∞
(
1
t
)
· lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z(τ) dτ
 = 0
lim
t→+∞
E0z(t)
t
= lim
t→+∞
z¯
t
= 0

Given formulae (2.33)–(2.37), the exact growth rates of the economy’s
variables take the general form
X˙(t)
X(t)
= a
Z˙(t)
Z(t)
+ b
Q˙(t)
Q(t)
(A.1)
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Applying the definition of the long-run growth rate to (A.1) yields the expression
g¯X = a lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
(
z(τ)
Z(τ)
)η−1
z˙(τ)
z(τ)
dτ
+ bg¯Q (A.2)
Given that η > 1 and z(t) ∈ [zL; zH ], expression (A.2) gives rise to the following
double inequality
a(
ζ
zL
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z˙(τ)
z(τ)
dτ
 6g¯X − bg¯Q 6
6 a(
ζ
zH
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z˙(τ)
z(τ)
dτ

a/zH(
ζ
zL
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z˙(τ) dτ
 6g¯X − bg¯Q 6
6 a/zL(
ζ
zH
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
1
t
E0
 t∫
0
z˙(τ) dτ

a/zH(
ζ
zL
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
E0z(t)
t
6 g¯X − bg¯Q 6 a/zL(
ζ
zH
)η−1
+ 1
lim
t→+∞
E0z(t)
t
(A.3)
Combining (A.3) with Lemma A.1.1.1 suggests that 0 6 g¯X − bg¯Q 6 0 ⇔ g¯X =
bg¯Q. Applying the last result to formulae (2.33)–(2.37) brings about the expres-
sions listed in Observation 2.1. 
A.1.2 The range of η’s empirical values in Extension №1
The natural logarithm of a firm’s R&D spending (2.35) and the time de-
rivative of that of its output (2.33) and are equal to, respectively, ln γ˜∗(t) =
b10− (η − 1) lnZ(t) + ln Φ(t) + lnQ(t) and (y˜
∗(t))′t
y˜∗(t) =
Z˙(t)
Z(t)
+ Φ˙(t)
Φ(t)
+ Q˙(t)
Q(t)
. The former
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can be transformed as follows
ln γ˜(t) =b10 − (η − 1) (lnZ(t) + ln Φ(t) + lnQ(t)) + η (ln Φ(t) + lnQ(t)) =
=b10 − (η − 1)
t∫
0
(y˜(τ))′τ
y˜(τ)
dt+ η (1 + χ) lnQ(t) + η lnφ
(A.4)
Note that in (A.4), the economy’s technology level Q(t), being a force affecting
the whole economy, is bound to have its impact captured by time-specific fixed
effects used in both Aghion et al. (2012) and Beneito et al. (2015). Thereby the
impact of Q(t) cannot feed into the estimates of (y˜(t))
′
t
y˜(t)
’s effect on ln γ˜(t), which
leaves one with the derived empirical values of η from Section 2.3. 
A.1.3 A firm’s and an industry’s output in Extension №2
We shall start with deriving expression (2.58) for an industry’s output. To
that end, one can use (2.56) to express an individual firm’s output y˜s(t): y˜s(t) =
Lνµy(t)
µ
ξ
(1−νξ)ys(t)
1−µ
ξ p˜s(t)
−µ, multiply both sides of the formula by ms(t)
µ
µ−1
and derive ys(t) from the result
ms(t)
µ
µ−1 y˜s(t) = ys(t) = L
νµy(t)
µ
ξ
(1−νξ)ys(t)
1−µ
ξms(t)
µ
µ−1 p˜s(t)
−µ
ys(t) = L
νξy(t) 1−νξms(t)
ξ
µ−1 p˜s(t)
−ξ (A.5)
Raising both sides of equation (A.5) to power ξ−1
ξ
, and summing it up for s = R
and s = P yields the expression
y(t)
ξ−1
ξ =
(
Lνξy(t) 1−νξ
) ξ−1
ξ
(
mR(t)
ξ−1
µ−1
p˜R(t) ξ−1
+
mP (t)
ξ−1
µ−1
p˜P (t) ξ−1
)
(A.6)
Plugging (2.57) into (A.6), and rearranging for y(t) brings about formula (2.58).
Expression (2.59) for a firm’s output y˜∗s(t) can be obtained by combining (2.56),
(2.57) and (2.58). 
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A.1.4 Proof of Observations 2.2 and 2.3
We shall start with proving Observation 2.2. Taking the derivative of lnψΓ∗(t)
and stipulating that it be positive, yields the inequality
(ln Γ∗(t))′z(t) =
(
(1− ν) (µ− 1)
νµ− 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
−
− νξ − 1
νµ− 1 ·
(µ− 1)2
µ− ξ · V1(t)V2(t)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
> 0
(A.7)
where v(t) ≡ Z(t)
z(t)
> 1, and V1(t) and V2(t) are defined as follows
V1(t) ≡ v(t)
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ − 1(
Φ−
Φ+
) ξ−1
µ−ξ v(t)
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ + 1
(A.8)
V2(t) ≡ v(t)
η−1 − 1
v(t)
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ − 1
(A.9)
Given that V1(t) > 0 and V2(t) > 0, necessary condition (2.67) can be
derived from (A.7) by omitting the second term on its right-hand side
(ln Γ∗(t))′z(t) <
(
(1− ν) (µ− 1)
νµ− 1 − (η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
⇔ η < µ+ ν − 2
νµ− 1
(ln Γ∗(t))′z(t) > 0⇒ η <
µ+ ν − 2
νµ− 1 (A.10)
Turning to sufficient condition (2.68), since we are interested in specifying
a sufficient condition for the positivity of (A.7), our approach is going to be to
replace V1(t) and V2(t) with their estimates from above, and then to derive the
condition for the resulting expression being positive. Starting with the former,
one can consider the chain of inequalities as follows
V1(t) < v(t)
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ(
Φ−
Φ+
) ξ−1
µ−ξ v(t)
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ
=
(
Φ+
Φ−
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
(A.11)
As concerns term V2(t), it can be replaced with its supremum, which is
derived using the following Lemma
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Lemma A.1.4.1. Let h(x) ≡ xa−1
xb−1 , x > 1.
1. lim
x→1
h(x) = a
b
.
2. If a < b, h(x) is decreasing for any x > 1; if a > b, h(x) is increasing for
any x > 1.
Proof.
1. Follows directly from applying L’Hôpital’s rule.
2. Differentiating h(x) yields the following formula
h′(t) =
(a− b)xa − (a− 1)xa−b + (b− 1)
x1−b (xb − 1)2 (A.12)
Since one needs to prove the monotonicity of h(x), and since (as suggested
by (A.12)) the sign of h′(t) is determined by its numerator, one needs to
show that the sign of the latter does not change. To that end, one can use
the fact that the numerator has a root at x = 1 in conjunction with showing
that it is monotonic for any x > 1
(
(a− b)xa − axa−b + b)′ >< 0
(a− b) axa−1 − a (a− b)xa−b−1 >< 0

 xa 6> 1⇔ x 6> 1a 6 b xa >< 1⇔ x >< 1a > b
(A.13)
Since x > 1, the first system of conditions in (A.13) suggests that when a <
b, the numerator of h′(t) monotonically decreases from zero, and thereby
is negative, which (given the considerations above) entails that h(x) is a
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decreasing function. A symmetric argument can be applied to the second
system in (A.13) to prove the statement in hand for the case of a > b. 
Given the stipulation that the necessary condition for Γ∗(t)’s procyclic-
ality (2.67) holds, one can straightforwardly show that η − 1 < “ηN2 − 1 <
(µ−1)(ξ−1)
µ−ξ , which, in light of Lemma A.1.4.1 suggests that V2(t) is a decreas-
ing function bounded from above by (µ−ξ)(η−1)
(µ−1)(ξ−1) . Substituting the result, alongside
equation (A.11), for V2(t) and V1(t), respectively, leads to the expression
(ln Γ∗(t))′z(t) >
(
(1− ν) (µ− 1)
νµ− 1 −
−
(
1 +
νξ − 1
νµ− 1 ·
µ− 1
ξ − 1
(
Φ+
Φ−
) ξ−1
µ−ξ
)
(η − 1)
)
(Z(t))′z(t)
Z(t)
(A.14)
The final version of condition (2.68), as stated in Observation 2.3, can be es-
tablished by setting the right-hand side of (A.14) non-negative, and solving the
resulting inequality for η. 
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A.2 Proofs for Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The static optimisation of problem (3.21) given (3.19), (3.20) and (3.25),
can be achieved through calculating a firm’s price p˜∗i (k; t) and demands for la-
bour l˜∗i (k; t) and intermediate goods
{
y˜∗ij(k; t)
}N
j=1
, which deliver the maximum
value for its profit p˜ii(k; t) at any t for a given level of productivity q˜i(k; t). The
solution of the static optimisation can be derived in two steps. First, one can
characterise a firm’s optimal production policy (i.e. the amounts of production
factors minimising the costs of producing a given level of output y˜i(k; t)), which
formally requires solving the following cost minimisation problem
Ψi(k; t) ≡ w(t) l˜i(k; t) +
N∑
j=1
pj(t) y˜ij(k; t) −→ min
l˜i(k;t),{y˜ij(k;t)}nj=1
(A.15)
given production technology (3.17). Since a firm’s production function is Cobb-
Douglas, and given the normalisation embedded in ζi in (3.17), problem (A.15)
has a standard solution, whereby the demand for each production factor is as
follows
l˜∗i (k; t) =
(1− νi) y˜i(k; t)
q˜i(t)w(t)
w(t) 1−νi
(
N∏
j=1
pj(t)
αij
)νi
(A.16)
y˜∗ij(k; t) =
νiαij y˜i(k; t)
q˜i(t) pj(t)
w(t) 1−νi
(
N∏
j=1
pj(t)
αij
)νi
(A.17)
Given optimal factor demands (A.16), (A.17) and the linear homogeneity of a
firm’s technology, its optimal production costs Ψ˜i(k; t) are linear in the out-
put Ψ˜i(k; t) = ψ˜i(k; t) y˜i(k; t). Furthermore, expressions (A.16), (A.17) sug-
gest that, as specified in (3.25), a firm’s marginal cost splits into an industry-
specific component ψi(t) and a firm-specific component comprising the productiv-
ity level q˜i(k; t).
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As the second step of the static optimisation, one needs to pin down a firm’s
pricing policy, which can be done by solving the profit maximisation problem with
respect to the price level p˜i(k; t), given demand for a firm’s product (3.13) and its
optimal production policy embodied in the optimal cost structure ψ˜i(k; t) y˜i(k; t)
(
pi(t)
p˜i(k; t)
)ξi
yi(t)
(
p˜i(k; t)− ψ˜i(k; t)
)
−→ max
p˜i(k;t)
(A.18)
Calculating the first-order condition for (A.18) yields the expression for optimal
price p˜∗i (k; t) in (3.25). Since ξi > 1 the objective in (A.18) is strictly concave,
which thereby makes p˜∗i (k; t) the global maximum of problem (A.18).
As the final step of static optimisation, one can derive expression (3.26)
from (3.22) by substituting there (3.25) for p˜i(k; t), and replacing formula (3.22)’s
last two terms with ψ˜i(k; t) y˜i(k; t). 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Given the expressions (3.13) and (3.25) (for demand for a firm’s product
and its optimal price), the objective of the dynamic problem in hand can be
rewritten in the following way
+∞∫
t0
e−δi(t−t0)
((
pi(t)
p˜∗i (k; t)
)ξi
yi(t)
(
p˜∗i (k; t)− ψ˜i(k; t)
)
− zi(k; t)
)
dt =
=
+∞∫
t0
e−δi(t−t0)
(Ai(t) q˜i(k; t) ξi−1 − zi(k; t)) −→ max
zi(k;t0)
(A.19)
where Ai(t) ≡ pi(t)ξiyi(t)ξi
(
ξi−1
ξi
)ξi−1
. A change of variable xi(k; t) ≡ q˜i(k; t) χi
transforms the dynamic problem in question as follows
+∞∫
t0
e−δi(t−t0) (Ai(t)xi(k; t) ςi − zi(k; t)) −→ max
zi(k;t0)
(A.20)
x˙i(k; t) = γizi(k; t)
ωi (A.21)
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where ςi ≡ ξi−1χi . Problem (A.20), (A.21) generates the Hamiltonian function
H(z;x) ≡ e−δi(t−t0) (Ai(t)xi(k; t) ςi − zi(k; t)) + γiµi(k; t) zi(k; t) ωi (A.22)
where µi(k; t) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with problem (A.20), which
will be shown to be strictly positive (see equation (A.25)). In light of that,
Hamiltonian H(z;x) satisfies Mangasarian’s sufficiency condition, and therefore
the pair of functions (z∗i (k; t) ;x∗i (k; t)) satisfying the first-order conditions for
dynamic problem (A.20) and (A.21), delivers it a global maximum.1,2
Calculating the first-order conditions for the maximisation of (A.22) yields
∂H
∂xi(k; t)
≡ e−δi(t−t0)ςiAi(t)xi(k; t) ςi−1 = −µ˙i(k; t) (A.23)
∂H
∂zi(k; t)
≡ −e−δi(t−t0) + γiωiµi(k; t) zi(k; t) −(1−ωi) = 0 (A.24)
Expressing µi(k; t) from (A.24) yields the following formulae for µi(k; t) and− µ˙i(k;t)µi(k;t)
µi(k; t) = e
−δi(t−t0) zi(k; t)
1−ωi
γiωi
⇒ − µ˙i(k; t)
µi(k; t)
= δi − (1− ωi) z˙i(k; t)
zi(k; t)
(A.25)
Dividing (A.23) by µi(k; t) and plugging in (A.25) allows one to express the
growth rates of xi(k; t) and zi(k; t) through each other
γiςiωi · Ai(t) · xi(k; t)
ςi
zi(k; t)
· zi(k; t)
ωi
xi(k; t)
= ςiωi · x˙i(k; t)
xi(k; t)
=
= δi − (1− ωi) z˙i(k; t)
zi(k; t)
(A.26)
where the equality in (A.26)’s first line follows from applying the free-entry condi-
tion (3.26) in conjunction with the dynamic equation (A.21) for the accumulation
of xi(k; t). Solving (A.26) for zi(k; t) yields
1Furthermore, the maximum is guaranteed to be unique for any ωi < 1.
2See (Acemoglu, 2009, pp. 236–239) for a detailed exposition of sufficiency conditions in
dynamic continuous optimisation.
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ςiωi lnxi(k; t) = lnC + δi (t− t0)− (1− ωi) ln zi(k; t)
zi(k; t) = Ce
δi
1−ωi (t−t0)xi(k; t)
− ςiωi
1−ωi (A.27)
where C is a constant of integration. Substituting (A.27) for zi(k; t) in the prob-
lem’s dynamic constraint (A.21), and solving the resulting differential equation
of xi(k; t) brings about the final expression for the variable
x∗i (k; t) = x
∗
i (k; t0) e
δiχi
φi
(t−t0) (A.28)
where φi is as defined in the statement of Proposition 3.2, and x∗i (k; t0) is x∗i (k; t)’s
initial value, which, given the definition of xi(k; t), equals q˜Ei (t0) χi , where q˜Ei (t0)
is the industry-specific initial level of a firm’s productivity upon entry, defined
in (3.15). Expression (3.27) for q˜∗i (t) can be immediately derived from (A.28),
while formula (3.28) for z∗i (t) in the main text comes directly from plugging
equation (A.28) into (A.27) or into (A.21). 
A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 3.2.1
As follows from equations (3.13), (3.25) the only potential source of het-
erogeneity between firms within an industry is their productivity levels q˜i(k; t).
Since, however, all firms grow at the same rate according to (3.27), firms’ pro-
ductivities can differ only in terms of firms’ initial entry productivity levels q˜Ei (t0).
In order to prove the opposite, in what follows, we will explicitly derive the dy-
namics of q˜i(t0) to show that q˜i(t0) = e
δi
φi
t0 , so that (3.27) collapses to (3.29).
To that end, note that, given (3.15) and (3.16), for some small ∆t, mi(t0 + ∆t)
and q˜i(t0 + ∆t) are
mi(t0 + ∆t) = (1− δi∆t)mi(t0) +mEi (t0) ∆t (A.29)
139
q˜Ei (t0 + ∆t) =
mi(t0+∆t)∫
0
q˜i(k; t0 + ∆t)
mi(t0 + ∆t)
dk =
=
(
1 + δi
φi
∆t
) ∫ (1−δi∆t)mi(t0)
0
q˜i(k; t0) dk +m
E
i (t0) ∆t
(
1 + δi
φi
∆t
)
q˜Ei (t0)
mi(t0 + ∆t)
(A.30)
where the first and second terms in the numerator in (A.30)’s second line capture
the contribution of, respectively, surviving firms and newcomers to the dynam-
ics of q˜Ei . Since every firm faces the same chance of its product’s becoming
obsolescent, the integral term in (A.30) equals (1− δi∆t)
∫ mi(t0)
0
q˜i(k; t0) dk =
(1− δi∆t)mi(t0) q˜Ei (t0). Plugging the result back into (A.30) and making use
of (A.29) yields
q˜Ei (t0 + ∆t) =
(
1 +
δi
φi
∆t
)
q˜Ei (t0) (A.31)
Subtracting q˜Ei (t0) from both sides of (A.31) and dividing by ∆t brings about the
equation q˜
E
i (t0+∆t)−q˜Ei (t0)
∆t
= δi
φi
q˜Ei (t0), which in the limit for ∆t→ 0 yields a simple
differential equation of the desired exponential function
˙˜qEi (t0) =
δi
φi
q˜Ei (t0)⇔ q˜Ei (t0) = q˜Ei (0) e
δi
φi
t0 (A.32)
Since all firms start at 0 with their productivities equal to unity, q˜Ei (0) = 1, this
establishes the result that q˜Ei (t0) = e
δi
φi
t0 , thus completing the proof. 
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
In the course of the proof, one can make use of the two following lemmata
Lemma A.2.4.1. Let A be a stochastic matrix, and ν be a vector of values
strictly smaller than one. Then matrix EN − dg(ν) A is invertible.
Proof. The proof relies on the result due to Gale (1960) (see (Gale, 1960, The-
orem 9.1)), stating that matrix EN − X is invertible if there exists a vector b
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such that Xb < b. One can show that the vector of ones e satisfies this criterion
dg(ν) Ae = dg(ν) e = ν < e (A.33)
The expression above completes the proof. 
Lemma A.2.4.2. Matrix Λν (EN − dg(ν)) has an eigenvalue equal to unity,
whose associated eigenvector is a ·e ∀a ∈ C, or equivalently Λν (EN − dg(ν)) e =
e.
Proof. By definition, Ae = e. Consider next the following chain of transforma-
tions
dg(ν) Ae = dg(ν) e
(EN − dg(ν) A) e = (EN − dg(ν)) e
As matrix (EN − dg(ν) A) is invertible (see Lemma A.2.4.1), one can establish
the desired result by premultiplying both sides of the last expression by Λν ≡
(EN − dg(ν) A)−1. 
As the first step of the proof, one can switch to the growth-rate version of
equation (3.35) by taking natural logarithms of both its sides, and differentiating
the result with respect to time
p˙i(t)
pi(t)
= −κi m˙i(t)
mi(t)
+ (1− νi) w˙(t)
w(t)
+ νi
N∑
j=1
αij
p˙j(t)
pj(t)
−
˙˜q∗i (t)
q˜∗i (t)
(A.34)
Denoting x˙(t)
x(t)
as gx(t) and combining all versions of expression (A.34) for each i
yields a chain of matrix equations
gp(t) = (E− dg(ν)) egw(t) + dg(ν) Agp(t)− (gq + dg(κ) gm(t))
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(E− dg(ν) A) gp(t) = (E− dg(ν)) egw(t)− (gq + dg(κ) gm(t))
where gx(t) is the vector of all gxi(t)s for each i. Given Lemma A.2.4.1, mat-
rix (E− dg(ν) A) in the expression above is invertible, which brings about the
following formula
gp(t) = (E− dg(ν) A)−1 (E− dg(ν)) (egw(t)− dg(κ) gm(t)− gq) =
= gw(t) e−Λν (gq + dg(κ) gm(t))
(A.35)
where the second line in (A.35) follows from Lemma A.2.4.2 and the definition of
the Leontiev inverse Λν . Note that given Proposition 3.2, gq is time-independent.
Pre-multiplying equation (A.35) by βT yields the expression
βTgp(t) = 0 = gw(t)− βTΛν (gq + dg(κ) gm(t))
where the second expression in the formula above follows from the definition of an
economy’s aggregate price index P (t) =
∏N
i=1 pi(t)
βi ⇔ lnP (t) = ∑Ni=1 βi ln pi(t)
and the fact that P (t) is the economy’s numeraire. Since w(t) = y(t)⇒ gw(t) =
gy(t), the expression above can be recast as
gy(t) = β
TΛν (gq + dg(κ) gm(t)) (A.36)
Finally, the time-independence of gy(t) and gm(t) can be shown by com-
bining (A.36) with the growth-rate version of the formula for equilibrium masses
of firms in industries (3.34)
 gy(t) = βTΛν (gq + dg(κ) gm(t))gm(t) = (gy(t) + gL) e− dg(χ) dg(ω) gq (A.37)
Substituting the second line in (A.37) for gm(t) in the first, yields an expres-
sion featuring gy(t) and a series of time-independent variables (whence the final
142
formula (3.37) for gy is expressed), which directly suggests that gy(t) is time-
independent as well. When applied to the second line in (A.37), the last result
leads to the same conclusion for gm(t). 
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Consider the difference g − gˆ = βT ((EN − dg(ν) A)−1 − EN)g. In what
follows, we will show that it is strictly positive by proving that the difference of
the Leontiev inverse and the identity matrix (EN − dg(ν) A)−1 − EN is so. The
last result follows from using the geometric series representation of the Leontiev
inverse3
(EN − dg(ν) A)−1 =
+∞∑
s=0
(dg(ν) A)s = EN +
+∞∑
s=1
(dg(ν) A)s (A.38)
Subtracting the identity matrix from (A.38) leaves
∑+∞
s=1 (dg(ν) A)
s, which, being
the sum of a nonnegative matrix’s powers, is nonnegative, thereby proving the
first statement in the proposition in hand. Note that expression (A.38) suggests to
interpret dg(ν) as the attenuation factor for the strength of interactions between
industries, which guarantees the convergence of the infinite matrix power series
in (A.38). Naturally, if industries rely largely on primary inputs (so that the
components of ν are close to zero), technological advances in the production of
intermediates will have only a limited expansionary impact on downstream firms,
which for the same reason will lead to a weak response further downstream,
thereby producing a limited total impact on the economy, as expressed in faster
convergence of the power series term in (A.38).
The second result can be established by calculating the matrix derivative
of g with respect to vector of shares of intermediates in industries’ production
3The Leontiev inverse (E−X)−1 admits the geometric series representation if the absolute
value of X’s largest eigenvalue |ev(X)| is strictly smaller than unity, which is the case with
the Leontiev inverse in hand: |ev(dg(ν) A)| = ev(dg(ν)) ev(A) = νmax · 1 < 1. The fact
that ev(A) = 1 is an implication of the Perron-Frobenius theorem for stochastic matrices.
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technologies ν
∂g
∂ν
= eT
(
EN ◦
(
AΛνgβ
TΛν
))
(A.39)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product. As ∂g
∂ν
constitutes a diagonal matrix
with the diagonal elements of the product of nonnegative matrices, it must be
nonnegative as well, thus establishing the desired result. 
A.2.6 Proofs of Propositions 3.5 and 3.6
Starting with Proposition 3.5, its proof proceeds in two steps: first of all,
one can use the geometric series representation of the Leontiev inverse (A.38) to
transform equation (3.39) as follows
g =
+∞∑
s=0
βT (νENA)
s gq = νβ
Tgq + β
T
+∞∑
s=1
(νA)s gq (A.40)
As suggested by (A.40), the economy’s structure affects its growth rate through
the infinite power series term βT
∑+∞
s=1 (νA)
s gq. As the second step, one can
show that for any matrix A different from 1N(i0), each of the series’ terms is
smaller than its counterpart generated by the latter matrix. To that end, one
can show that for any s > 1 vector (ν1N(i0))s gq is greater or equal to (νA)s gq.
Starting with the case of s = 1, one can arrive at the expression
Agq =

∑N
j=1 α1jgj∑N
j=1 α2jgj
···
∑N
j=1 αNjgj
 6

∑N
j=1 α1jgmax∑N
j=1 α2jgmax
···
∑N
j=1 αNjgmax
 =

gmax
gmax
···
gmax
 = gmaxe = 1N(i0) gq
ν1N(i0) gq > νAgq (A.41)
Note that νAgq is strictly smaller or equal to ν1N(i0) gq when only one sector
in the economy grows at the rate of gmax. Moving on to values of s above unity,
consider first the following chain of equalities
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As−11N(i0) gq = gmaxAs−1e = gmax
where the rightmost equality follows from the fact that for any production mat-
rix A, Ae = e. Note that the transformations above apply to any production
matrix including 1N(i0), thus yielding
1N(i0)
s
gq = A
s−11N(i0) gq ⇔ (ν1N(i0))s gq = νsAs−11N(i0) gq (A.42)
Given that As−1 is a power of a transition matrix, it is a transition matrix as
well, which makes it strictly nonnegative. This directly implies that multiply-
ing by As−1 preserves the inequality sign, so that if x1 6 x2 then it must be
that As−1x1 6 As−1x2. In particular, the discussion of the case for s = 1 allows
one to replace x1 and x2 with Agq and 1N(i0) gq, respectively
Asgq = A
s−1Agq 6 As−11N(i0) gq = 1N(i0)sgq
ν1N(i0)
s
gq > νAsgq (A.43)
Together equations (A.41), (A.43) prove that (ν1N(i0))
s
gq > (νA)s gq for
any s > 1. In conjunction with the fact that βT is strictly positive, this natur-
ally suggests that βT (ν1N(i0))
s
gq > βT (νA)s gq for any s > 1, thus entailing
that
∑N
s=1 β
T (ν1N(i0))
s
gq >
∑N
s=1 β
T (νA)s gq, which completes the proof. 
A slightly more intricate proof is readily available for Proposition 3.6 de-
scribing the case of heterogeneous shares of intermediates νi. It utilises the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma A.2.6.1 (Decomposition of the Leontiev Inverse). Suppose that a
technology matrix A is a generalised pre-weighted linear combination of technology
matrices Ak, k = 1 ÷ K, so that A ≡
∑K
k=1 ΓkAk, where Γks are nonnegative
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diagonal matrices adding up to the identity matrix E:
∑K
k=1 Γk = E. Then A’s
Leontiev inverse can be written as
Λν ≡
K∑
k=1
Γ˜kΛν;k
Γ˜k ≡ ΛνΓkΛ−1ν;k
(A.44)
where Γ˜ks are characterised by the following properties:
1. Together, all Γ˜ks add up to the identity matrix:
∑K
k=1 Γ˜k = E;
2. For each row index i, the sum of Γ˜ks’ i-th row sums γ˜iks across all Γ˜ks is
equal to 1:
∑K
k=1 γ˜
i
k = 1, ∀i;
3. For each row index i, the i-th row sum of every Γ˜k is nonnegative: γ˜ik > 0, ∀i.
Proof. Equation (A.44) can be validated by direct demonstration
K∑
k=1
Γ˜kΛν;k = Λν
K∑
k=1
ΓkΛ
−1
ν;kΛν;k = Λν
K∑
k=1
Γk = ΛνE = Λν
Analogously, Γ˜ks’ first property can be proven by direct calculation using
the definition of the Leontiev inverse together with that of A
K∑
k=1
Γ˜k = Λν
K∑
k=1
Γk (E− dg(ν) Ak) = Λν
(
K∑
k=1
Γk − dg(ν)
K∑
k=1
ΓkAk
)
K∑
k=1
Γ˜k = Λν (E− dg(ν) A) = ΛνΛ−1ν = E
The second property follows immediately from the first property combined
with the equivalence of row summation to post-multiplication by a vector of ones

∑K
k=1 γ˜
1
k∑K
k=1 γ˜
2
k
···
∑K
k=1 γ˜
N
k
 =
K∑
k=1

γ˜1k
γ˜2k
···
γ˜Nk
 =
K∑
k=1
Γ˜ke = Ee =

1
1
···
1

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Finally, the last property uses the fact that matrices A and Aks are
stochastic

γ˜1k
γ˜2k
···
γ˜Nk
 = ΛνΓ (Ee− dg(ν) Ae) = ΛνΓ (e− ν)
From the expression above, the vector of γ˜iks is the product of a nonnegative
matrix (Γ) and two strictly nonnegative matrices Λν and e− ν,4 which makes it
a nonnegative matrix as well, thereby suggesting that so are all its elements. 
The proof of Proposition 3.6 relies on noting that any production mat-
rix A can be represented as a pre-weighted combination of K = N 1N(i)-
type matrices, where each weighting matrix Γk is the corresponding diagonalised
column of A: Γk ≡ dg(A·k). This consideration allows one to bring to bear the
results of Lemma A.2.6.1 by decomposing A’s Leontiev inverse as
Λν =
N∑
k=1
Γ˜k (E− dg(ν)1N(k))−1 =
N∑
k=1
Γ˜k
(
E +
1
1− νk dg(ν)1N(k)
)
(A.45)
where Γ˜k is defined as in (A.44), and the rightmost expression follows by cal-
culating (E− dg(ν)1N(k))−1 either directly or using the geometric-series rep-
resentation of Leontiev inverse (A.38). Applying the first property derived in
Lemma A.2.6.1, equation (A.45) transforms as follows
Λν =
N∑
k=1
Γ˜k+
N∑
k=1
1
1− νk Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) = E+
N∑
k=1
1
1− νk Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) (A.46)
The further course of the proof makes use of the fact that in expression (A.46)
each matrix product Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) is nonnegative (and is strictly nonnegative
4In the case of Λν this conclusion follows from the geometric-series representation of the
Leontiev inverse (A.38), whereas for e− ν it is implied from the fact that νi < 1 for all i.
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if Γk is distinct from zero), as shown below
Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) ≡ ΛνΓk (E− dg(ν)1N(k)) dg(ν)1N(k) =
= ΛνΓk · (1− νk)1N(k)
(A.47)
where the second line in (A.47) follows from the direct post-multiplication of E−
dg(ν)1N(k) by dg(ν)1N(k). Naturally, Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) is nonnegative, as so is
each of its constituent terms in its representation in the second line of (A.47).
Plugging expression (A.46) into the equation for the growth rate (3.39)
yields
g = βTgq + β
T
N∑
k=1
1
1− νk Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) gq
g = βTgq +
N∑
k=1
δk/φk
1− νk
(
1
δk/φk
βT Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) gq
)
In light of the nonnegativity of Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) as discussed above, each scalar
multiplier 1
δk/φk
βT Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) gq is also nonnegative, which enables one to
evaluate g from above by substituting maxk=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1−νk
}
for δk/φk
1−νk in the above
expression
g 6 βTgq +
N∑
k=1
max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}(
1
δk/φk
βT Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) gq
)
In conjunction with the first property proven in Lemma A.2.6.1, the last expres-
sion leads to the result as follows
g 6 βTgq + max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}
βT
(
N∑
k=1
1
δk/φk
Γ˜k dg(ν)1N(k) gq
)
g 6 βTgq + max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}
βT
(
N∑
k=1
1
δk/φk
Γ˜kν (δk/φk)
)
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g 6 βTgq + max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}
βT
(
N∑
k=1
Γ˜k
)
ν = βTgq + max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}
βTEν
g 6 βTgq + max
k=1÷N
{
δk/φk
1− νk
}
βTν ≡ βTgq + dmax · βTν (A.48)
where the rightmost expression in (A.48) follows from the definition of the con-
centration potential di ≡ δi/φi1−νi .5
As the final step of the proof, one can derive the growth rate of an economy
with the interlinkage focused on the sector i1 with the maximal concentration
potential, which equals
g˚ = βT (E− dg(ν)1N(i1))−1 gq = βT
(
E +
1
1− νi1
dg(ν)1N(i1)
)
gq
g˚ = βTgq + dmax · βTν (A.49)
A direct comparison of (A.48) and (A.49) suggests that any structure of an eco-
nomy’s interlinkage delivers the growth rate not exceeding g˚ (and the inequality is
strict when at least one sector has the concentration potential smaller than dmax),
thus establishing the desired result. 
5Note that the derivation of equation (A.48) uses implicitly the fact that δk/φk1−νk > 0 ∀k, as
follows from the properties of δk and φk. The argument however can be generalised immediately
for the situation when at least one δk/φk1−νk > 0 (i.e., the maximal concentration potential dmax
is positive).
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A.3 Countries and Industries in Chapter 3’s Data-
set
Table A.1: List of countries in Chapter 3’s dataset.
Code Name
ARG Argentina
AUS Australia
AUT Austria
BEL Belgium
BGR Bulgaria
BRA Brazil
BRN Brunei Darussalam
CAN Canada
CHE Switzerland
CHL Chile
CHN China
COL Colombia
CRI Costa Rica
CYP Cyprus
CZE Czech Republic
DEU Germany
DNK Denmark
ESP Spain
EST Estonia
FIN Finland
FRA France
GBR United Kingdom
GRC Greece
HKG China, Hong Kong SAR
HRV Croatia
HUN Hungary
IDN Indonesia
IND India
IRL Ireland
ISL Iceland
ISR Israel
ITA Italy
Code Name
JPN Japan
KHM Cambodia
KOR Republic of Korea
LTU Lithuania
LUX Luxembourg
LVA Latvia
MAR Morocco
MEX Mexico
MLT Malta
MYS Malaysia
NLD Netherlands
NOR Norway
NZL New Zealand
PER Peru
PHL Philippines
POL Poland
PRT Portugal
ROU Romania
RUS Russian Federation
SAU Saudi Arabia
SGP Singapore
SVK Slovakia
SVN Slovenia
SWE Sweden
THA Thailand
TUN Tunisia
TUR Turkey
TWN Taiwan
USA United States
VNM Viet Nam
ZAF South Africa
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Table A.2: List of sectors in Chapter 3’s dataset.
Code Name
C01T05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
C10T14 Mining and quarrying
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
C20 Wood and products of wood and cork
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
C24 Chemicals and chemical products
C25 Rubber and plastics products
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products
C27 Basic metals
C28 Fabricated metal products
C29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
C30T33X Computer, electronic and optical equipment
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C35 Other transport equipment
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c., recycling
C40T41 Electricity, gas and water supply
C45 Construction
C50T52 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs
C55 Hotels and restaurants
C60T63 Transport and storage
C64 Post and telecommunications
C65T67 Financial intermediation
C70 Real estate activities
C71 Renting of machinery and equipment
C72 Computer and related activities
C73T74 R&D and other business activities
C75 Public administration and defence, compulsory social security
C80 Education
C85 Health and social work
C90T93 Other community, social and personal services
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A.4 Quantification of β, µ, ν
This Appendix presents a brief summary of estimating parameters from
Chapter 3’s framework β, µ and ν. The histograms of the parameters’ pooled
distributions (across all countries, years and industries) are presented below in
Figures A.1, A.2, A.3.
Examining the histogram of sectors’ relative sizes βis suggests that those
follow a power law-type distribution Pr(Size > s) ∝ s−ζ . Our estimates of the
tail index ζ suggest the value of ζ ≈ −2.242,6 for which the hypothesis of heavy
tails ζ = 2 cannot be rejected on any standard significance level – in line with
the consensus in existing literature.7
As mentioned above, the pooled mean and median of sectoral mark-ups’
distribution (1.131 and 1.100, respectively) are in line with existing estimates
from the specialised literature. The mean and median shares of intermediates
are 0.617 and 0.649 – above the conventional benchmark of 0.5, which we can
attribute to two factors: firstly, our estimates take into account that the true
values of νis are distorted away from the corresponding shares in sales by imperfect
competition (see equation (3.23));8 secondly, the aforementioned benchmark value
is derived for the US economy, characterised by relatively low values of νi (its
average share of intermediates occupies the 15th place from the bottom out of 63,
see also the discussion in (Jones, 2011, SectionV)). The final remark on the two
distributions in hand concerns the noticeable spikes at 1 for both νis and µis.
The former is created by the natural restriction that νi < 1, while the latter
occurs owing to the fact that some mark-ups are estimated from below using
6The estimate was derived using the standard ln-ln regression with the correction due to
Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011): ln(Pr(Size > s)) = const − ζ ln(i− 12), where i is the index of
the histogram’s bar.
7See Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011).
8For a comparison’s sake, Figure A.3b presents the histogram of pooled distribution of νis
implied by the competitive markets (i.e., RIs from the empirical exercise in Section 3.2), with
the mean of 0.550 and the median of 0.580.
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Figure A.1: The distribution of estimated βis (pooled).
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Figure A.2: The distribution of estimated mark-ups µis (pooled).
the data on GFCF. One should note that both represent the minority of all
observations (approximately 9.3% and 3% for µis and νis respectively), and when
averaged across years, the two spikes disappear – i.e., hitting the bounds by µis’
and νis’ estimates is not systematic.
Moving to the sectoral level, Figures A.6, A.7, A.8 present the scatter
plots of country averages of, respectively, βis, µis and νis for industries in dataset.
On average, the smallest share of consumption expenditures is allocated to basic
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Figure A.3: The distribution of estimated νis (pooled).
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Figure A.4: The distribution of estimated mark-ups µis (averages across years).
metals (C27), while the largest – to sector C50C52: wholesale and retail trade and
repairs, followed by housing (C45, construction sector), which is also characterised
by the lowest average level of mark-ups. The highest mark-ups are a feature of
sector C26: ‘Other non-metallic mineral products’. Finally, with regards to νi,
education and production of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
are the sectors least and most reliant on the use of intermediates, respectively.
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Figure A.5: The distribution of estimated νis (averages across years).
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Figure A.6: Country averages of estimated βis by sector (orange) and
pooled averages by industry (blue).
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Figure A.7: Country averages of estimated µis by sector (orange) and
pooled averages by industry (blue).
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Figure A.8: Country averages of estimated νis by sector (orange) and
pooled averages by industry (blue).
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